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ABSTRACT
The Psychological Sense of Community
and the Small College Campus:
A Community Psychology Perspective
on the Role of
the Dean of Students
(May 1981)
Joseph Ivan Mandell, B.A., Windham College
M.A., New York University
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor John W. Wideman
Sense of community is a term, common in our
language, used with instinctive certainty as to its mean-
ing and sources by professional and layman alike.
Sarason added the word "psychological," and with that
refinement the expression was elevated to the level of a
construct which holds implications for the practice of
community psychology: the psychological sense of community
(PSC). Sarason posed a clear challenge for that profession
when he asserted that a field which purported to be con-
cerned with community had to be based on the development
and the maintenance of PSC. The dean of students of a
small campus is the person typically charged with looking
after the "quality of life" in that setting; in so doing
the dean often finds himself involved in a variety of tasks
vi
that are observed to parallel those of a community psy-
chologist. Underlying this report is the proposition that
community psychology provides a pragmatic framework and
valid model for student affairs administration.
The major portion of the study is devoted to an
analysis of literature representing a broad spectrum of
disciplines and a wide variety of phenomena and issues
that relate to the human community. It attempts to show
the interrelatedness of these findings in terms of what
makes, sustains, enhances or destroys community and how
this knowledge relates to the concept of PSC.
The study explores the meaning of sense of commun-
ity, first through an examination of the idea of community
itself, then through a review of basic notions regarding
factors which induce people to cohere in groups, and the
mechanisms that promote bonding, cohesiveness and group
spirit. The means by which intentional communities (e.g.
,
communes) build into their systems a sense of community
and commitment are examined. Also explored is the concept
of territory as an analogue to community, particularly as
it relates to the biological correlates of the communal
response to crisis. The communal response is also viewed
through Buber's socio-theological perspective, principally
through his concepts of I-Thouness and The Centre.
Sarason's concept of PSC is studied through a
review of his
vii
principal works. Also reviewed is a study designed to
develop PSC into a measurable construct. The community
psychological perspective is studied along with the lit-
erature pertaining to the college as community and how the
role of the dean of students relates to such a perspective.
The final chapter raises some questions for future study
and examines the implications of the findings through
illustrations taken from the writer's experiences as a
dean at a small, private college, and in terms of the
conception of the dean of students as community psycholo-
gist . The study as a whole may be viewed as a documen-
tation and as an argument in support of this conception
with the emphasis placed on attitude (the PSC perspective)
rather than on technology.
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If* I 3-in not for myself who will be for me?
But if I am only for myself, what am I?
Hillel
All for one, one for all, that is our device.
Alexandre Dumas
The proper way of dying is from fatigue after
a lifetime of trying to mitigate agency
with communion.
David Bakan
The quest for community will not be denied,
for it springs from some of the most powerful
needs of human nature—needs for a clear
sense of cultural purpose, membership, status,
and continuity.
Robert Nisbet
A field which purported to be concerned with
community had to be concerned with and based
on the development and maintenance of the
psychological sense of community .
Seymour B. Sarason
A college is a corner of men’s hearts where hope
has not died. Here the prison house has not
closed; here no battle is yet quite lost. Here
we assert, endow, and defend as final reality the
best of our dream as men. Here lies our sense
of community.
Howard Lowry
The ultimate therapy is to translate our private
problems into corporate issues. . . . Therapy
involves identifying and building communities of
concern
.
Parker J. Palmer
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Prologue
In the winter of 1976 Windham College experienced
its first collapse, and with it collapsed the writer's job
as dean of students and his plans for a doctoral study
using that school's student population. The next two years
found him groping for a topic which he vaguely sensed was
already formed in the back of his mind, having to do with
his experience at the College, but not yet articulated.
The winter of 1978 delivered the answer. The writer
had been a resident of the city of Hartford for two years
and like many new city dwellers had felt like a stranger
among strangers. For one grand and evanescent moment, how-
ever, like a stage set in an otherwise dismal theatre, the
writer found himself in a scene in the middle of the city
in which he felt like a townsperson among townspeople. It
was the morning after Storm Larry, "the Blizzard of ’78,"
had dropped four feet of snow on the Northeast. All func-
tions of modern civilization seemed to have ceased: facto-
ries and institutions closed, transportation halted (except
for sleds and cross-country skis), street traffic limited
1
2to pedestrians. The city was in crisis
. Walking through
the open streets on a strikingly sunny and blue-sky morn-
ing, pacing with high boots on the clean white snow packed
perfectly for hiking by the all-night city plows, being
greeted time after time by a startling new brand of city-
folk who would pause from the exhilarating task of shovel-
ing mountains of snow from driveways and walks—for blocks
and blocks it seemed that everyone on earth was engaged in
this one enterprise--with a wave, a smile and the noticeable
absence of the ritual of turning one’s head or gaze to
avoid eye contact with a stranger, observing repeated in-
stances of people cooperating to dig each other out, pushing
cars, lending shovels, and playing, or just walking through
the white miles of the city—all this contributed to a sense
of being in community
. What allowed people to drop their
guardedness toward strangers and momentarily become people
who seemed to have been operating from an orientation' of
safety, security and cooperativeness, and a collective
sense of mutual concern, involvement and belongingness? And
why did the situation
•
just as suddenly revert to "business
as usual" after the crisis subsided? (This was a common
enough observation. The writer can recall other occasions
like it. For example, he remembers that once, when riding a
subway in New York City, a rush-hour train became stalled
in the middle of a tunnel. He recalls how the alien crowd
*
was forthwith transformed into a mini-community of con-
3cerned citizens conversing, eye-to-eye and face-to-face,
and how, when the train became unstuck, the riders went
back to sleep, back to their newspapers, or back to their
downcast, floorward postures.)
Why, in a crisis, did the writer experience a feel-
ing oi being a townsperson rather than a stranger? What
had produced that fleeting feeling which, upon further re-
flection, he had identilied as c ommunion or as a sense of
community ? And what did such a feeling have to do with the
.more subtle and protracted version of it, the kind of
"sense of community" which people who studied or worked at
Windham College had often said was lacking and growing more
and more scarce there? In no uncertain terms, the writer
had experienced a transient version of it, apparently brought
on by the reaction of persons experiencing a common crisis.
Our topic for this study was discovered!
The Problem
It was Sarason (197*0 who added the word "psycho-
logical" to the term sense of community; and with that re-
finement, what was once merely a household expression, was
now a respectable theoretical construct available for con-
sideration by practicing community psychologists: the
psychological sense of community . Sarason posed a clear
. challenge to the community psychology profession when he
asserted "that a field which purported to be concerned with
community had to be concerned with and based on the develop -
ment and maintenance of the psychological sense of community"
(1974, p. viii
,
emphasis ours). The psychological sense of
community, he believes, should be "the value which informs
action," an orientation which dictates that any change in
policy, plan, structure, or for that matter "... any
change in any significant aspect of a community
. . . be
scrutinized from the standpoint of what its possible ef-
fects would be on the psychological sense of community"
(1974, p. 152). The psychological sense of community is de-
fined by Sarason to mean
. . . the sense that one [is] part of a readily avail-
able, mutually supportive network of relationships
upon which one could depend and as a result of which
one [did] not experience sustained feelings of lone-
liness that impell one to actions or to adopting a
style of living masking anxiety and setting the stage
for later and more destructive anguish (197^, P* 1).
Sense of community is a term, common in our language,
used with instinctive certainty as to its meaning and as
to its sources by professionals and laymen alike. And yet
this meaningful but elusive expression had never gained the
status of a theoretical construct, or of an operationally
understood, manipulatable variable.
The term somehow elicits "remembrances of things
past": family circle outings; summer camp; the club house;
the block. parties and air-raid drills and the victory cele-
brations of World War ,11; more recently, the feeling that
permeated our neighborhood on that Sunday afternoon when our_
5hockey team won the Olympic competition; the transient
"highs" of weekend retreats and marathon encounters; and
those "crisis" situations: being a passenger on a train
broken down in the middle of a subway tunnel, a city-
dweller in the midst of a paralyzing snow blizzard; or a
volunteer fireman helping to put out a blaze in a neigh-
bor’s barn; and, of course, those massive exhilarating
rituals : the civil rights and anti-war marches of the
sixties. Earth Day, 1970 in New York City; the pre—dawn
May Pole event on the college campus—any one of us can go
on and on with a list of such "peak" experiences that are
communal in nature.
This is not to say that what we mean by the exper-
ience of a sense of community is necessarily felt with such
intensity. In fact our conception of it is the more common
experience of it which would be more accurately described
as a placid and subtle psychological undercurrent that would
be brought to cognition only upon deliberation. We would
make a similar distinction between, let us say, a state of
joy and a state of happiness, or between an exuberant vi-
tality and a state of good health, or between the experi-
ence of an initial romantic encounter and the condition of
a stable relationship. Indeed, it is the "stable setting"
of a family relationship, the "sense of family," from which
we no doubt derive the ideal mental picture of community.
(Sarason draws our attention to this analogy when he men-
6tions the Waltons TV series in his Interview with the wri-
ter [Sarason, I98O; see the Appendix].) After reading our
report the reader will see that the picture of the "com-
munity feeling" which we extract from the literature, will
very little from an unsophisticated sense of that
picture derived from our familial and communal experiences.
Let us look at a partial list of what might be called the
elements of community feeling:
Sense of belongingness
Sense of safety
Sense of caring and protection
Sense of pride
Sense of trust
Sense of an agreed upon set of goals, values, purposes
Sense of accessibility to helpful resources
Sense of recognition (mutual)
Sense that "I need not be alone"
Sense of being effective or useful or having an impact
Sense of exclusivity
Sense of group identity
Sense of common ritual
Sense that my presence or absence would be noticed, etc.
Calling these "elements" is not to suggest that each cate-
gory is pure and irreducible, or that all must be present
at any one time and place in order to result in a psychologi-
cal sense of community. Presenting this list at this junc-
ture is to give the reader a clearer idea of what the writer
had in mind when he began this inquiry.
We should state what we do not mean by the term
sense of community. We are not referring to the state of
interpersonal intimacy we call "love"— or even "friendship"
—where commitment resides in a rather explicit manner. If
7there is any commitment in our conception of the psychologi-
cal sense of comminity, it is conceived of as a general-
ized attraction to the collective setting rather than an
interpersonal commitment like love. However, commitment,
itself, is a significant and complex variable, as we shall
see in our review of Ranter’s studies of the enduring 19th
century communes (1970, 1972, 1973) presented in Chapter IV.
As was mentioned earlier, the writer recalls that
the term was often used in the context of his experience
as a dean of students at a small liberal arts residential
college. Its usage most often arose when members of that
college community were attempting to explain some of the
perennial problems of the institution; it was invariably
used in the negative. (We shall, in the final chapter, be
discussing this setting in more detail.) Somehow the
speakers of that term, and the spoken to, had a grasp of
its meaning, although none of us was ever called upon to
articulate its meaning. As Sarason (197*0 observed, in his
book on the subject:
. . . The concept of the psychological sense of
community is like that of hunger: neither is easy to
define, but there is no mistaking it when an individ-
ual experiences the lack of a psychological sense of
community, just as there is no mistaking what we
think an individual experiences as a result of star-
vation (1974
, p . 3) .
Is there some body of knowledge that would treat a
theory of bondedness caused by common crisis? Or more
broadly, is there somewhere in the literature inside or
8outside of psychology some treatment of the sense of com-
—
nlty as a theoretical construct? Is there something we
can learn about the concept of community
. itself, that
might have useful implications for those of us who are
given the responsibility of looking after human environ-
ments, particularly in the college setting?
The major portion of this study is devoted to an
analysis of literature representing a broad spectrum of
disciplines and a wide variety of phenomena and issues that
relate to the human community. We attempt to show the
interrelatedness of these findings and to bring together
what is known about community—what makes, sustains, en-
hances, promotes, destroys it—and relate that knowledge
to the sense of community
,
both as a concept and as a human
condition. We will view this knowledge through the lens of
a community within an institution. The institution that we
are concerned with is the small residential liberal arts
college; the community that we are concerned with is the
collectivity of the persons who work, study and/or live
there. In the final summing up, the writer’s experience as
a worker at Windham College (a now defunct institution at
which he served as dean of students) will be brought into
the discussion in order to provide a frame within which to
weave a synthesis of findings and experience, and to illus-
trate our concerns. To paraphrase Sarason, this report is
not in the how-to-do-it tradition; it is an attempt to bring
9order to the writer’s own efforts to understand his own
experiences in facing the problem of community in a col-
lege setting.
Our search of the literature will begin with an
examination of the various conceptualizations and defini-
tions of community. Being a major concept in the field of
sociology, there is no shortage of such discussions. One
sociologist (Hillery, Jr., 1955) reviewed no less than
ninety— four definitions of community! The shortage, in-
deed, occurs in the traditional training literature of
counseling and clinical psychology. Most of us who are
trained in these disciplines missed our chance to have any
formal exposure to the concept of community if we had not
taken an undergraduate course in sociology. Some of us
will have had to await our eleventh hour doctoral excur-
sions into fields unknown to discover, for example, the
significant concepts of Gemelnschaft und Gesellschaft
(Tonnies, 1957).
The literature is examined with an eye to discover-
ing clues as to how to move from the instinctively under-
stood idea of a sense of community to a manageable construct
that has pragmatic implications in the field of human af-
fairs, or more narrowly, student affairs. We look at the
mass society concepts about community per se which abound
in the literature of sociology in light of their applica-
tion to the problems that a dean as overseer of "the qual-
10
ity of life" must face within the microsociety of the
college -campus : the college as community
.
Since we intend to relate the broad concept of com-
munity to the narrower issue of campus life, a question
might arise as to whether, in fact, the campus is a com-
munity. Some would argue that it is not. In one sense we
would agree; for the college is clearly an institution
,
a
formal organization . Formal organizations are structurally
and functionally centralized; and they tend to be "expli-
cit" in nature as against the "implicit" nature of commun-
ities (NTL, 1969 ). Further, institutions are defined as
. the standardized solutions to collective problems
which men apply in their group activities" (Martindale,
1964, p. 69). Thus the college is formally organized to
solve the collective problem of higher education. However,
within the organization is a collectivity of people— fac-
ulty, staff and students—in a given territory—the campus.
It is this collectivity that we are calling a community; it
is the people who "implicitly" form the community that we
are addressing in our concern with the psychological sense
of community.
This, however, does not completely settle the theo-
retical problem, for some would argue further that the
community is a "system of systems, and include^ organiza-
tions within it" (NTL, 1969). Again we would agree,
but
this statement would be acceptable in the converse
as well,
11
which becomes clear when we see that the same source states
that "we may characterize [community] as a group of people
who have a sense of common identification through their
development and/or joint use of some institutions and a
physical environment." That the word institution is used
in the plural does not take away from our argument. Not
only is the college an institution but so are its component
parts— classes, classrooms, faculties, dormitories, faculty
and student senates—all "standardized solutions to col-
lective problems" explicitly designed to meet the goals of
the formal organization: the college.
We find that for our purpose in understanding the
meaning of the psychological sense of community it is only
more confusing to follow in detail the sociological nice-
ties and the theoretical distinctions between one type of
social system and another. What does it matter, for exam-
ple, if a given setting turns out not to fit a theoretical
definition of community, if in that very setting a "psy-
chological sense of community" is in fact found to appear?
Thus we are told that a formal organization in contradis-
tinction to a community, has "sharp, recognizable goals"
(Hillery
,
Jr., 1968, p. 145) hut that an ideal community
is only "a consequence of cooperation in a given location."
Similarly, McWilliams distinguishes between a corporate
group and fraternity by suggesting that only the former is
a "collectivity of discrete beings" (McWilliams, 1973, P-
12
35). Again, this distinction does not necessarily rule
out the appearance of a psychological sense of community
or "fraternity" in a formal organization or in a corporate
group of discrete beings.
Klien ( 1965 , p. 307) addresses this issue by asking
"Is the campus an appropriate analogue for communities gen-
erally?" His answer is yes and no: yes, because of the
elements of physical size, population density, guiding val-
ues, distribution of authority and power, patterns of com-
munications, and so forth; no, because of limitation of
residency, i.e., most retain other home addresses and a
short-lived, "predetermined period of community membership,"
and so forth. (Notice the semantic problem that arises
when Klien employs the word "community" even when arguing
that there is no community.) In any event, for purposes
of this study, there is no intellectually compelling need
to be concerned with whether or not there is a good fit
with classic definitions of community. It may require a
new word, but there is no doubt that we are dealing with
something more than "institution," "organization," group
or simply "collection of teachers, scholars and administra-
tors." We explore this issue in Chapter X, "The College
as Community."
13
Significance and Delimitations of the Study
This study proposes to develop for the student
affairs dean and other college managers a new perspective
from which they may view their traditional repertoire of
counseling skills, student development designs, and manage-
ment options. The "community perspective" of the study may
appear to the reader to be a sentimental yearning for a
very vague and imprecise state of affairs, and may seem
suspect and singularly unattractive to hard-core management
personnel whose boards of trustees have been demanding five-
year plans with "substance." Sarason recognizes this when
he writes:
The concept "psychological sense of community" is not
a familiar one in psychology, however old it may be
in man’s history. It does not sound precise, it
obviously reflects a value judgment, and does not
sound compatible with "hard" science. It is a phrase
which is associated in the minds of many psychologists
with a kind of maudlin togetherness, a tear-soaked
emotional drippiness that misguided do-gooders seek
to experience (197^> p. 156).
The study develops an argument that attempts to extinguish
these attitudinal obstacles. We will argue that the psy-
chological sense of community is not only a valid construct
that has implications for reducing stress and alienation,
but that it also has cost-effective consequences that have
implications for reducing "stress" on the physical plant,
reducing attrition, and reducing alumni apathy and other
eroders of a college’s fiscal health.
The report reviews and brings together material and
conceptual discussions from a variety of writers not usu-
ally encountered by the student psychology or higher edu-
Catl °n
* denying the study is the proposition that-
community psychology provides a pragmatic framework and
v
_
alid model for student affairs administration, with the
focus on the psychological sense of community as the guid-
ing beacon. While this is not offered as an alternative
to the student development model, there is a shift of em-
phasis from "personal growth" to the community of persons,
albeit ultimately in the service of the individual in that
community
.
The study does not report in depth on other values
that are of equal and perhaps complementary importance to
the success of the campus experience (for example, the sense
of self, the sense of privacy, the concept of freedom and
individuality), although these are brought into the final
discussion. It would be well to caution the reader that
this study does not portray the psychological sense of
community as the ultimate panacea in the survival of small
private colleges. Nor does it put forth the argument that
the decline and fall of Windham College could have been pre-
vented if only that institution’s sense of community were
totally intact. We will argue that the degree of presence
of a sense of community, while often recognized as a vaguely
valued condition, deserves closer study as one of the "vital
signs" of the "healthy" college campus. How necessary and
15
how sufficient are Questions that remain to be investi-
gated through experimentally designed studies.
It was not our intention to conduct an exhaustive
search into the literature of community and to deliver a
definitive report from the archives of sociology; that task
is better left to the sociologist. For the philosopher
and those of more literary bent we have left the task of
sorting out the literary and classical statements about
community such as certainly appear in Plato's The Republic
,
the Bible and other ancient commentaries.
Neither have we examined to any great length the
literature on organizational development and organizational
behavior, the laboratory method, encounter and other "human
potential" group modalities. The writer believes that the
successes of these disciplines have been confined for the
most part to packaged productions that produce feelings of
cohesiveness, trust, increased productiveness, and even deep
and enduring changes in attitude, lifestyle and personal-
ity. He believes that at best these modalities meet the
needs of the narcissistic, Ge sell sc haft like component of
human growth, with the group feeling coming up quickly and
then fading like a transient high. Paradoxically, it seems
that group "treatment" is the best means of treating the
individual—not the group. While there have certainly been
successful programs that have employed organizational de-
velopment techniques in industrial and school settings.
16
perhaps resulting in smoother orientation, reduced absen-
teeism, higher production, and so forth, we believe that
m the long run the community loses the benefits. Why?
Perhaps because the glue is the quick-acting variety that
cracks and dries when the atmosphere is too hot, too humid,
or too stressful. What appears to be missing is some sort
of moral coherence, that cement that would create the per-
manent bond, the communitas
,
the Gemeinschaft
, the enduring
esprit de corps
. Whence comes our subject of study. In
any case, the reader will find that these and similar modes
of intervention are treated briefly in Chapter IX in a dis-
cussion of the tools that are available in the area of
community consultation.
The Literature
The psychological, sociological and educational
literature of roughly the last decade is sampled with an
eye toward retrieving what has been said, both directly and
indirectly, about the psychological sense of community,
both as a concept and as a condition. The indirect approach
was necessary because very little of the literature on the
psychological sense of community, which according to Sara-
son is "vast," is accessible via an index entry. Its sta-
tus as a conceptually loose expression has not earned it
the rank of "descriptor" in any of the computer banks. The
computer search through ERIC and other abstract services had
17
to ask for the word
"community-adjacent-to-the-word-
sense in addition, descriptors like alienation and lone -
liness
-conditions hypothesized to exist when the psycho-
logical sense of community is lacking—were used, as well
as concepts like group unity, organizational climate
,
affiliation need, group cohesion, college or academic en-
vironment, and college dean. (The yield of the information
banks was quite stingy. is this an indication that virgin
ground is being broken or that a field is being tapped where
there has been relatively little interest?)
We found little in the literature that would bring
a body of theory to, or directly illuminate the issue of
the sense of community on a college campus. The notable
exception was a collection of papers delivered at the 54th
Annual Conference of the National Association of Student
Personnel Administrators, entitled "The Communitization
Process in Academe," a review of which is presented in
Chapter X. However, we found that, unlike the famous "Bos-
ton Conference" which gave birth to the field of community
psychology, the "Denver Conference," judging by the litera-
ture in the decade that followed it, spawned little interest
amongst our colleagues in academe.
Only one reference was found that treated the psy-
chological sense of community squarely and directly as a
conceptual subject: a doctoral dissertation (Glynn, 1977)
on "Construct development and initial measurement of the
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psychological sense of community." Glynn's effort to
design and validate an instrument to measure the psycho-
logical sense of community is a brilliant contribution,
particularly as it lends itself to future studies of the
psychological sense of community in varied settings when an
experimental design is called for. Although his review of
the literature and other substantive discussions of the
psychological sense of community are lacking any novel in-
sights, Glynn provides valuable information derived from
the factoring out of key elements of the psychological
sense of community collected from the responses to his
questionnaires widely distributed among community psycholo-
gists. Because the purpose of his study was limited to
designing a measurement device, there was apparently no
need to explore the origins and maintenance issues of the
psychological sense of community.
To fill out the picture, we review some of the
commentators of the "lost community" school of thought who
have written on the problem of the erosion of the psycho-
logical sense of community in the world-at-large. For ex-
ample, Nisbet (1970), a major contributor to this field,
discusses sense of community on a macro-societal level,
with the emphasis on historical forces that have undermined
it and on universal human conditions.
Regarding a "crisis theory" that would explain the
have described earlier and about whichcommunal responses we
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we posed a question, we could find no direct discussion in
the literature. However, related material was found in
some of the behavioral scientific literature. Most fruit—
l*ul s ln this regard, was material from a very surprising
source: Ardrey's The Territorial Imperative (1966).
Ardrey’s work provided us with insights derived from the
study of evolution and animal behavior which opened our
conceptual view of the "communal response to crisis" to
an extent not anticipated. This discussion is carried on
in Chapter V.
Some Explanations
We approached this study with no little trepidation;
writing a scholarly paper on something as conceptually loose
and on as familiar and as common a "thing" as the "sense of
community" seemed a formidable task, especially when the
writer considered that he would have to journey through
unknown territory in the literature of disciplines other
than his own. In some ways our fears were confirmed; we
found very little of the "hard" data of the kind that typi-
cally lend substance to a thesis. The reader will find that
there is not much quantification in these pages and therefore
not much opportunity for firmly establishing relationships
between and among the variables that are discussed. There
is a preponderance of rhetoric that, because of the nature
of the findings, must substitute for the orderly reporting
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of empirical evidence and controlled experimentation. In
the end, however, the writer has learned vital things about
a field in which he purported to be a professional practi-
tioner and in which, until this undertaking, he believed he
was thoroughly schooled. The report attempts to keep at a
comfortable distance from either end of a continuum whose
one extreme is made up of the philosophical ponderings
about the nature of man (happily, though we did take one
excursion with Martin Buber) and the other made up of how
A effects B and how C is impacted by their interaction.
More importantly, we feel we have raised an issue that
needs raising in the fields of counseling, psychology, and
in particular, higher education.
We expect that some of our colleagues in higher
education will challenge the fact that we are focusing our
concern on a kind of setting which they may see as having
no future, that is, the small, private, non-competitive,
liberal arts college. Our response to this anticipated
challenge is twofold: firstly, we feel that such institu-
tions under strong and flexible management will continue to
serve a population of students that otherwise might not be
served by their more elite counterparts or the technical
institutions; secondly, the findings of this report have
implications for settings other than the small college. We
believe there is "something here for everybody." The or-
ganizational psychologist, Chris Argyris (1964), tells us
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that organizations derive their "energy," their "effec-
tiveness," their success, from the "psychological energy,"
and the "psychological success" of their workers. We be-
lieve that the role of the "community feeling" in helping
to achieve psychological success deserves careful study by
the managers of environments; there is something in this
study for them.
One final point of clarification is in order: in
thinking about the college as a community we do not conceive
of the problem as one of setting up living situations that
would serve in the long pull—as utopian communities like
communes are meant to do. In Chapter IV, in which we
discuss the intentional community, we offer this quote:
. . . And I say that the difference between the college
and the so-called ideal communities ... is this: in
any community which you set up the idea is that people
shall live in that community, and the aim of that com-
munity is the achievement of happiness. Whereas the job
of a college i s to provide a place into which people
may come and get the kind of development which will
enable them to leave it (Duberman, 1972, pp. 132-133,
emphasis added).
If we think in terms of the students, then, the college as
community is a place which one passes through in the search
for one's own community (although, as we shall see in Chap-
ter X, some thinkers, like Buckminster Puller and Arthur
Chickering, view the traditional, permanent model of com-
munity as a thing of the past). On the other hand, when we
think of the college workers—the people who represent its
continuity of sorts—we believe that we come a bit closer to
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the traditional idea of community. Here, the family anal-
ogy works well: the "good" family raises its children to
leave after the nurturing and developmental function is
complete and then continues to be the family.
CHAPTER I I
COMMUNITY AND THE SENSE OP COMMUNITY
Definitions and Concepts
Some of the principal questions that we face in
this study are what is meant by the term "sense of commun-
ity, who experiences such a sense and where or how does
such a sense arise. We start with the premise that the
word community," contained in the expression "sense of
community" is used as an ideal and not as a reference to
a community. By analogy, one may speak of a "sense of fam-
ily" without there being a referent family. a group of
workers may experience a sense of family while at the same
time a group of relatives or blood brothers and sisters
may not have a sense of family. Might it not be reasonable
in an attempt to understand or explain the meaning of the
term "sense of family," to first understand the meaning of
family as a concept even though we have agreed that the two
concepts are independent? The problem for this study is
that the concept of community, while as common as the con-
cept of family, is far more difficult to define. Although
this paper does not have as its intent a thorough sociologi
cal exploration of community per se, it is thought that to
arrive at an understanding of the term sense of community
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then we should at least have to understand the term commun-
ity in its ideal form.
Tentatively, we may begin with a literal, word by
word approach in which a definition of a sense of something
would simply require that we first define sense and then
define the "something." We say this approach is tentative
because, intuitively, we suspect that the meaning of a
grouping of words (concepts) may be greater than the sum of
its parts, particularly when combining a subjective concept
like "sense" with an objective "something." Thus, for ex-
ample, a sense of country cannot be understood merely by
knowing the geo-political concept of "country," even if we
know that the dictionary definition of "sense" is "a defi-
nite but often vague awareness or impression; a motivating
awareness" (Webster’s, 1976).
Of course, Seymour Sarason (1974), by the use of
his term "the psychological sense of community," compounds
our problem. Although Sarason (1980) modestly confesses
that the addition of the word "psychological" may be a re-
dundancy that was used primarily to attract the attention
of the "audience of psychologists" to the issue of sense of
community, the addition may, in fact, be a refinement of
the concept. The concept "psychological," defined by Web-
ster’s (1976) as " . . . affecting or intended to affect the
mind," when added to the concept "sense of," seems to com-
plete the picture by bringing us from a state of "vague
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awareness or impression" to a state of affect or conscious-
ness; that is, when we have a sense of something, that
means that we are aware that this something exists for us,
but when that awareness impinges on our consciousness so
that we are emotionally impacted then we can speak of a
psychological sense of something.
The "something" in this case is, of course, commun-
ity, which our dictionary defines as:
1. a unified body of individuals; lb. the people with
common interest living in a particular area;
. . .Id.
a group of people with a common characteristic or in-
terest living together within a larger society (Web-
ster * s , 1976 ) .
In an article that is now considered classic among
sosociologist s , George Hillery, Jr. (1955) analyzed all of
the definitions of community that could be found in the
literature, ninety-four in number. The extent of agreement
among the various conceptions then in use was what he set
out to ascertain. Hillery identified sixteen concepts that
were employed in the ninety-four definitions, but the only
concept common to all was that people are involved in com-
munity! The next most common element was "social interac-
tion" followed by "an area of common ties" (1955, P- 119).
Summing up his findings Hillery wrote:
Most students . . . are in basic agreement that
community consists of persons in social interaction
within a geographic area and having one or more addi-
tional common ties (1955, P* HI).
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In spite of the disagreements which Hillery found in
his search for a consensus of definition, the uncommon ele-
ments undoubtedly had meaning for those writers who employed
them in their conceptualizations; certainly they are of
equal importance to us in our search for an understanding
—
ense of community
. Taking the combination of social in-
teraction and geographic area as a given, what remain are
the categories of common ties that are found among the vari-
ous definitions, each source arguing in favor of one of
these categories as the "crucial factor" or "essential ele-
ment" of community. Listed below are the "essential ele-
ments" which Hillery derived from his ninety-four sources:
Self-sufficiency
.
Common life, or unity in belief and/or work.
Consciousness of kind, i.e., of a certain homogeneity.
Common ends, means or goals.
Collections of institutions.
Locality group, i.e., heavy emphasis on localism.
Individuality, or uniqueness.
At the same time Hillery found some writers who ex-
cluded geographic area as a necessary condition for commun-
ity. With the stress on social interaction they included
most of the above elements, emphasizing "the totality of
feelings and attitudes" (1955, p. 116) rather than some-
thing held in common. However, every definition of rural
community contained all three notions of a common tie, geo-
graphic area and social interaction.
In a later work, Hillery (1968), dealing with an
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analysis of communal organization, begins his discussion
this way: (Note his new emphasis on "quality.”)
. . . as the word has come down to us, [community]
has three interpretations. First, community is used
as a quality, generally referring to people having
something in common, whether goods, rights, or char-
acter. The second meaning concerns a body of people,
or in modern sociological parlance, a social system;’
third, sometimes but not always associated with either
of the first two meanings, community pertains to people
with a common land or territory ( 1968 , p. 3).
Don Martindale offers definitions that take into
account the fullness of interaction over a period of time,
that is, a total way of life formulated around the idea of
a mutual set of problems:
A community is a set or system of groups suffi-
cient to solve all of the basic problems of ordinary
ways of life (1964, p. 69 )
and later he adds:
. . .
The essence of a community is to be found in
the capacity of the members of a collectivity to act
and communicate and to form a total system of social
life capable of bringing them through the ordinary
problems of a single year or of a single life (1964,
P. 70).
Martindale' s concept of community, therefore, considers the
element of geographic area to be secondary or even irrele-
vant as compared to an integrated system of social life.
"The fundamental terms of any system of interhuman life are
established not by environment or territory directly but by
one's capacity to communicate and to interact on a day-to-
day basis" (1964, p. 71).
Knop (1976), whose article on community as "process
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and form" will be reviewed below when we dlscuas the forma-
tlonal and maintenance aspects of community, approaches the
subject of community not as a backdrop of social activity
but as a
. . series of processes which yield or trans-
form localized
. , . social organization" (1976, p. 103).
Knop continues:
• • • The interpretation of the concept "commun-ity varies
. .
.
,
but there is considerable agree-
ment in contemporary sociology that it involves estab-lishment of interrelated patterns for solving a range
of like, common, or reciprocal problems of people liv-ing near one another and/or identifying with one an-
other. The phrase "involves the establishment of"
implies both the act of establishing as well as the
honoring of established interlaced instrumental behav-
iors. A degree of mutual identification and interac-
tional frequency resulting in "community spirit" or
esprit de corps is further implied by most specifica-
tions of the term (1976, p. 104).
Minar and Greer provide a well-rounded discussion
of community by bringing in both the "ecological" connota-
tion and the connotation that begins to approach that quality
that we are calling the psychological sense of community.
In the preface to their book (1969), The Concept of Commun-
ity
,
they introduce their subject this way:
Frequently we use "community" to refer to a physi-
cal concentration of Individuals In one place. This
is the ecological meaning and accordingly a community
is what ever happens to exist in a given territory--
rabbits and coyotes, businessmen and laborers. It
means no more than that. There is another connotation
of the word, however, which refers to the social organ-
ization among a concentration of individuals. And
this latter is the source of still another meaning.
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For community is both empirically descriptive of asocial structure and normatively toned. It refersboth to the unit of society as it is and to the aspects
of the unit that are valued if they exist, desired intheir absence. Community is indivisible from human
actions, purposes and values. ... it expresses our
vague yearnings for a commonality of desire, a commun-ion with those around us, an extension of the bonds ofkin and friend to all who share a common fate with us
(1969, p. ix).
In a more philosophical vein, Ralph Keyes, a social
commentator, brings us directly to our topic:
. . . When we try to be more specific about just
what "community" means, we usually think first of a
place, the place where we live. And yet when we con-
sider where we find a "sense of community," it is
rarely in fact where we live. We use the word inter-
changeably, but it really means two different things.
A sense of community is what we find among the people
who know us. With whom we feel safe. That seldom in-
cludes the neighbors ( 1975 , p. 9).
Before we turn our attention directly to the concept
psychological sense of community, it would be well to in-
vestigate one other aspect of the sociological theory of
community, that is, an explanation of how and why communi-
ties form and then decline.
Edward Knop (1976) has written an extensive and
elaborately detailed piece on community as a process. Al-
though the language of the article is thick with abstract
sociological terminology, Knop's presentation has the vir-
tue of being one of the few statements we have found that
attempts to talk about community per se rather than about
community as a backdrop or setting in which certain behav-
iors or conditions occur. Essentially, Knop is concerned
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with the elements that are Involved In community formation,
maintenance and destruction.
Like everything else in the universe, communities
do not exist in a vacuum; they are, in gestalt terms, fig-
ures embedded in a ground. The ground in which the commun-
ity is embedded, in Knop ’ s view, is a significant variable
in terms of how a community defines itself or in terms of
its eventual decline. Knop refers to this ground as the
contingent milieu
,
which is both the community’s natural
setting and its external social structure and environment.
He uses the term "linkage" to refer to any form of relation
that people in the community have with the contingent
milieu, for example shopping, external laws, etc.
Two broad "categories of concern" form the basis of
Knop ' s theory of community formation: private reasons and
public reasons. Private reasons involve issues of "socio-
emotional comfort" and "physical sustenance," while public
reasons involve issues of "social control," both "formal"
(e.g., judicial systems, police, etc.) and "informal power
mechanisms" (e.g., obligations involving money or favors,
status, etc.), as well as "informal esteem mechanisms,
which operate through preferences or expectations of signif-
icant others which call for voluntary compliance and are
primarily enforced by subtle responses, gratuities, gossip,
avoidance, or other such emotional rewards and costs"
(1976, p. 105).
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A third important notion is the concept of "clos-
ure" defined as "the activities and procedures employed in
a community to protect it against detrimental interference
by outsiders." This concept is similar to the principles
of "completeness" or "self-sufficiency" and is seen by Knop
to be an important variable in respect to what we are calling
the psychological sense of community. As Knop explains:
. . . the more the closure, the more the subjective
feelings of community in a mutual identification, in-
teractional intensity and esprit de corps sense, and
the more the linkages, the less the subjective sense
of local community (1976, p. 106 ).
It can be seen that Knop sees the notions of "clo-
sure" and "linkages" has having an inverse or reciprocal
relationship. Strict residence requirements, strict en-
forcement of legal sactions against "outsiders" and a
"general pattern of ’polite cold shoulders' shown strang-
ers" are examples of closure provided by the author.
Knop offers a set of propositions containing "pre-
conditions for community formation." The first such pre-
condition is related to the idea of homogeneity, that is,
similarity of values, norms, aspirations, problem-solving
methods and methods of getting things done. "Consensus"
and "practical unanimity" in the decision-making process and
in the ordering of priorities of "pressing community con-
cerns" are the consequences of such community compatibil-
ity. Related to this precondition is the ability to "in-
teract in a mutually intelligible manner" in conjunction
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with the ability to "assemble for primary interaction."
His second precondition is borrowed from Martindale
(1964) whom we quoted in our earlier discussion of the
definition of community. It is the set of the three se-
quential processes postulated by Martindale as being essen-
tial for community formation: stabilization, consistency
and completeness.
The process of stabilization
,
relating to the solu-
tions of "collective problems of social life," refers to
the categories of pr ivat
e
and public concerns discussed
above involving the issues of comfort, sustenance and social
control. Consistency refers to standardized problem-solving
procedures (i.e., institutions) organized so as not to be
in competition with one another, thereby integrating the
functions of various institutions within the community.
The final process, completeness
,
relates to Martindale’
s
definition of community in which he emphasized the "total
system capable of bringing [people] through the ordinary
problems of a single year or of a single life."
The key variables that operate in the stabilization-
consistency-closure processes are outlined by Knop. The
list, not subject to distillation because it is so densely
abstract, is quoted in full:
(1) individual definitions of the collective situ-
ation, both in terms of potentials for interaction and
the nature of the contingent milieu; (2) the extent
and nature of complementary role relations; (3) the
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frequency of interaction; (4) the extent of overlappinggroup memberships; ( 5 ) the nature of the power structure
.
both locally and externally; (6) thetypical in-clusiveness of interaction (or the range of generaltopics covered in normal primary and secondary inter-
with°p^hi h P- the extent of individual satisfactionth establis ed institutions and their consistencyincluding perceptions of the adequacy of local insti-
fences (1976!°“V?n)!
hWart dlSruptlve external In-
Following the above set of variables, Knop presents
a series of "chain propositions" designed to explain in
detail how the variables work in each of the three major
processes. For our purposes it would suffice to note that
the underlying principle that would incorporate all these
variables in community formation is the growth of the simi-
larity of perceptions leading to some optimal level of
stabilization, of consistency and of closure. Only when
closure is complete does the collectivity or neighborhood
become a community.
Regarding a theory of community maintenance and de-
cline, Knop offers two general hypotheses that seem to
parallel the reciprocal notions of community formation,
"linkages" and "closure," discussed at the onset:
Community maintenance is contingent on (A) the adequacy
of established local institutions to satisfy common
needs, and on (B) the adaptability of institutions to
meet the challenge of changes in the contingent milieu.
When local institutions are inadequate to satisfy
(A) common needs, and/or (B) the adaptability of insti-
tutions to changes in the contingent milieu is insuffi-
cient, decline or destruction of the local community
occurs (1976, p. 114).
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And finally, maintaining community is a function of
four basic provisions: the adequacy of "member replace-
ment and socialization"; satisfactory physical and socio-
emotional sustenance; the adequacy of internal and external
social control; and the retaining of "the local base of
problem-solving prerogatives" (1976, pp . 114-115). Knop
sees community decline as the result of the inhabitants
turning to the linkages in the contingent milieu for these
provisions thus diminishing the sense of "self-sufficiency"
—not only the sense, but the actuality. "Coterminous with
the sacrifice of completeness and closure is the sacrifice
of community." Here, of course, Knop is referring to com-
munity in the local sense, for it becomes evident that the
extension into the "external milieu" introduces the idea of
"the larger community." As the author observes "... per-
sons, in sacrificing their local community, are not depriv-
ing themselves of all semblance of community but are trading
it for membership in larger, more diffused communities"
(1976, p. 109).
"Lost Community"
Looking at the meaning of community we have discov-
ered that its definition blurs over into a feeling about
or a longing for community. Community as an ideal
or utopian concept is inseparable from the idea of
the psychological sense of community. It is impos—
35
sible to conceive of a world which contains human culture,
whether civilized or uncivilized, that does not also contain
human communities. To say that our society is bereft of
community is certainly not to insist that we have no com-
munities j to say that "alienated" contemporary man is on a
"quest for community" is certainly not to convey the idea
that he is without a community. The first assertion is an
hyperbole—a way of saying that we seem to be at a distance
from the ideal of community. Parallel to this assertion is
the second one, which is a way of saying not that we cannot
find a community, but that the community in which we can
find ourselves does not feel like a community—there is no
sense of community that pervades in the psychologies of the
mass of men.
If the reader senses a tone of rhetorical chest-
beating, he is quite correct. The "lost community" sentiment
that has just been expressed is a reflection of what is
known as the "mass society theorem"—the belief that with the
waning of the Middle Ages, with its set of fixed, monolithic
values, and later with the decline of an agricultural, small
village society with its traditional moral values and its
craftsman work-style, all leading up to the industrializa-
tion, urbanization, bureaucratization, depersonalization and
secularization of society, modern man has become a victim of
"mass society," implying anxiety, alienation and atomization,
etc. Mass society is described by Palmer ( 1977 ) as
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characterized not simply by size, but by thefact that individuals in it do not have organic rela-tions with one another, only a common membership in
a nation-state. In a mass society the person stands
alone against the state, without a network of communal
associations to protect personal meaning, to enlargepersonal power, or to teach the habits of democracy(Palmer, 1977, p. 14). y
A corollary feature of such a phenomenon is of course the
much reputed loss of a sense of community in society in
general, which in turn has often been seen as a chief cause
of social ills and commented on by a stream of social com-
mentators (e.g., Tonnies, 1957; Durkheim, 1964; Bakan, 1966
;
Fromm, 1941; and Nisbet, 1970).
To take an example of the "lost community" school
of thought, we shall turn to Robert Nisbet, a most eloquent
commentator on "things gone wrong." Nisbet ? s book. The
Quest for Community ( 1 9 7 0 ) builds its case on the erosion
of community around the notion of the loss of local author-
ity and the ascendancy of a central authority. We can be-
gin with his description of community formation which
appears in the preface:
Community is the product of people working together
on problems of autonomous and collective fulfillment of
internal objectives, and of the experience of living
under codes of authority which have been set in large
degree by the persons involved. . . . There is no com-
munity [when] there are no common problems, where the
effective control of functions and authority is inves-
ted elsewhere ( 1970 , p. xv).
Nisbet concludes that the problem of community in
present-day society stems from
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. . . the decline in functional and psychological
significance of such groups as the family, the smalllocal community, and the various other traditional re-lationships that have immemorially mediated between theindividual and society.
. . . These have become func-~
tionally irrelevant to our State and economy and mean-ingless to moral aspirations of individuals. ... We
are forced to the conclusion that a great deal of ' the
peculiar character of contemporary social action comes
from the efforts of men to find in large-scale organi-
zations the value of status and security which were
formerly gained in the primary associations of family
neighborhood and church (1970, pp . 49-50).
Although sounding very much like a conservative,
Nisbet would not have society return to a medieval state to
find solidarity and community. As he explains:
. . . The real problem is not, then, the loss of the
old contexts but rather the failure of our present
democratic and industrial scene to create new contexts
of association and moral cohesion within which the
smaller allegiances of men will assume both functional
and psychological significance (1970, p. 73).
And finally, Nisbet touches on the theme of alien-
ation :
Much of the contemporary sense of impersonality of
society comes from the rational impersonality of . . .
great organizations. ... In spatial terms the indi-
vidual is obviously less isolated from his fellows in
the large-scale housing-project or in the factory than
was his grandfather. What he has become isolated from
is the sense of meaningful proximity to the major ends
and purposes of his culture. . . . The quest for com-
munity will not be denied, for it springs from some of
the powerful needs of human nature—needs for a clear
sense of cultural purpose, membership, status, and con-
tinuity (1970, pp. 72-73).
The alienation theme is echoed by educator Douglas
Heath (1974) writing in the context of school settings. He
describes the students in his studies as " . . . deeply bored,
gloomy and despairing, resentful, purposeless, uncommitted
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privativistic . " Heath believes that "youth are undergoing
characterological changes which are alienating them from
their emotional needs, from each other, and from traditional
communal sources of values." And like Nisbet, Heath con-
cludes that these changes "... are caused by an historic
and irreversible transition in the power of different
social institutions to have educative and maturing effects
on the young." He is referring, of course, to the "insti-
tutions" which are our primary groups— family, neighborhood,
church—all familiar examples.
It seems fitting to end our brief discussion of the
concerns about the loss of the sense of community in society
as a whole by taking note of an observation by Willis Harman,
a social policy researcher at Stanford University. In a
treatise (1977, pp. 107-108) on "the possibility of a major
social transformation," Harman produces a laundry list of
what he considers to be the "lead indicators" of historical
cultural change. First on his list of lead indicators is
"Decreased sense of community"! The complete list, in fact,
is very telling in light of this discussion and worth pre-
senting :
Decreased sense of community
Increased sense of alienation
Increased frequency of personal disorder and mental
illness
Tnr'r’pa^pd rate of violent crime
Increased frequency and severity of social
disruption
Increased use of police to control bf^vior
Increased public acceptance of hedonistic behavio
(particularly sexual, of symbols of degradation,
and of lax public morality)
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In some cases, economic inflation
Summary and Discussion
Having reviewed some definitions and sociological
conceptualizations of community we may now list the prin-
cipal elements:
People with common interests living in common area
(Webster ' s
)
Social interaction; common ties; same geographic area;
self-sufficiency; unity in belief; consciousness of
kind; common goals; common institutions; localism;
uniqueness (Hillery, Jr.)
A system of groups sufficient to solve all of the basic
ordinary problems of a single year; capacity to inter-
act on a day-to-day basis (Martindale)
Mutual identification, honoring established interlaced
instrumental behaviors; interactional frequency; com-
munity formation depending on the needs for socio-
emotional comfort, physical sustenance, and formal and
informal linkages with a contingent milieu, accompanied
by the meeting of the above-mentioned needs and condi-
tions leading to a subjective sense of community, which,
along with the preconditions of homogeneity, stabili-
zation-consistency-completeness, help form community.
Necessary for maintenance: member replacement and
socialization, and the continuing adequacy of the for-
mational elements. Decline seen as breakdown of self-
sufficiency (closure) and the turning to linkages in
the contingent milieu (Knop)
We have examined some statements of the "lost com-
munity" school of thought, particularly Nisbet, who stressed
the importance of primary relationships which "mediate be-
tween the individual and society." To rebuild a sense of
community a society would have to "create new contexts of
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association and moral cohesion" under an authority that
would emanate from a local level as against power emanating
from the State. These new contexts hopefully would produce
a "clear sense of cultural purpose, membership status, and
continuity .
"
This chapter began with the announced intention of
getting right to the problem of the definition of the psy-
chological sense of community. To some extent we have been
diverted from our task by being drawn to writers who did
not (except by implication) tell us what the psychological
sense of community i_s but only that it has been in very short
supply in the larger society and that its absence seems to
produce a worse state of affairs than would its presence.
Some explanations were offered regarding its absence, and
for the most part we as readers were left to infer what it
is we have to do to build up the supply, again, in the lar-
ger society. That this has not altogether been a fruitless
digression may be seen if we pause here to gain some per-
spective as to where we have been and where we wish to go
in this report.
Simply put, we are seeking to discover what is known
about the concept "the psychological sense of community"
(PSC) with the intention of considering ways to apply
that
knowledge in the context of a small college campus.
We shall
later be reviewing the only two writers we have
been able
to find who have attacked the issue of PSC
in a sigmfi-
and head-on manner. Seymour Sarason ( 1972
,
1974
, 1977 a,
1977 b, 1980), the major writer in this field, approaches
the problem from two principal perspectives: the primary
role that PSC plays in the identification of community psy-
chology as a discipline; and more importantly, the essen-
tial role that PSC plays in settings whose basic functions
are to help or treat or teach or train persons in need of
such. The second writer, Thomas Glynn (1977), following
Sarason’ s lead, wrote a dissertation on "Construct Devel-
opment and Initial Measurement of the Psychological Sense
of Community," the title of which is a sufficient enough
description for our present purposes. Neither of these
writers provides any direct discussion of the campus as a
community. (See, however, the transcript of our interview
with Sarason, January, 1980, which appears in the Appendix
to this report.) To arrive at the meaning of PSC, what we
have done so far is to examine some representative litera-
ture on the subject of community per se, that is, a special
kind of aggregate of persons as distinguished from other
collectivities. Having gone through that process, we found
that some conceptualizations of community spilled over from
the idea of a collectivity of persons to the idea of the
quality that such collectivities take on. For example, we
saw that Knop (1978) talked about a "mutual identification"
and "interactional frequency" which result in a "community
spirit"; and that Minar and Greer (1969) described community
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as an expression of
-yearnings for ... a communion with
those around us." (As we shall see, Glynn [1977], who
reports on only a handful of definitions of PSC, uses this
fragment of Minar's and Greer's definition of community
,
in spite of the fact that those authors were not offering
it as a definition of PSC. Of the remaining four defini-
tions given in Glynn's report of the literature, one [Cowan,
1975] is merely a restatement of Sarason's definition. The
point here is not to show the inadequacy of Glynn's review,
but to underscore the rarity of the direct treatment of PSC
in the literature. Most of Glynn's review of the litera-
ture, in fact, regarding PSC is a reporting of those writers
of the "lost community" school one of whom [Nisbet, 1970] we
have just reviewed.)
We may take some measure of comfort from the fact
that Sarason, himself, provides the rationale for community
psychologists to become acquainted with this mass-societal
literature. In the conclusion to his book (1974) Sarason
cautions us:
There is no formula for how to instill and maintain
the psychological sense of community. Indeed, the
thrust of this book has been that before we indulge our
tendency to develop formulas and techniques (to become
absorbed with technical-engineering issues) in our
endeavor to effect change, we need to understand better
how the nature of our culture produced the situation we
wish to change. ! ! ! The one thing we can be certain
about is that in our society the absence or dilution of
the psychological sense of community is a destructive
force (1974, p. 276, emphasis added).
^3
Be-t hat-as-1 t-may
,
we have set for ourselves a task
in this study that has some "technical-engineering” aspects;
we want to know how one may effect change (in a small col-
lege setting) that would tend to foster, in an institutional
collectivity, the psychological sense of community. We are
now ready to say where we wish to go in this report: to
discover in the literature anything that might throw some
light (we do not expect to find formulas) on PSC as a con-
cept that would "inform action" (as Sarason would say).
We shall report on a variety of authors whose
writings hold some promise of contributing something— if not
directly, then indirectly—to our understanding of the psy-
chological sense of community; where it comes from, how it is
maintained or destroyed, its relation to group bondedness
and to human motivation and need, its appearance in inten-
tional communities, and a variety of issues more directly
related to Institutional environments.
CHAPTER III
PEOPLE IN GROUPS
Social Psychology of Groups and Organizations
Many sociologists, social psychologists and psy-
chologists begin their treatment of groups in the abstract
with some discussion of the smallest group unit, the dyad.
Thus Sarason (1972) offers "marriage" as the smallest in-
stance of a setting
,
which is defined as a relationship
between two or more people lasting over a sustained period to
achieve certain goals. In a more basic discussion of group
formation, Homans (1950) begins by describing the interactive
behavior of two men and summarizes the description as fol-
lows :
We have separated the concrete behavior of the two
men into factors or elements: emotion, personality,
interests, association, activities and the success of
their activities. We have seen how these elements are
internally related to one another, and how their mutual
relations make a recognizable, ongoing entity: not
just two men, but linked together; not just two indivi-
duals, but a new kind of unit, a group. . . . this
unit exists in an environment, and some of its charac-
teristics are determined by the nature of the environ-
ment (Homans, 1950, p. 8).
In their Social Psychology of Groups , Thibaut and
Kelley (1959) take a closer look at this two-person rela-
tionship, the essence of which is interaction:
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Two individuals may be said to have formed a re-
lationship when on repeated occasions they are observed
to interact. By interaction it is meant that they emit
behavior in each other's presence, they create prod-
ucts for each other, and they communicate with each
other. In every case we would identify as an instance
of interaction there is at least the possibility that
the actions of each person effect the other (1959,
p . 10 ) .
The consequences of such interaction are then described by
the authors in terms of the rewards (pleasure, satisfaction,
gratification) or the costs ("inhibiting response factors,"
e.g., anxiety, embarrassment, physical harm) of the inter-
action. Interactive behavior is also described in terms of
"sets" or "behavior sequences" which are effected by the
reward or cost value of an interaction. Each member of a
dyad (and by extension, of a group) has two standards by
which to evaluate membership in that relationship: the
standard against which the member evaluates the "attrac-
tiveness" of the relationship which Thibaut and Kelley refer
to as the comparison level , or "CL"; and the standard the
member uses in deciding whether or not to remain in the
relationship, which they refer to as the comparison level
for alternatives
,
or "CL alt" (1959, P* 21). ". . .A pre-
requisite for the existence of the dyad," conclude the
authors, "is a dependence of the rewards of each upon the
other's behavior, that is, a condition of interdependence.
In summary, they write:
the formation of a relationship depends
largely upon (1) the matrix of the possible outcomes
of interaction; (2) the process of exploring or sam-
46
pling the possibilities; and ultimately (3) whether or
not the j pint ly experienced outcomes are above each
member’s CL alt (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959, pp. 22-23)
Remaining with the concept of attractiveness but
moving to a discussion of the larger group setting, we
enter the realm of group dynamics which presents us with
the related concept, cohesiveness
. A distant cousin to the
idea of a sense of community, the concept of cohesiveness
well deserves our attention in this report. Thibaut and
Kelley define cohesiveness as
... an increasing function of the attractiveness of
the group to its members; that is, cohesiveness will
be greater to the degree that rewards are experienced
in belonging to the group. These rewards have some-
times been classified by their sources: attractive-
ness of the members to one another, attractiveness of
the goals achieved by belonging to the group, and at-
tractiveness resulting from the positive evaluations
of the group by relevant non-members (prestige)
(1959, P. 114).
A number of investigations reported by Thibaut and
Kelley support the general finding that greater agreement
about goals and conformity to norms is reached in highly
cohesive groups than in those of low cohesiveness. (Meas-
urement in these investigations were invariably done through
sociometric rating techniques.) They also report that mem-
bers of highly cohesive groups have greater power over one
another so that, in general, there is a trend toward simi-
larity of values and attitudes. This state ol at fairs ap-
parently produces a spiral effect in which "... interde-
pendence begets further interdependence" (Thibaut and Kel-
ley, 1959 , P • 115)
.
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Most of the studies reported by Thibaut and Kelley
investigated the effects of cohesiveness on work output
within industrial settings. Because of interdependence,
members of highly cohesive groups apparently have the power
to exert more "fate control" over each other than members
of less cohesive groups, and hence group goals are more
easily achieved. The bulk of the evidence points toward
the general conclusion that cohesive groups work more em-
phatically toward communication with the "goal deviate,"
either "straightening him out" or clearly rejecting him,
thus producing a high degree of goal-directed behavior
(1959, PP- 259-260).
Of course, it must be remembered that while most
of these social psychological investigations have dealt
with production goals and with interdependent work groups
of relatively small size, it is our task in this study to
address ourselves to a very different kind of setting, the
college campus, where "production" goals are less clearly
defined and the "work groups" larger and more diffuse.
Further, "cohesiveness" does not translate directly
to
"the psychological sense of community." Thus it
remains
for us to view these as parallel findings
from which rele-
vant implications may be extracted. Perhaps
the parallels
may be brought a bit closer if we move
from the social psy-
chology of groups and review some of the
findings of Katz
and Kahn in their Social Psyc hology of
Organization s (1978)
Here again we encounter the study of workers in an
industrial setting, but this time within the framework of
what Katz and Kahn call "internalized motivation." We
shall briefly summarize their principal conclusions, par-
ticularly from their review of the literature relating to
affiliative expression, group belongingness, and alien-
ation .
Their discussion begins with an unquestioned premise
that the need for a sense of belongingness does in fact
exist in humans. (They do discuss elsewhere the Maslow
model of a need or motive hierarchy in which belongingness
takes its place between the basic biologic needs and the
higher order needs of "self-development, self-esteem and
self-actualization.") From their understanding of the
literature Katz and Kahn conclude that:
By being part of something beyond the physical self,
the individual can achieve a sense of belongingness
and can participate in accomplishments beyond indivi-
dual powers. Moreover, affiliating with others can
extend the ego in time as well as space, for individu-
als can see their contributions to the group as endur-
ing over time even though they themselves may not
survive ( 1978 , p. 37 ^0 *
The authors conjecture that at the core of this special
extension of the ego is the need for affiliation and report
how that construct has been measured using projective tech-
niques. A related concept, the reference group_ is dis-
cussed in terms of "those instances in which the individual
feels a part of some larger social entity and recognizes
The identifica-
a bond of identification with that entity."
tion discussed here is meant in an affective sense where
feelings such as admiration, respect or liking are domi-
nant. Examples of larger reference groups are those of
political party loyalty, or nationalistic expression
(patriotism); groups involving direct contact or immediate
membership would be the smaller variety. Group solidarity
is also reported as an area of study in which "the group
and not the individual becomes the psychological basis for
assessment of accomplishment and satisfaction” (Katz and
Kahn, 1978, p. 375).
Several studies are cited by Katz and Kahn which
illustrate how three basic factors facilitate reference
group identification. The factors are (1) early socializa-
tion (in which a child’s training forms the basis for later
group identification), (2) anticipatory socialization (in
which people aspiring toward a particular role are made
aware through their culture of the norms that will be re-
quired of them as they seek membership in the appropriate
organization), and (3) the factor most pertinent to our
topic, the socialization practices of organizations to
which the individual belongs as an adult. Here we quote the
authors in full:
The critical condition for producing organiza-
tional identification through the activities of the
organization itself is participation in decision making
and the sharing of rewards. If people are involved
in determining policies and share in the returns trom
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collective effort, they regard the organization as
of their own making. There is little need for con-
vincing them through indoctrination when, in fact
the organization is theirs (Katz and Kahn, 1978 d
378). *
Various measuring scales used to measure the degree
of organizational identification are discussed and de-
scribed by Katz and Kahn. Most of the examples of items
supplied by the authors, such as "I feel I am part of the
company" or "I like working for this company," differ very
little from what one would expect to find among the items
of a scale measuring PSC (e.g., see Glynn, 1977). The
same may be said for those examples of items which seek to
measure organizational commitment (Katz and Kahn, 1978,
p. 379). Commitment is defined as a person’s willingness to
exert effort for, a desire to remain with, and the accept-
ance of the major goals and values of the organization.
From our brief look at some basic group and organ-
izational theory we have seen that the quality of group
ties (strength or weakness) is a function of the reward or
cost value of repeated interactions. The interactions are
in turn colored by certain affective, cognitive, and per-
sonality elements of the members as they impact on one
another, as well as by the nature of the environment. If
the interactions are successful—that is, goals are achieved
and satisfactions are realized—then a spiral of interde-
pendence may be set in motion. Under these circumstances,
group cohesiveness may develop, further promoting and main-
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taining interdependence and the group norms and goals. Also
operating as internal motivators are certain postulated
human needs, such as the need for affiliation, belonging-
ness, and identification with a reference group. It has
been found that when such needs are allowed expression in
an organizational setting through the sharing of rewards
and participating in decision making, these motivators may
help the group arrive at group solidarity and commitment.
Although the authors we have reviewed are reporting
of studies of small groups, mostly within the context of
the industrial work place, it is nonetheless apparent that
the basic elements being discussed, i.e., interdependence.
cohesiveness, affiliation, belongingness, identification,
group solidarity
,
and commitment
, are elements that would
be directly related to the emergence and/or maintenance of
a psychological sense of community in any collectivity or
social system. We are therefore encouraged at this juncture
to proceed further to look for any source that would add
to our understanding of the basic nature of group ties and
of the elemental forces which may be operating in their
formation. Accordingly, we shall next take an extended look
at a very different approach to group theory which takes
the point of view of an hypothesized presence of certain
innate intrapsychic "energies." We are, of course, referring
to Sigmund Freud’s contribution to the field of group psy-
chodynamics
.
Freud's "Group Psychology "
52
One of the avenues through which we are approach—
ing the understanding of the basis for a psychological
sense of community is that of motivation—emotional
,
bio-
logical or otherwise— for the coming together of humans in
groups. It seems fitting that we start with a look at
Sigmund Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the
Ego (1921). In this work Freud essentially attempts to
demonstrate that "libidinal ties are what characterize a
group" (1921, p. 57). While it is both tempting and popu-
lar to dismiss this notion in a contemporary discussion, we
would argue, but for the choice of terms which connote the
mechanistic presence of sexual energies and tensions that
are forever seeking release, that Freud's observations find
their parallels in most of the later and contemporary
findings about group life.
Freud begins his analysis by reviewing the liter-
ature of his day regarding the nature of groups (pp. 5 - 32 ).
He begins with the accepted premise of the day that before
a random "crowd" of people can constitute a "group" cer-
tain conditions have to be fulfilled. As a starting point
he summarizes five such conditions that are proposed by
McDougal, from a book entitled The Group Mind (no reference
information), written the year before. Supposedly, these
were "principal conditions" for raising "collective mental
life to a higher level." By this he meant bringing an un-
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organized group ('’crowd"), which is understood to have an
emotionally and intellectually "primitive" mentality, to
the level of an organized group (organization). Here are
McDougal's "principal conditions": (1) A degree of con-
tinuity of existence in the group, material or formal.
The former, if the same individuals remain in the group for
a period of time; the latter, if there is a system of fixed
positions which may be occupied by a succession of persons;
(2) Within the group "some definite idea should be formed
of the nature, composition, functions and capacities of the
group" so that each member may form an emotional tie to the
group as a whole; (3) Interaction, perhaps through rivalry,
with other similar groups; (4) The possession of customs
and traditions, especially those that impact the relations
of members to each other; and (5) The clear presence of an
order or structure "expressed in the specialization and
differentiations of its constituents" (Freud, 1921, pp. 30-
31). Commenting on McDougal's organization theory, Freud
brings in his own analytic psychology:
It seems to us that the conditions which McDougal
designates as the "organisation" of the group can with
more justification be described in another way. The
problem consists in how to procure for the . group Pre_
cisely those features which were characteristic of
the individual and which are extinguished in him by
the formation of the group (1921, p. 32 ).
In short, in his usually penetrating fashion, Freud
jumps right into the heart of the matter at least from the
analytic point of view—of the primacy of the biologic self
5*J
manifesting its energy by extension to the organized group.
In fact, he brings the discussion of organizational for-
mation to an abrupt close by recalling "a valuable remark"
of a colleague of his
. .to the effect that the tend-
ency towards the formation of groups is biologically a
continuation of the multicellular character of all the
higher organisms" (p. 32). Using this same biological
analogy, it could be said that the view, espoused by an
American contemporary of Freud’s, Charles H. Cooley (1909),
discussed below, would be expressed in the converse: the
cell (individual) derives its characteristics from the
organism (group).
And now we come to the heart of the matter, Freud’s
libidinal theory of group psychology. Here we quote the
author in full: (In the paragraphs preceding, Freud was
leading up to the question of how individual self-love
[narcissism] is able to tolerate the suppression of its
energy in a group setting.)
... So long as a group formation persists or so far
as it extends, individuals behave as though they were
uniform, tolerate other people's peculiarities, put.
themselves on an equal level with them. Such a limit-
ation of narcissism can, according to our theoretical
views, only be produced by one factor, a libid inal tie
with other people. Love for oneself knows only one
barrier --love for others, love for objects. The ques-
tion will be at once raised whether communities of
interest in itself, without any addition of libido,
must necessarily lead to the toleration of other people
and to considerateness for them. This objection may e
met by the reply that nevertheless no lasting limi a-
tion of narcissism is effected in this way,. since tms
tolerance does not persist longer than the immedia e
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advantage gained by other people's collaboration.
But the practical importance of the discussion is less
than might be supposed, for experience has shown that
in cases of collaboration libidinal ties are regularly
formed between the fellow-workers which prolong and
solidify the relation between them to the point beyond
what is merely profitable. The same thing occurs in
men's social relations . . . The libido props itself
upon the satisfaction of the great vital needs, and
chooses as its first objects the people who have a
share in that process. And in the development of man-
kind as a whole, just as in individuals, love alone
acts as the civilizing factor in the sense that it
brings a change from egoism to altruism . And this is
true both of the sexual love for women, with all the
obligations which it involves of sparing what women
are fond of, and also of the desexualised
,
sublimated
homosexual love for other men, which springs from
work in common.
If therefore in groups narcissistic self-love is
subject to limitations which do not operate outside
them, that is cogent evidence that the essence of a
group formation consists in a new kind of libidinal
ties among the members of the group (lj2l, pp. 5t-^8
,
emphasis ours )
.
Freud ends this discussion by questioning the nature
of these libidinal ties. To find the answer, he first
must explore the "phenomenon of being in love" which we
have just seen is believed to be the fundamental mechanism
operating in group ties. However, he puts off his search
while he devotes an intervening chapter to an investigation
of the alternative mechanism of identification . It shall
suffice for us to merely offer a brief description oi this
mechanism which is certainly familiar to all who have cut
their professional teeth on Freud.
As we know, identification is the earliest mechanism
which ties one person to another. It plays an important
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part in the so-called Oedipus complex in which a son adopts
his father as his ideal, in the sense that he puts himself
in his father's place, while at the same time, so the psy-
choanalytic theory goes, the boy develops "a true object-
cathexis towards his mother." To relate this concept to
the formation of the "group mind" Freud simply lifts it
out of the context of child-parent relations. He observes
that
:
. . . it may arise with every new perception of a
common quality shared with some other person who is
not an object of the sexual instinct. The more impor-
tant this common quality is, the more successful may
this partial identification become, and it may thus
represent the beginning of a new tie.
We already begin to devine that the mutual tie
between members of a group is in the nature of an
identification of this kind
. .
. ,
and we may suspect
that the common quality lies in the nature of the tie
with the leader ( 1921 , pp . 65 -66 ).
The investigation of the nature of love and its
relationship to the group bonding process continues in
Freud's next chapter which is the famous essay on "Being
in Love and Hypnosis" (pp. 71-80). Through a series of
mental maneuvers regarding analogies between love and hyp-
nosis, and hypnosis and group formation, basically building
on his discussion of ego identification and the surrender
to a love-object, Freud leads up to the conclusion of the
chapter, which is all that we shall quote here: (Note the
use of the term "primary group" which, as we shall see
later, is the invention of Cooley.)
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... A primary group of this kind is a number of
individuals who have substituted one and the same
object for their ego ideal and have consequently
identified themselves with one another in their ego
(1921, p. 80).
The main thrust, then, of the chapter, in addition to its
esoteric dissertation on love, is that through identifica-
tion and a special relationship with a central leader which
Freud likens to the hypnotist, the person "surrenders"
self-interest in the interest of the group as a whole. In
a later discussion of the subject (1921, p. 100) Freud
emphatically states that suggestion lies neither at the
heart of hypnosis, "which has a good claim to being de-
scribed as a group of two," nor of group closeness. He
states in a footnote that the riddle of hypnosis, and by
implication group psychology, is only partially explained
by suggestion, and that "hypnosis is solidly founded upon
a predisposition which has survived in the unconscious
from the early history of the human family." What Freud is
alluding to is "the primal father as the group ideal," which
stems from his theory of the "primal horde," a subject to
which we shall now turn.
After he concludes his investigation of hypnosis,
Freud admits that he has not gotten to the bottom
of the
group issue. Instead he looks again at the
characteristics
of the group, describing what sounds more
like a mob,
in modern terms:
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. . . Some of its features—the weakness of intellec-tual ability, the lack of emotional restraint theincapacity for moderation and delay, the inclinationto exceed every limit in the expression of emotion andto work it off completely in the form of action—
these and similar features
. .
.
,
show an unmistakablepicture of a regression of a mental activity of an
earlier stage such as we are not surprised to find
among savages or children (1921, p. 82).
With this he introduces Trotter's theory of the "herd in-
stinct which he accepts only tentatively while again mak-
ing use of the biologic analogy. Says Freud ( 1921
,
p. 83),
"•
• • this gregariousness is an analogy to multicellular-
ity and as it were a continuation of it." But still Freud
tenaciously clings to libido theory when he adds "
. . .it
is a further manifestation of the inclination, which pro-
ceeds from the libido, and which is felt by all living
beings of the same kind, to combine in more and more compre-
hensive units .
"
Freud finally rejects the herd instinct theory
because its claim to be "primary," i.e., irreducible, is
unfounded, essentially because it fails to account for the
place of the leader and other phenomena of group life.
He then traces some of these phenomena as seen in the de-
velopment of the "communal feeling" in a typical group of
nursery school children. He arrives at what first seems
like an improbable conclusion: that the communal feeling
can be traced from an original feeling of jealousy (rivalry
for the younger sibling at home) to a "reaction-formation
for justice and equal treatment for all" (1921, p. 86).
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From there he goes to the example of "a troop of women and
girls who crowd around a singer after his performance."
Freud continues his fantasy:
... It would certainly be easy for each of them tobe jealous of the rest; but, in face of their numbers
and the consequent impossibility of their reaching
the aim of their love, they renounce it, and, instead
of pulling out one another's hair, they act as a united
group, do homage to the hero of the occasion with their
common actions, and would probably be glad to have a
share of his flowing locks ( 1921
,
p. 87 ).
This seemingly banal fragment is quoted because it leads
up to, though only briefly in passing, a treatment of a
phenomenon that has a family resemblance to our subject of
the psychological sense of community. Writes Freud: "What
appears later on in society in the shape of Gemeingeist
,
esprit de corps
,
etc., does not belie its derivation from
what was originally envy. No one must want to put himself
forward, every one must be the same and have the same"
(1921, p. 88 ). Thus Freud is proposing that social feeling
is a reaction-formation related to an originally hostile
feeling, converted through the mechanism of identification
to "a positively-toned tie." This leads to his final word
on the subject: the theory of the "primal horde."
Starting with the proposition that the sequence
envy— ( or j ealousy) -reaction-formation-identification leads
to a feeling of equality among the group members (including
the condition that all are loved equally by the leader),
Freud ends with the pronouncement that man is not a herd
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animal but rather a horde animal
, "an individual creature
in a horde led by a chief" (1921, p. 89).
Borrowing the notion from a 1912 conjecture of
Charles Darwin that the primitive form of society was that
of a horde "despotically ruled over by a powerful male,"
Freud builds up his theory that the group mind is in real-
ity a regression to "a primitive mental activity." He
explains the psychology of such a group as follows:
. . . the dwindling of the conscious individual per-
sonality, the focusing of thoughts and feelings into
a common direction, the predominance of the emotions
and the unconscious mental life, the tendency to the
immediate carrying out of intentions as they emerge
... we should be inclined to ascribe to the primal
horde (1921, p. 91).
It is not difficult to see why a number of later
social commentators (for example, Adler, 1927; McWilliams,
1973; and Kanter, 1972, 197*0 look with disdain upon
Freud's pronouncements. For psychoanalysis appears to be
telling us that communal activity stems from a weakness
rather than from strength, and by extension, that group
solidarity and, for that matter, the psychological sense of
community, are merely defenses against initial feelings of
rage and envy. "In short," complains Kanter (1972, p. 56),
to Freud "the group is an agent of repression. . . ."
Though not speaking specifically about Sigmund Freud, Mc-
Williams takes a stand against all theories that would
equate eros with communal feeling (1973, p. 36). And fur-
ther, he refutes theories of the "group mind" that origina-
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ted supposedly from "primitive" societies that were popular
among nineteenth-century social theorists—presumably theo-
rists that had some Influence on Freud. "Men In traditional
societies are not more 'naturally communal' than other men.
. . . Traditional societies surround man with iron-clad
custom out of individual anxiety, not communal love"
(McWilliams, 1973, p. 39).
However, this writer believes it is a mistake to
dismiss Breud
’ s notions out of hand, for, strangely,
something rings true in these pronouncements. There does
seem to be at least a reasonable possibility that "being
in community" is some distant relation to "being in love."
Cooley’s Concept of the Primary Group
Around the same period that BYeud was pondering
about the "group mind" and the "primal horde" an American
sociologist, Charles Horton Cooley, was doing pioneer work
regarding the relationship between individual consciousness
and group consciousness (Cooley, 1909). Cooley was one of
the early proponents of the idea that self-image is a deriv-
ative of the self perceiving others’ reactions to oneself.
His chief contribution is the concept of the "primary group"
(1909, pp. 23-31), which is the group from which the endur-
ing self-images appear to be derived.
Our interest in this study is not with the social
psychology of the self. The importance of the primary group
concept is that, in contradlstinc tion to Freud, who held
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that group feeling and attractiveness to groups in general
was regressive and immature, it establishes the group as
important in its own right in the development and adjustment
of the human personality.
By "primary groups" Cooley means:
. . .those characterized by intimate face-to-face
association and cooperation.
. . . They are fundamen-
tal in forming the social nature and ideals of the
individual
. The result of intimate association,
psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities
in a common whole, so that one’s very self ... is the
common life and purpose of the group ( 1909
,
p. 23 ).
The examples that Cooley gives of the most important of
these "intimate associations" are the family, the play-group,
the neighborhood and the "community group of elders"—all
these being described as "practically universal, belonging
to all times and all stages of development" (1909, p. 24).
Rather significant for our purposes, especially
because the family may be viewed as the appropriate ana-
logue in terms of the embodiment of the sense of community,
is that Cooley, at the very beginning of his discussion of
primary groups, quickly points out the non-utopian nature
of the primary group:
It is not to be supposed that the unity of the
primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is
always differentiated and usually a competitive unity,
admitting of self-assertion and various appropriat ive
passions (1909, p. 23).
Thus Cooley is not presenting us with a romantic
view of human nature. Although some see him as a social
idealist (e.g., Kanter, 1972, p. 33), Cooley clearly under-
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stood the disruptive elements of human nature, and that man
can best pursue his private, self-interested goals through
cooperation and interdependence. (Cooley's idealism was
more a function of his desire and hope that "primary group"
spirit could be extended "to our country, our race, our
world.") For Cooley the "we-feeling" stems from what he
refers to as a "moral unity," which is both the outgrowth
of the primary ideals which emerge from the identification
of the self-interest with group interest, and at the same
time the bonding agent which perpetuates the group. Again,
the family serves as the model for moral unity, as does
the play-group. And, again, Cooley directs our attention
to the idea that unity need not (and cannot) exclude indi-
vidual expression:
Moral unity
. . . admits and rewards strenuous ambi-
tion; but this ambition must either be for the success
of the group, or at least not inconsistent with that.
The fullest self-realization will belong to the one
who embraces in a passionate self-feeling the aims of
fellowship ... It is, then, not my aim to depreciate
the self-assertive passions. I believe they are fierce,
inextinguishable and indispensable (1909, p. 35)-
Cooley, who invented the term, "we-feeling," closes
his discussion of primary groups by asking us to
. . .
see and feel the communal life of family and
local groups as immediate facts, not as combinations
of something else. And perhaps we shall do this best
by recalling our own experience . . . What, in our
life, is the family and fellowship; what do we know
of the we-feeling ( 1909 , p. 31 )?
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Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
Throughout the sociological literature on community
one finds the use of the expressions Gemeinschaft and
Gesellschaft
,
the first denoting the traditional quality of
community made up of the stuff of such primary groups as
the family, friends, and neighbors; the second denoting
the quality of non-traditional society made up of the
"contractual” or "instrumental" relationships such as
merchant and consumer, performer and spectator, and so
forth. The sociologist responsible for bringing these
concepts into common sociological parlance is Ferdinand
Tonnies ( 1957 ) in his classic work (published originally in
1887 ) Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft , translated either as
"community and association" or "community and society."
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are to be taken as qualities
or Platonic forms which this or that community may have
more or less of at any one time but never a full measure of,
or a complete absence of.
Tonnies set out " . • . to study the sentiments and
motives which draw people to each other, keep them together,
and induce them to joint action" ( 1957 , p. 237 ). He de-
duced that there are two distinct kinds of human motivation
or "wills" which govern relationships. On the one
hand
there is natural will which is seen as simple, direct,
emo-
tional and/or impulsive and "which tends not to be
deliber-
ertain ends; it "does not
ate" or seek certain means to c
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necessarily rule out intellect and. reason," which, when fused
with the natural will, becomes the creative part of human
mentality. On the other hand there is rational will
,
. .in which thinking has gained predominance" ( 1957
,
p.
247). He then makes this pronouncement:
I call all kinds of associations in which natural
will predominates Gemeinschaft
,
all those which are
formed and fundamentally conditioned by rational will,
Gesellschaf
t
(1957, p. 247).
Thus these "two different modes of mentality and behavior"
signify two types of association, the rational or Gesell-
schaft mode having for Tonnies the connotation of "mechan-
ical," and the natural or Gemeinschaft mode the connotation
of "organic." When a relationship is seen as "an end in
itself" it takes on the quality of Gemeinschaft . On the
other hand if a relationship is formed for a certain purpose,
that is, an "association by agreement—an instrument to
achieve certain ends," it becomes an "instrumental" rela-
tionship taking on the quality of Gesellschaf
t
(1957, p.
263) .
There is an element of Tonnies which to some extent
appears to be more than a description of purely ideal types;
that is, it appears that he is providing a description of
where society was heading: toward Gesellschaf
t
,
"a mere
coexistence of people independent of each other" (1957, P*
38 ). Thus, his theoretical posture also offers
his personal
view of the future, as in such statements like
".
.
.as
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time passes rational will has a tendency to supplant natu-
ral will” (1957, p. 267). However, the main thrust of
his thinking strives essentially to provide a framework
through which to view human association. Many of the wri-
ters we have reviewed are prone to take potshots at Tonnies
as the result of interpreting Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaf
t
as
a strict either/or dichotomy rather than ideal types. Also,
Tonnies is often depicted as a prophet of doom, sentimen-
tally yearning for the past and predicting the final death
of community in our society generally, rather than as a
cogent observer of societal trends. For example, Kanter
(1972, p. 241), chooses to argue with Tonnies when she
writes "Utopian communities are just as clearly defined
and ordered by their gesellschaf
t
nature—the fact that
members relate to one another in the context of their
organizational tasks—as they are by their communal goals."
Tonnies would not deny this because Gemeinschaft and Gesell-
schaft may both be descriptive of the attributes of one
community, that is, they are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive qualities. As to his sentimentalism and pessimism
we have only to read the introduction which reminds us that
Tonnies believed
.
that the process of change from Gemeinschaft
to Gesellschaft might be reversed by real causes if
such existed, but not by speeches and sentimental
romanticizing about the past (1957, P* 3).
Intimate Secondary Relationships
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Cooley has told us about primary relationships,
that is, those relationships which take place in the con-
texts of primary groups. These not only include the family,
play-group and close neighbor relations which we have men-
tioned, but also common friendships, and day to day close-
knit work groups. Recently, Wireman (1978a, 1978b) has
written about another kind of relationship which sociolo-
gists refer to as a secondary relationship
,
a category
implied but not discussed by Cooley. Simply put, what
occurs in secondary relationships is the opposite of what
occurs in primary ones; that is, there is none of the
intense personal and/or family involvement, the socializ-
ing, or the mutual knowing of personal life or character
that is found in primary relationships. Neither is there
the open-ended commitment. The secondary relationship
focuses on a specific purpose and is public in nature; the
interactions occur in public places only. Some examples
are the relationships between salesperson and customer,
among members of a committee, stockholders at a meeting or
between bureaucrat and client.
Wireman, however, writes about a very special kind
of secondary relationship which she calls the intimate
secondary relationship . The intimate secondary relation-
ship has some of the characteristics of both primary and
secondary relationships. It has in common with primary re-
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lationships the quality of intense involvement, warmth,
sense of belonging, and rapport; and while there is mini-
mal sharing of personal information and minimal socializing,
there is the mutual knowing of each other’s character. In
every other respect it has the characteristics of the sec-
ondary relationship described above. Examples that Wireman
gives are voluntary committee and board memberships, task
forces, branch office groups, ad hoc problem solving
groups, political and other planning groups.
The main focus in Wireman' s articles is on the
nature of the functions of such intimate secondary relation-
ships in terms of ameliorating the alienating effects of
"modern urban life" and, in general, the rapidly changing
social conditions of "modern society." This "community
lost" picture of contemporary society, says Wireman, is
drawn by proponents who claim that
whereas the individual formerly lived within a
context of overlapping local primary relationships
among family, neighbors and workmates, m modern soci y
man is autonomous and alienated, thrust into a
series
of isolated relationships entered into for
instrumental
purposes and maintained only as long as necessary
for
goal achievement (1978a, p. 3)*
perhaps it begins to be clear why our attention
has been drawn to Wireman. The relevance
of her topic should
become even clearer by a reading of the
functions of inti-
mate secondary relationships identified
in her discussion.
Wireman summarizes these as follows:
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Functions in areas of rapid geographical mobility in-
clude: rapid intimacy, rapid knowledge of character
rapid knowledge of community resources and norms,
rapid sense of community
,
and joint action. Functionsin heterogeneous areas include: controlled intimacy,
knowledge of character, joint action, accepting all
residents as community members
, understanding the
needs of different groups, and creating a community
network of trust relationships 7 . . Intimate secondary
relationships can create community Integration through:
relating newcomers to the community quickly
,
relating
diverse people, relating diverse interest groups,
establishing and disseminating community values, and
creating and disseminating community norms (1978a,
pp . 1-2, emphasis added).
Wireman stresses that intimate secondary relation-
ships and networks of such relationships "... promote an
intangible spirit of community, a feeling of being connec-
ted at least indirectly to many members of the community,
not just one's friends and neighbors " ( 1978 a, p. 14, empha-
sis ours). At the same time Wireman also claims that the
functions of these relationships permit a degree of inti-
macy and a knowledge of others without commitment to
friendship . "The crucial quality," she points out, "is not
affection but credibility ..." (1973b, p. 15).
Essentially, Wireman’ s contribution is that she has
focused attention on the functions and content of intimate
secondary relationships, a concept which she rightfully
states has clear "heuristic value." Beyond that, her sug-
gestions for future research moves from a descriptive to a
prescriptive one and therefore, closer to the concerns oi
this study. "Finally," she asks, "what are the practical
implications of such relationships for community design and
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policy matters? Conscious attention needs to be given in
the design of buildings and communities to provide the pub-
lic places needed for the formation of intimate secondary
relationships and the minimal staff and other supports for
encouraging the voluntary groups which foster them" (1978a,
p. 20 ) .
Same-sex Bondedness: "Men in Groups "
and "the Idea of Fraternity "
In his book. Men in Groups (1969), Lionel Tiger
proposes the theory that males, human and otherwise, have
an innate need to band together. The need, which he calls
male-bonding, arises out of the evolutional necessities of
the hunt, of war and defense, and of work. This bioanthro-
pological view, deplored though it may be in feminist cir-
cles because of what may be construed as its sexist over-
tones, presents a rather fresh perspective on why humans,
albeit in this case exclusively the male of the species,
are motivated to form and sustain close ties. As we are
most interested in the sense of community as a human experi-
ence, it behooves us to consider any theory which has as
its central focus human bonding, especially a theory whose
essential dynamics does not rely on sexuality as the domin-
ant motivating force. (Freud, for example, as we have seen,
viewed male-bonding as "desexualized , sublimated homosexual
love . . . which springs from work in common.")
A less sexist approach to "the natural tendency of
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men to come together" may be found in McWilliams’ ambitious
700 page tome. The Idea of Fraternity in America (1973).
Basically, it is an historical essay on American political
thought through which he follows the thread of "the idea of
fraternity" as he reviews the contributions of our great
statesmen and writers and some of the foundations of poli-
tical traditions. More importantly for our topic, it deals
with a concept that most certainly is a first cousin to
the "idea of community." Sarason, in fact, considers it
to be among the major statements on the subject of the
sense of community (1980).
At first it was difficult to know whether McWilliams
meant for us to understand the term "fraternal" as applying
to all humankind regardless of sex. The author steadfastly
and with few exceptions from beginning to end uses the word
"fraternity" to mean just that—a relation of affection
founded on the shared values and goals of men . However,
there are a few passages which suggest that women , no less
than men, may participate in the virtues of solidarity. Two
clues, appearing in the acknowledgement section of an ex-
ceedingly brief preface, suggest that perhaps the author
would allow us to mentally interchange "she" for "he" as we
explore with him the "idea of fraternity." McWilliams, ded-
icating the book to "all [his] brothers ," asserts his in-
debtedness to a woman "... for the standard she set by her
fierce devotion to truth. . . ." Shortly after, he mentions
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his debt to his wife ”... for proving the interdependence
o f
_
sorority and
,
fraternity and ... by demonstrating that
a man’s wife can stand in the first rank of his friends and
brethren ” (1973, PP . x-xi, emphasis ours). Then in the
first chapter, he develops the argument that men, more so
than women, are in great need of solidarity because their
functions are far less certain, and their authority more
fragile (p. 15). Since "male virtues
. . . imply independ-
ence and self-sufficiency as an ideal," then such virtues
".
. . enhance the danger of division among men." McWilli-
ams therefore builds his case on ",
. . the recognition of
imperfection in ’masculinity’" (p. 16). This is what makes
fraternity difficult. But then before closing the gates,
in a wink he lets his sisters through:
Traditional societies may have associated fraternities
with men, but the appeal of sorority is no less. With
all its difficulties, fraternity is vital for anyone
who would find himself and who knows that no one can
do so alone (p . 18 ) .
And a final hint is offered later in the book when
McWilliams is discussing the work of James Baldwin as one
of the literary commentators on the question of fraternity
in black America:
. . .
To love one another, to have genuine fraternity,
men must love what is "feminine" in themselves (and
vice versa, in the case of sorority); the world of
fraternity must be free of sexual Jim Crow (1973, P*
612 ) .
We shall now look at how McWilliams’ idea of fra-
ternity can contribute to our understanding of community.
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We have just shortly before mentioned Lionel Tiger's theory
of male-bonding. McWilliams believes that although Tiger's
proposition of an innate male solidarity is "
. . . inti-
mately related to fraternity, it does not deal with the
specific qualities of fraternity as a relationship" (p. 3).
In other words, although providing a foundation. Tiger
stops short of giving us a complete picture of what McWil-
liams calls "the structure of fraternity." In McWilliams'
view of fraternity, the solidarity of alienated groups can
work to foster a sense of community in a given setting:
Fraternity presupposes alienation. . . . one must
acknowledge what is human in one's brother, what is
kin between him and all men, before one can claim to
have a genuinely higher regard for him . .
.
[It] is
in what is most immediate to man, in the self, that he
first feels the sense of shortcoming that is so vital
an element of fraternity. ... As Nietzsche knew,
continued striving for what is excellent and continuing
recognition of one's own faults cannot be endured
without a friend. The individual who knows his own
unworthiness needs the assurance that he has value; he
demands the encouragement of affection" (1973, PP •
50-51) •
There is no one concise and coherent definition of
fraternity provided by McWilliams. He introduces the topic
by arguing that fraternity
1 .
2 .
3-
4 .
5.
s a bond based on intense interpersonal affection,
nd
, ,
_
ike all such bonds, is limited in the number of
ersons and in the social space to which it can
e extended; that it
Iso involves shared values and goals considere
ore important than "mere lite," and
s closely related to the development of ego
dentity," since it
_
ncludes a recognition of shortcomings and failure
n the attainment of ultimate values, but
7Provides the emotional encouragement and sense ofworth ( "assurance of identity") which makes itpossible to endure such tensions without betraying;
one’s own values, and finally.
Implies a necessary tension with loyalty to societv
at large ( 1973
, pp. 7-8). y
Although not explained by McWilliams (as does Tiger when
theorizing on "men in groups") as being derived from a
particular biological necessity, his theory of fraternity
is nevertheless essentialist ic in that he sees it as part
of the nature of man.
One distinction between fraternity and community
is that the former requires an intense personal commitment
and "interpersonal affection." This may be illustrated by
the example of a black person addressing the man next to
us as "brother," and us as "mister." By so doing he is
excluding us from his fraternity but not necessarily from
his community
. Community requires only an intensity of
commitment to some center and to the value of interdependenc
Fraternity is also seen as a bonding agent which
connects elements of a community otherwise blocked by
barriers of status and station, or locked in the isolation
of sexual or romantic unions:
Sexual solidarity helps ... to decrease the social
importance of sexuality. Sexual gratification is
self-referential and isolating, and its logical tend-
ency is to create isolated groups or sporadic unions
for immediate gratification. The solidarity of sex
overcomes the tendency to some degree and serves as a
bond which crosses the line of clan and descent .
Sexual solidarity creates a likeness between persons
otherwise separated by barriers of age, command, and
authority, a hierarchical rather than horizontal patt
of communication and community (1973, PP • 13-14)-
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On the other hand solidarity, whether it be sexual,
racial, whether it be expressed in cliques or gangs, ob-
viously, as McWilliams points out, sometimes must present
problems to the larger society in which it is embedded.
However, the value of these groups are rarely understood
by those who would aspire to a larger sense of community.
Ethnic gangs, for example, provide ".
. .a center of unam-
biguous loyalty for youth caught between a disintegrating
heritage and exclusion from the dominant society" (p. 85 );
cliques, appearing as they do in the less violent behavior
settings of institutions, are nonetheless an expression of
a similar desire to form exclusive, intensive relations for
mutual support. And yet "established social institutions
seem almost contrived to prevent such ’mere friendship'
groupings," McWilliams reminds us (p. 86 ), "even as they
actively encourage extensive social contact."
Very important in the idea of fraternity is the
concept of the acknowledgement of individual separateness
in its best sense. To make his point McWilliams appears
to set up Gemeinschaf
t
(Tonnies, 1957), as a "straw man,"
presenting it as a concept that would exclude the private
self. However, the major thrust of his remarks is well-
taken :
Traditional societies surround man with iron-clad cus-
tom out of individual anxiety, not communal love. . . .
The single "identity" of customary society is not com-
munity; communion and common things presume something
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shared between two or more entities otherwise separate
an essential unity of things divided by their accidents
The "we" of gemeinschaft is based, by contrast, on adenial of individual personality and separateness.
. . . Those who do not understand man are incapable of
understanding the nature and conditions for community
and fraternity between men (1973, pp. 39-40).
Again, gemeinschaft
,
excluding private self-interest which
would keep others at a distance in an attitude of conceal-
ment, certainly includes within its meaning the nurturing
of the private self. McWilliams himself states that "Man
cannot conceal himself from others without losing part of
himself, and privatization more than any single factor
destroys the possibility of genuine privacy" (p. 90, empha-
sis added). Relatedly, the exclusion of disagreement or
even aggression as components of personal attachments would
deny the possibility of a sense of fraternity (p. 47).
Without these various components of personal attachment
"Men [tend to] move in circles which are 'limited liability
communities.' ... It is, in fact, a pseudo-gemeinschaft"
. . . (p. 89).
Like other writers, McWilliams discusses war as a
galvanizing process in the sense that it momentarily ends
alienation from the community; at the same time it is seen
as a source that is destructive of fraternity. Here is one
of the rare passages in his book that clearly pits community
against fraternity:
During a period of crisis and war the shamelessness and
fearlessness of brethren, their willingness to lose life
and their fascination with death, become needs oi
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society, not dangers to it. War and crisis are temp-tations of those false brothers for whom fraternity isnot enough, who would escape alienation in order to
reenter community ip. 30 . emphasis aririPrH
Violence, McWilliams admits, does help men find
solidarity. The "fraternity of battle" does produce moments
of "nobility" and "rebirth." And yet,
. . . the fraternity of battle is radically defective
as fraternity. Those who must fight or "confront"
others to find solidarity leave the essential decision
—what is being fought about— to the enemy.
. . .
The fears which prevented the same sense of solidarity
from developing in time of peace are quieted in time
of conflict.
. . . The solidarity one was too cowardly to seek
in peace is purchased at the price of a brother’s
blood. ... I hardly deny the sad truth that war
and violence are sometimes necessary. I only deny
the proposition that they produce fraternity. Brothers
may march to defend something they value already, and
it may strengthen both their bonds and their devotion
to the valued thing that they do so; it creates neither.
Why else the mournful lesson of battle fraternity, that
it lapses with the end of the war (pp. 92-93)?
So we see that, for McWilliams, fraternity is not
only independent of community, but often may be at odds
with the survival of community because one of the values of
fraternity is that survival may come at too high a price.
With this in mind he states that there are three conditions
necessary to sustain fraternity among citizens in a politi-
can context:
(1) the absence of continuous war or crisis; (2) the
small state, which makes possible the sharing of af-
fection and emotion; and (3) a nonmaterialist standard
of value, excluding the possibility of individual per-
fection and setting citizens apart from other members
of the community (pp. 31-32).
78
These conditions specifically were derived from
McWilliams' analysis of the city-state or the polis of
ancient times. (It is interesting to note that elsewhere
[p. 87 ] the author observes that the college campus "...
is one of the last analogues of the polis.
. . .") For the
hope of fraternity in contemporary settings, political or
otherwise, he offers that we must face three imperatives:
"to recognize fraternity when it occurs; to broaden the
chance for others; to feel compassion for those denied the
opportunity of fraternity" (p. 94). In short, for the lead-
ership to set the example, "the oldest duty of fraternity."
Summary and Discussion
To understand the basis of group formation we began
with an analysis of two-person relationships (Thibaut and
Kelley)
. The dyad relationship was said to exist when on
repeated occasions two people have interacted in terms of
communication "with possible consequences" and with the in-
tention to "create products with each other." The strength
of the relationship depends on the rewards and costs , where
interdependence would emerge from the "dependence on the
rewards of each upon the other's behavior." To the extent
that the rewards in belonging to the group in terms of
achievement of group goals and prestige are experienced, to
the same degree will cohesiveness be an attribute of group
life, producing greater agreement about group goals, and
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greater influence or power over one another. This, in turn,
creates a "spiral of interdependence" in which group goals
are more easily achieved.
We saw that in organizational theory (Katz and Kahn)
the sense of belongingness was postulated to be a human
need. It was said that affiliation "extends the ego in time
and space," enabling it to "participate in accomplishments
beyond individual powers." The reference group is that
larger social system with which the individual identifies;
thus group solidarity becomes the basis for a sense of ac-
complishment and satisfaction. Three factors were cited
which are said to facilitate reference group identification :
early socialization (training for later identification);
anticipatory socialization (being made aware of norms re-
quired for membership); and participation in decision making
and sharing of rewards.
The observation was made that the elemental factors
in group and organizational theory appear to be directly
related to the idea of a psychological sense of community;
therefore, we were encouraged to look further into the
basic nature of group ties.
Freud’s essay on group psychology was then reviewed.
First cited were McDougal’s "principal conditions for
group
formation": continuity, material or formal; definite
idea
of nature of the group with which to attract
emotional ties;
interaction with other similar groups; customs and
traditions
V
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order or structure. Freud saw the emerging group as an
extension of the individual psyche which is extinguished
as the group forms. The question for Freud was how narcis-
sism is able to be suppressed so as to allow for the group
feeling and for the toleration of other people’s needs.
His answer was that narcissism is only temporarily put aside
(limited) to take advantage of collaboration ("Love alone
brings a change from egoism to altruism"). Freud concluded
that the essence of group formation consists "in a new kind
of libidinal ties among the members of the group." Identi -
fication was seen as the primary mechanism in group forma-
tion, through the recognition of a "common quality shared
with a person who is not a sexual object." The surrendering
or self-interest is accomplished by identification with the
leader by each member and thus by identification with each
other. Freud postulated a predisposition in humans for
seeking "the primal father" (leader of the "primal horde")
he also theorized that there is an inclination of the libido
"to combine in more and more comprehensive units" (in the
same way that cells combine into organisms). Communal feel -
ing was described as being a consequence of a reaction-forma-
tion with respect to feelings of jealousy (sibling rivalry)
in regard to the admired leader (primal father). Since "the
aim of love is impossible" it is . renounced, and in its
place is the call for "equal treatment for all," unity , and
esprit de corps ("no one wants to put himself forward; every
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one must be the same and have the same").
The connection between Freud’s theory of group for-
mation and an understanding of the experience called the
psychological sense of community was recognized in terms of
the relationship of the idea of "being in love" to the idea
of "being in community."
Cooley's conception of the primary group was dis-
cussed. The primary group evolves out of a moral unity—the
result of the identification of self-interest with group
interest, and the "we-feeling" associated with the family
or play-group as prototypes. The idea of moral unity in-
cludes not only "harmony and love," but differentiation,
competitiveness, and self-assertiveness that are not incon-
sistent with group goals. Although not identical with com-
munity and sense of community, the primary group neverthe-
less serves as the community ideal, and hence the model for
the larger and more extended idea of community.
Gemeinschaf
t
and Gesellschaft were brought into our
discussion because of the important place these concepts
have in the literature of community, particularly in the
writing of Ferdinand Tonnies. That writer conceived of
these as polarities of human motivation in regard to social
interrelatedness. They represent a typography of community
life and are therefore descriptive of the quality of the
dominant relationship style in a given society or social
system. Gemeinschaf
t
described the communal aspects of
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society evolving from the natural will, the emotional and
direct attribute of human interaction; Gesellschaf
t
. from
the rational will, described the instrumental aspects of
human interchange. These were seen as ideal qualities
which coexist to some degree, with one or the other being
dominant at a given time or fused into a workable synthesis.
Tonnies* conception provides a framework through which to
view society in terms of the tension between these two poles.
An example of a "workable synthesis" was seen in
Wireman's concept of the functions of intimate secondary re-
ion ships • These are relationships which focus on a speci-
fic purpose (instrumental) and are public in nature, but
which have some of the qualities of primary relationships
without the same degree of sharing, socializing and commit-
ment. Interactions of this sort were seen as based upon
"credibility rather than affection" and are exemplified by
such groups as committees, boards and other voluntary asso-
ciations. Wireman viewed these relationships as being very
effective in promoting "an intangible spirit of community"
in areas of rapid geographical mobility and/or areas with
heterogeneous populations. For those of us who are concerned
with creating, enhancing or preserving the psychological
sense of community in a setting like the college campus these
revelations perhaps bare some good news. The campus may be
looked at as a miniature of the modern urban life described
above. By definition the college commitment is time-and-
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space-limited. If one were to depend on the emergence of
the whole as an ideal Coolian primary group in order to
achieve a corresponding emergence of a sense of community,
then one indeed would have to despair. The concept of in-
timate secondary relationships and their functions may
provide the theoretical foundation for explaining why cer-
tain kinds of campus "activities" foster community feeling
while certain others do not.
The college, after all, is both an "area of rapid
geographical mobility" and a "heterogeneous area." There
is no question that stability and homogeneity are community-
creating conditions as we shall learn in the next chapter
by looking at communes and other intentional communities.
However, these conditions are not necessarily desirable in
a democratic and pluralistic society. The implications of
Wireman's findings are welcome precisely because they offer
an alternative to nostalgically bemoaning the loss of com-
munity as it has been known in the past.
We are not here talking about any novel or mysteri-
ous forms of relationships. Boards, ad hoc committees and
other task oriented memberships and the like abound pro-
fusely in our society and in the miniature societies of our
campuses. What is novel is the observation of just how
these common bodies function to produce social consequences
and hence community psychological consequences of such enor-
mous benefit, perhaps even more far-reaching than certain
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experiences like encounter groups which are deliberately
designed to "enhance community."
A brief mention was made of Lionel Tiger's propo-
sition that males of all species have an innate need to
band together. For our purposes, it would be well to con-
sider not male-bonding per se, but same-sex (or unisex as
Tiger prefers to call it) bondedness (not homosexual) as a
factor in the facilitating of communal strength. If we
tentatively accept the proposition that anything like an
innate same-sex-bonding need does exist in human society then
we would have to ask what would be the consequences of a
social system whose structures and norms are inhibitive of
the expression of this need? Just as many of the most suc-
cessful utopian communities (Kanter, 1972) had built into
their communal design the prohibition of sexual pairing for
fear that such subgroups would undermine the sense of com-
munity, how would the recognition of unisex-bonding be in-
cluded in such a design? Assuming, for example, that in a
given community the sexes are evenly divided in number, we
would have to ask whether providing encouragement, through
social, architectural and other means, of the meeting to-
gether of persons of the same sex as a regular and routine
segment of the life of that community, would hinder or en-
hance the overall sense of community of that group. Perhaps
such opportunities would tend to strengthen communal bonds;
this may be a much overlooked communal-facilitative strategy.
85
The common metaphor of the woven fabric provides a
handy analogy for seeing how such social arrangements can
be a cohesive rather than a divisive force. Simply put,
the sexes in their separateness represent the woof and warp
in their perpendicular relationship. The fabric (the com-
munal bonding) is created by the natural sexual or pairing
tendencies which represents the interweaving mechanism that
ensures that the woof and the warp are not two separate
masses. This is obviously too simplistic, for it does not
take into account all the other possibilities of inter-
personal dynamics. But if we imagine for a moment that in
our hypothetical community every person is a partner in a
sexual pairing, then we can see how the cross threading of
same-sex bondedness would tend to pull an otherwise dyadi-
cally segmented collection of persons into a unified group.
In our review of McWilliams' book (1973) we saw
that "the idea of fraternity" also encompasses single-sex
relationships. While the author defined fraternity as a
relation of affection founded in the shared values and
goals of men
,
we concluded that he had in mind the extension
of this idea to women (sorority) as well. Fraternity, or
sexual solidarity, was described as an essentialistic at-
tribute of man, and as a bond between persons "otherwise
separated by barriers" providing a "center of inambiguous
loyalty." The fraternal nature of man was seen as helping
to decrease the social importance of sexuality.
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How is McWilliams’ notion relevant to our search
for the understanding of the concept of the psychological
sense of community? We suspect that what he was really
expressing, seen in the context of a critique of modern
liberalism by an essentially political commentator, is a
yearning for what he calls "the old tradition," implying
the virtues of constraint and discipline. It is not, says
McWilliams, the social science tradition which continues
".
. .to identify eros and community, and to define com-
munity in terms of ’warmth,’ physical gratification, and
the ’original,' ’natural' desires of pre-cultural
,
pre-
political man" ( 1973 , p. 36 ). Nor is it, as others have
suggested, "a desire to recapture the ’sweetness’ of child-
hood." McWilliams would have us revive the old virtues of
"honor, obligation [and] authority" which "involve more than
constraint; as they imply, constraints are involved whenever
affection matters, whenever one is deeply bound to other
human beings " ( 1973 , p. 623 , emphasis ours). Here we seem
to find some agreement with most of the writers reviewed in
this study; that the sense of community has everything to
do with order; and that the necessary conditions for order
are that it neither yields to a tyranny of the one nor of
the collective, and that it springs from some vital central
value. We believe this is best epitomized in man's efforts
to create ideal or utopian communities. For this reason we
shall now turn to the subject of the commune.
CHAPTER I V
INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY
Communes and Commitment
The subject of the commune as a unique type of so-
cial organization, widely studied by sociologists, has re-
cently caught the attention of community psychologists (for
example, Sarason, 1974, 1978; Zax and Specter, 1974) pre-
sumably in their efforts to find material that is relevant
to an understanding of the community as process, or commun-
ity in the making. For this reason we shall turn toward
this subject as part of our attempt to understand the psy-
chological sense of community. It should be made clear that
while our chief concern is with the college campus as
community, we are not proposing that we turn our schools into
utopian communities where the object would be the establish-
ment of "harmony, brotherhood and peace" and other forms of
human "perfectability . " The point is not to turn colleges
into communes but rather to consider if, and in what manner
we may use the knowledge of how successful communes were
formed and maintained in the context of building or main-
taining a sense of community on a campus. (Some American
colleges, notably Antioch and Oberlin in the nineteenth
century, did actually begin as utopian experiments. Later
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in this chapter we discuss Black Mountain College, a twen-
tieth century example, whose rather brief existence is de-
scribed by Duberman [ 1972 ].) Sarason ( 1972
,
p. 86) has said
that "creating a commune and creating an establishment-type
setting conceptually and developmentally have far more in
common than has been recognized," although elsewhere (1974,
1978) his expressions seem more pessimistic about the pres-
ent knowledge, ability and willingness of social planners
and leaders to create "optimal social living conditions."
There have been those who have consciously set out
to create small social systems with the central goal of
establishing an order that would guarantee or at least maxi-
mize community mindedness which, in turn, would serve to
perpetuate the community structure. Such systems have been
called intentional communities; the term intentional commun-
ity refers to the structured "community mindedness," that
is, the "sense of community" that is built into the system.
Conover (1978), a specialist on the subject of the "alter-
nate culture" movement out of which such communities began
burgeoning in the late sixties, makes a technical distinc-
tion between communes and intentional communities. He de-
fines both forms as groups "of five or more adults who en-
gage in extensive sharing at the economic and interper-
sonal levels" with the distinguishing elements being that
communes, unlike intentional communities, incorporate a
"common pooling of Incomes" and "long-term multiple sexual
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commitments” (Conover, 1978, pp . 1-2). In this chapter we
are not concerned with such distinctions but rather with
the broader meaning of intentional community which would
include communes and any other social systems where commun -
ity itself is an important goal. The contemporary commune,
which Conover sees as an outgrowth "of currently felt
needs for community in an urban middle-class environment
seething with alienation and anomie," is the better exam-
ple of intentional community as compared to the 19th cen-
tury commune. The latter, according to Conover, was based
on other "influential dynamics" such as "ideologies impor-
ted from Europe" or the "economic theories of Owens and
Fourier." However, perhaps because of the advantage of
historical perspective, a more definitive body of research
seems to have come out of studies of the communes of the
past. We shall turn our attention to one such study.
Rosabeth Kanter (also reviewed by Zax and Specter
[197^ } PP* 282-295]), a Brandeis sociologist who writes
extensively on the life of communes (1970j 1972, 1973) > has
clearly and painstakingly provided an analysis of the
"mechanisms" she found to have been commonly present in
"successful" 19th century communal organizations (1972).
("Successful" communes are defined as those which lasted
twenty-five years or more.) Ranter's major focus is on the
concept of commitment , for she found that the chief differ-
ence between success ful and unsuccessful communes "lies
in
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how strongly they built commitment
. . . where the primary
issue is organization” (p. 64).
According to Kanter (1972, pp. 66-67), commitment
refers to
. . . the willingness of people to do what will help
maintain the group because it provides what they need
.
In sociological terms, commitment means the attachment
of the self to the requirements of social relations
that are seen as self-expressive. Commitment links
sel f
-^interest to social requirements. A person is
committed to a relationship or to a group to the extent
that he sees it as expressing or fulfilling some funda-
mental part of himself; he is committed to the degree
that he perceives no conflict between its requirements
and his own needs; he is committed to the degree that
he can no longer meet his needs elsewhere.
. . .
[Commitment] forms the connection between self interest
and group interest.
Kanter identifies three major aspects of a social
system that involve commitment: retention of members,
group cohesiveness and social control (1972, p. 67). It is
not clear from her initial discussion in which direction the
causality lies; that is, does commitment appear before or
after the appearance of these factors? However, she does
maintain that all three must be present if we are to find
commitment in a setting, and that each of the three as-
pects, although independent, may be "mutually reinforcing
and multiply determined” (p. 68). It appears that to have
a full appreciation of Ranter's analysis, we must, for the
moment, accept a kind of circular logic. To find a more
linear path we might ask these questions: What do we need
if we are to have a "successful” commune (i.e., lasting at
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least a generation)? Presumably, Kanter would answer that
we need people who are willing to "stick it out," "stick
together," and "stick" to the values and demands of the
system (retention, cohesiveness and social control). Then,
how would members be influenced to orient themselves to a
system in these three ways? Kanter provides a rather con-
cise answer in the form of three distinct kinds of commit-
ment which, in turn, lead to precisely the three major
factors of a "successful" commune.
Says Kanter "A person orients himself to a social
system instrumentally
,
affectively, and morally" (1972,
p. 68). An instrumental orientation is the "cognitive"
approach whereby a person evaluates the rewards and costs
that come with participation in a group (i.e., "What's in
it for me?"). When experience, in the balance, produces a
"positive cognition" then Kanter would say that such a
person has the potential of developing an instrumental com-
mitment
,
which, in turn, induces him to stay in the system.
Similarly, an emotional attachment to persons in the system
would produce an affective commitment which leads to group
cohesiveness; an attraction "to the moral compellingness of
the norms and beliefs of the system" produces in the indi-
vidual a moral commitment leading to an acceptance of so-
cial control.
Thus, the central issue for Kanter was to discover
the manner in which successful communes developed within
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their memberships these kinds of commitment so essential
for the maintenance and survival of their settings. There-
in, we believe, lies the core of her work.
Kanter discovered six commitment—building processes
which she distinguished from other elements in the nine-
teenth century communes and which were found to be more
prevalent in the successful ones (1972, pp . 75-125). These
processes or commitment mechanisms are seen by Kanter as
either detaching-oriented or attaching-oriented
.
(To re-
duce the value of non-communal commitments, detachment
processes are needed; attachment processes are required to
increase the value of communal commitments.) The three
attaching mechanisms are investment
,
communion
,
and tran-
scendence
;
the three detaching mechanisms are sacrifice
,
renunciation
,
and mortification . Sacrifice and investment
are seen as the mechanisms that promote retention; these
are the instrumental aspects. Renunciation and communion
are seen as the mechanisms that promote cohesiveness; these
are the affective aspects. And finally, mortification and
transcendence are seen as the mechanisms that promote
social control; these are the moral aspects. Such an analy-
sis suggests a pyramidal relationship among the various pro-
cesses. This may be seen if we arrange the categories in
this fashion:
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THE ENDURING COMMUNE
COMMITMENT
RETENTION COHESIVENESS SOCIAL CONTROL
SACRIFICE/ RENUNCIATION/ MORTIFICATION/
INVESTMENT COMMUNION TRANSCENDENCE
detachment/ detachment/ detachment/
attachment attachment attachment
INSTRUMENTAL AFECTIVE MORAL
We do not believe that Ranter’s theory of commit-
ment would hold that these are pure categories, but only
that they are categorical trends. As noted above. Ranter
sees them as mutually reinforcing, but independent. How
independent, of course, cannot be determined in such an
ex post facto analysis. It is not difficult to conceive,
for example, that transcendence would enhance the sense
'V~
of cohesiveness, or that social control would be enhanced
by cohesiveness, etc. It remains for us to understand
how Ranter has defined the six commitment mechanisms and
to see the kinds of examples she has cited for each.
"Sacrifice
,
11 says Ranter (1972, p. 72), "involves
the giving up of something valuable or pleasureful in or-
der to become a member of the organization . . . , mem-
bership becomes more costly and therefore is not likely to
be given up easily." And later she adds (1972, p. 76)
"Sacrifice operates on the basis of a simple principle
from cognitive consistency theories: the more it ’costs’
a person to do something, the more 'valuable' he will con-
sider it, in order to justify the psychic 'expense' and
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remain internally consistent." The chief factors here
were abstinence and austerity . Examples cited by Ranter
of abstinence were the giving up of the use of alcohol,
tobacco, coffee, tea, rich foods, or meat. Also cited
were celibacy, and the prohibition of wearing jewelry and
other "personal adornments." Examples of austerity repre-
sented other kinds of "nonindulgence"; "an ascetic life-
style (often arising out of necessity) and the struggle to
literally build the buildings and all aspects of the com-
munity 'from scratch'." Ranter found that communities in
which there was no shared struggle had less commitment and
therefore a tendency to be shorter lived (1972, p. 79)-
" Investment involves giving up control over some
of the person's resources to the community" (Ranter, 1972,
p. 72). "Profit" thereby is committed to the group; leav-
ing it then becomes "costly" (p. 80)
.
The cost can be in
actual dollars or property or in the expenditure of "time
and energy." Examples given by Ranter include financial
contributions upon admissions, buying shares of stock, and
assigning property to the organization. One important
component of investment, whether in the dollar mode
or the
participation mode, is that outsiders are excluded
from in-
vesting. A second component is irr ever sib ility_,
that is,
tended not to allow persons to withdrawsuccessful communes
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their contributions when they left the community
. The
custom of not keeping records underscored this policy.
Giving up relationships outside of the community
and avoiding private, exclusive attachments (either dyadic
or family) within the community is what Kanter refers to
as the renunciation mechanism (1972, p. 73). Examples given
fall into four categories (p. 92): insulation
,
which in-
cludes the adaptation of uniforms or special language or
jargon, the ignoring of outside newspapers and the customs
and holidays of the outside world; cross-boundary control
,
which includes restrictions on leaving the community and
interaction with visitors; couple renunciation involving
either free love or celibacy or other measures of controlling
sexual relations; and family renunciation involving parent-
child separation or the prohibition of families sharing a
dwelling unit.
Kanter defines communion as " . . . bringing members
into meaningful contact with the collective whole, so that
they experience the fact of oneness with the group and de-
velop a 1 we-feeling' " (1972 , p. 73). Six factors contrib-
uting to communion are identified by Kanter. They are listed
here with some of the examples that are cited by her:
Homogeneity. Similar religious, social, educa-
tional, national or ethnic back-
grounds of the members.
Communal Sharing. Shared ownership of property; shared
wages; even shared clothing.
Communal Work.
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Job rotation; no wages; no charge
for services; no skills required
for admission.
Shared dwellings and dining halls;
regular group meetings; few places
for privacy.
Special celebrations and ceremon-
ies; group singing; songs related
to community.
Common enemy; physical attack and
economic discrimination; public
denouncement s
.
A fifth commitment mechanism is mortification
,
de-
scribed by Kanter as . . the submission of private
states to social control, the exchanging of a former iden-
tity for one defined and formulated by the community"
(1972, p. 7^). Examples offered are public confession and
mutual criticism, public sanctions, punishment within com-
munity, spiritual differentiation such as probationary pe-
riod for new members, distinguishing between members on
moral grounds, and deindividuation
,
using such factors as
uniforms and communal dining halls and housing.
The sixth and final mechanism is transcendence ,
".
. .a process whereby an individual attaches his deci-
sion-making prerogative to a power greater than himself,
surrendering to the higher meaning contained by the group
and submitting to something beyond himself" (1972, p. 74).
Four factors which were discovered by Kanter to be facili-
tate of the transcendence mechanism are listed below to-
gether with some examples:
Regularized Group
~ Contact
.
Ritual
.
Persecution Ex-
perience
.
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Institutionalized Awe
. An elaborated Ideology; charis-
matic leadership and membership;
mystery, magic and powers in-
vested in group; authority hier-
archy; special leadership pre-
rogatives
.
Guidance
. Fixed daily routine; rules of
personal conduct and demeanor.
Ideological Conver-
Taking of vows; selective pro-
cess for admission to member-
ship; commitment to ideology
required
.
Norms which have "withstood
the test of time"; community
derived from prior organization
passing on the values and norms.
Rosabeth Ranter’s analysis of the processes that
make communes work provides us with possible clues as to
what the bonding mechanisms might be in social systems
other than communes. Such "mechanisms," of a less intense
variety than the ones found to be operative in communal
settings, could be used, not in a "technical-engineering"
sense, but in a set of principles that could guide decision-
makers and policy-makers who choose to be guided by the
psychological sense of community as an overarching value.
Sarason, who himself is very skeptical about how-to-do-it
approaches to the problem of building a sense of community,
nonetheless observed that John Humphrey Noyes, the founder
of the famous Oneida Community, was "... outstanding [in
his] conceptual and technical accomplishments in instill-
ing the sense of community" (1978, p. 286). (Sarason was
sion
Tradition
.
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referring to Noyes’ use of group dynamics, particularly his
use of communal ’’mutual criticism.") Not surprisingly,
Kanter recognizes that the sense of community is just what
communes are meant to embody. In the preface to her second
book on commune life ( 1973 , p. xiii) she explicitly states
"All kinds of organizations in the society could borrow
ideas from communes about how to enhance the 'sense of
community’ among their members and at the same time could
be made aware of the dangers that communes sometimes expe-
rience and so be prepared to avoid them." However, Kanter
leaves it to her readers to decide just how such borrowed
ideas may be properly extracted and applied to non-communal
organizations; that is, in settings where we would neither
desire nor expect individuals to completely divest them-
selves of their separateness through a total investment in
the group.
What we mean by sense of community does not appear
to have the degree of intensity of the identification of the
self with the group that is involved here. However, it may
be that in our search for the meaning of PSC, we would have
to, in the very least, keep our community psychological
compasses pointed in the direction of commitment as con-
ceived of by Kanter. For the moment, an important thing
to
keep in mind is that the college campus presents a
very
special case of community which makes the goal of
building
commitment an especial challenge. In fact, some
sociologists
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may argue that with a "two-year" or "four-year" stay built
into the system, and with thirty to fifty percent attrition
being almost a universal fact of life, we cannot properly
talk about colleges as being communities. We shall return
to this issue in Chapter X.
And lest we forget, Zax and Specter remind us (197^,
p. 292) that even "successful" communes are not immortal.
Longevity, itself, becomes problematical, ideologies become
"stale" and new generations lose the zeal of the founding
fathers. Hence, an important lesson in the study of com-
munes is that the psychological sense of community is only
one important factor in the building of better social systems.
Black Mountain College: An Experiment
in Community and Education
P~
A fresh perspective on the issues of communal life
is offered by author-playwright Martin Duberman in his
book about the life and decline of an experimental college
community (1972). The community. Black Mountain College,
which thrived in the foothills of North Carolina from 1933
to 1956, attracted Duberman’ s attention because of his com-
bined interest in community and education. He is skeptical
of the usefulness of the sociologist’s approach to the study
of communes or other intentional communities because of so-
cial science’s insistence on "time/edifice measurement and
evaluations" (that is, length of time, etc., as a criterion
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of success). For example, using Kanter's twenty-five
year measure (the sociological definition of a generation),
Black Mountain just missed being "successful" by two years.
Writes Duberman:
But durability, size and endowment are coarse, and
perhaps wholly irrelevant gauges of an institution's
actual importance for the individuals who come within
its orbit. Anarchist communes, often surviving for
only a few months, and during those months often liv-
ing on the edge of survival, can have a greater impact
on the lives of their transient members than, say, an
Ivy League college or the undergraduates who reside
in it for four uninterrupted years. ... My only
point is that mere durability (like mere transience)
is not a sensitive barometer for measuring the quality
of communal experience—though it's the one usually
favored by historians of utopia (1972, p. 161).
Duberman is skeptical about sociology's ability to
successfully draw parallels between the various utopian
communities and thereby to develop generalizations or
models of how communities become communities. "I've be-
come convinced," he writes, "that the configuration of each
community was and is so special that parallels between
them are forced—at least at the level of generalization
where one could begin to talk about 'basic' human capaci-
ties and needs" ( 1972 , p. 257 ). In one sense Duberman'
s
book suffers from a lack of the social scientist's zeal for
finding unifying principles. In a larger sense, however,
his book provides us with a rare documented report of the
day-to-day conflicts and resolutions that actually did
arise in one intentional community.
Initially it seemed that the founder, John Andrew
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Rice, set out to build a community—not a college. However,
Duberman quotes Rice during one of the never-ending and
typical "community discussions" about the identity of
Black Mountain as asserting quite the opposite. Here is
an excerpt:
I say it is a college. And I say that the difference
between the college and the so-called ideal communi-
ties ... is this: in any community which you set
up the idea is that people shall live in that commun-
ity, and the aim of that community is the achievement
of happiness. Whereas the job of a college is to
provide a place into which people may come and get the
kind of development which will enable them to leave
it (1972, pp. 132-133).
In Black Mountain "the kind of development" to
which its founder alluded was principally individual
achievement in the arts—clearly an artistic setting in
which talent was the norm, and lack of talent, deviance.
Therefore, a significant thing about this enterprise was
the tension between the goal of community and the goal of
private development. What comes through clearest, however,
is that members who were rewarded received such "rewards"
mostly in light of their contribution to the community.
This is what gave Black Mountain its "experimental" qual-
ity, what distinguished it from other higher education
institutions of the time. A central aim, says Duberman,
. . .
was to keep the community small enough so that
members could constantly interact in a wide variety
of settings . . . All aspects of community life were
thought to have a bearing on an individual’s educa-
tion— the usual distinctions between curricula and ex-
tracurricula were broken down . . . while information,
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analytical skills and reason were prized, they wereconsidered aspects rather than equivalents of personaldevelopment; they were not confused
—as they are inmost educational institutions
—with the whole of life
4l%2)
lly elements of self worthy of praise (1972, pp.’
That contribution to the community was the over-
arching value is borne out by the practice of not readmit-
ting students who failed to demonstrate a willingness to
participate, even if those students’ academic work was
proceeding satisfactorily:
No single activity or attitude was itself taken to
be the measure of participation; nobody had to hoe
beans, or to help repair the road, or to turn in papers
on time, or to be chatty at lunch. But if an individ-
ual constantly refused to do any of the jobs or reso-
lutely held back from any association with community
life, if he was totally apathetic or single-mindedly
disruptive he wouldn’t be readmitted the following
year (1972, p. 90).
Prom Duberman's report we would gather that the
very tension which arose from the conflicting goals (indi-
vidual versus community) through the media of constant
self-examination and community dialogue fostered by its
system of governance, produced the organization elan which
we are calling sense of community. Though its faculty
and leadership were changing, and its ideals of educational
utopia were continuously in flux, the shared enterprise of
educative participation provided the bonding mechanism for
that sense of community. Important too, was the part that
the group process played, although that by itself did not
prove to be the panacea some of its leaders hoped it would.
Ironically, according to Duberman, the "economic precari-
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ousness" that stayed with Black Mountain throughout its
history was one of the major factors in "community elan"
(1972, p. 82 ). In fact he reports that Rice, the founder,
believed that "Communities
. . . should lead hand-to-mouth
existences; unsettlement was their life's blood" ( 1972
,
p. 161). The book offers a number of instances in which
austerity automatically led to community practises like
shared labor, most notably the "building program," which
in turn fostered a sense of cohesiveness.
AH in all, in spite of the author's cynicism re-
garding sociologic generalisations, it is apparent that
the parallels with the "commitment mechanisms" outlined by
Kanter are glaringly present in this report of an educa-
tional community. However, there remain two important dis-
tinctions. One is the overriding importance of individual
achievement. The second, which was controversial and
therefore fluctuated in its importance at any one time in
Black Mountain's history, was the acknowledgement of the
"surrounding community" and an involvement with it. Sara-
son too considers involvement with "the community in which
a setting is embedded" as vitally important to that setting's
psychological sense of community [Sarason, 1980]). Duber-
man explains:
. . . The "other" community— the one beyond the walls
—was periodically acknowledged, but a blend of appre-
hension ("they'll burn us down"), and disdain ("they're
incapable of understanding us"), had kept contact min-
imal .
And then Duberman tells us that a new leader ap-peared, for whom . . . "community" meant both
what went on within the college and betweerTThe college
and its neighbors; and he viewed Black Mountain's iso-lation from its local setting as a scandal (1972 d
243) . * P
However, the new leader found little faculty support for
this "second communal concern," and it never achieved the
centrality of the other two major enterprises: shared
community and the flourishing of individual artistic ex-
cellence. It should be noted how the "apprehensions"
mentioned above bear a very close resemblance to what
Kanter described (1972, p. 102) as the "persecution ex-
perience" serving as a "communion mechanism."
That Black Mountain achieved a psychological sense
of community there seems to be no question; and neither
does Duberman leave us in doubt that its founders set out
deliberately to do so, however fumbling and contradictory
were their efforts. For our purposes, the importance of
Duberman f s case history of such an institution is that it
forcefully illustrates, even when the sense of community
is a guiding value agreed upon by all, that a setting may
in the end not survive the convulsions that arise out of
its search for a consensus. As Sarason points out repeat-
edly, agreed upon values do not necessarily lead to a
consensus in terms of what actions or policies should be
adapted to preserve such values. Be-that-as-it-may , if we
were to use Duberman' s barometer for measuring the "success
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of a community, i.e., the degree of impact it had on
the lives of those that passed through, we would guess
that Black Mountain scored quite high.
Summary and Discussion
We have reviewed Ranter's analysis of the commit -
merrfc mechanisms found to be essential elements of the
successful communes of 19th century America. Commitment
was seen as the connection between self-interest and group
interest, the link between the self and social require-
ments. It was arrived at more readily in communes which
maximized retention
,
cohesiveness
,
and social control
among its members. These, in turn, were respectively
dependent upon certain "detaching" and "attaching"
instrumental
,
affee ti ve
,
and moral behaviors (mechanisms)
which Ranter identified as sacrifice/investment
,
renuncia-
tion/communion
,
and mortification/transcendence
. It was
observed that while such intense practices and the re-
sultant deep personal commitments are more appropriate in
a communal setting than they would be in a college setting,
there may nonetheless be important implications in re-
gard to the question of what it is that enhances the
degree to which a sense of community is present in any
given setting.
A good example of a college which was structured
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around community life (i.e., an intentional community) was
found in Duberman's case study of Black Mountain College.
We learned that an important distinction between an ideal
community (such as a commune) and a community-oriented
educational setting is that the latter "is a place [like
the family] where you get the kind of development that
would enable you to leave" whereas in a commune the ideal
is to create an environment to which one would be committed
essentially for life. Another related distinction that
appears in a community such as Black Mountain is the in-
terest in individual achievement— in this case, in the arts.
However the founder and subsequent leaders of the school
structured the programs and environment of the place so as
to achieve community. This was accomplished principally
by breaking down the usual distinctions between curricula
and extra-curricula--that is, personal development involved
all aspects of community life, the classroom being only
one of those aspects— and by a system that emphasized dia-
logue and self-examination in a group setting, participa-
tive governance, and communal practices such as shared la-
bor and shared resistance to persecution and other hazards,
not unlike the commitment mechanisms which Kanter discov-
ered in successful communes. Notwithstanding, we saw that
Black Mountain did not endure long enough to meet Ranter’s
criterion for success. We conclude that the intention to
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create a sense of community in a college setting, and in-
deed the achievement of such (evident in this case his-
tory ) does not in and of itself provide a guarantee of
institutional longevity—sobering knowledge for the writer
of the present study who may otherwise have become intoxi-
cated with the idea that the psychological sense of com-
munity is enough to elude all the forces that might con-
tribute to the decline of a setting. In the case of Black
Mountain we saw that in the end that setting did not sur-
vive the convulsions that arose out of its search for a
consensus. However, it did achieve its founder’s purpose
in developing an environment where students and teachers
learned to excel in their art, share in their work, and
leave with the certain knowledge that real community is
possible
.
CHAPTER V
THE COMMUNAL RESPONSE TO CRISIS
Crisis as a Bonding Mechanism
One of the issues related to the psychological
sense of community is the question of what lies behind the
well-known phenomenon of the intense but transient subjec-
tive feeling of community that often is experienced by
persons during a crisis. In Chapter I the writer related
how his experiencing of a severe winter storm first led
him to ponder the whole issue of "sense of community" be-
cause of the manner in which the crisis seemed to momentar-
ily transform stranger into neighbor, and interpersonal
guardedness gave way to exhilarated openness. In our read-
ing of the literature we found that most authors writing
about community mentioned this phenomenon, examples of which
are presented below. However, we found no unified crisis
theory of community feeling that would provide an explan-
ation for such experiences. On the other hand, we
found
bits and pieces of related material, most notably
in Au-
drey’s discussion in The Territorial Imperative
(1966) on
the part that threat and stimulation play
in territorial
motivation. Throughout our discussion of this
issue it
would be well to keep in mind that at
center stage of this
108
109
paper Is an Investigation of what It Is that makes humans
band together in a unified and cooperative spirit
. The
crisis phenomenon as a subject of discussion is to be seen
as an important side-issue an understanding of which may
throw some light on our subject.
Cowen (1973) has defined crises as "brief concen-
trated periods of disturbance, often characterized by in-
tense upset, preoccupation, emotional churning, a sense of
inadequacy, and openness to the impact of other people "
(1973, P- ^39, emphasis added). This definition was not
presented in a context of a discussion of community per
se, but rather in a review of intervention systems, in this
case, "crisis intervention," in community mental health.
What caught our eye, of course, was the reference to the
"openness to the impact of other people." It reminds us
that sometimes, in a psychotherapeutic context, the thera-
pist may introduce tension, strain or some form of con-
trolled "crisis" as a strategy for promoting some desired
change in the therapeutic process. For example, in a book
on family therapy, Minuchin and Barcai (1972) present a
chapter entitled "Therapeutically Induced Family Crisis" in
which the authors discuss the induction (in therapy) of
"unstable situations requiring restructuring." Here crisis
is seen as "an opportunity for change." In an article on
primary prevention Caplan and Grunebaum (1970) elaborate
on this view:
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It appears likely that the direction of a person's
psychological development throughout life, whether
toward mental health or disorder, is most sensitive to
influence at times of crisis . These crises represent
transition points, at each of which the person may
move nearer or further away from adaptive patterns of
functioning. Primary preventive efforts are often
directed toward modifying the field of forces at times
of crisis in the belief that efforts may be more ef-
fectively and more efficiently applied at these times
(1970, p. 68, emphasis added).
In an early work dealing with the application of the
social work model to the college campus Price (1941), dis-
cussing social norms, observes that "One departs from con-
formity in times of great stress or disaster" (1941, p.
45). She goes on to say:
Whenever social life ceases to run smoothly . .
.
,
and
there are tensions and strains in the lives of a num-
ber of people in a community, the equilibrium of life
ceases to be stable and the air is pregnant with pos-
sibilities .
Freud (1921) recognized the emotional integration
among group members that takes place during a crisis.
Panic, on the other hand, results in the "cessation of
emotional ties which hold a group together" (Freud, 1921,
p. 48). It is also well-known that environmental disorder
and social upheaval may be important factors in the etiol-
ogy of mental disturbance in terms of the stress that may
be created. (Newspaper accounts of the aftermath of the
"Three-Mile Island" disaster indicate both the phenomenon
of the unifying of the community and the heavy toll in
terms of depression and other mental problems.) However,
Ill
the community psychological approach would emphasize the
development of resources that would help community members
cope with stress while at the same time encouraging the
mobilizing and galvanizing effects of that stress (Heller
and Monahan, 1977
,
p. 130 ).
So far we have been discussing various conceptions
of crisis which have in common the idea that (except in
panic) a person in crisis is brought into more significant
contact with others, whether it be in terms of "openness
to impact," "opportunity for change," "sensitivity to in-
fluence," "emotional integration," or being in an atmos-
phere which is "pregnant with possibilities." We would
assert that it is no coincidence that classic social psy-
chological doctrine (e.g., Katz and Kahn, 1978 ; Thibaut and
Kelley, 1959 ) relating to organization and group behavior
holds that the more cohesive a group is the more its mem-
bers are subject to the influence of the group as a whole.
In other words, "crisis" and "community" (cohesiveness)
seem to produce a similar set of effects. Another example
is the finding by Feldman and Newcomb in their study of
the impact of college on students (1969) that the "impact"
of college seems to increase in settings that are more
intimate and cohesive. It still remains for us to discuss
what others have said about the relationship of these
variables
.
Attempting to describe what he means by the concept
"psychological sense of community" Sarason (1974) uses
this illustration:
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[It] is at its height when the existence of the refer-
ent group is challenged by external events, by a cri-
sis like the air war over London in 1940, or a catas-
trophe like an earthquake; it is also at its height
for shorter periods in times of celebration, during a
political victory party or an Easter mass (197^, p.
157).
Many of the authors we have reviewed use war or
catastrophe as exemplifying the power of crisis to create
the sense of solidarity and community among a previous
peaceful, but otherwise alienated multitude. Morgan (1957)
seems to struggle as he describes his concept of "the
quality of community" : "... mutual confidence, good
will and responsible brotherhood— small face-to-face social
group we call the small community—intimate acquaintance,
cooperation . . ."—until he offers this image: "It was
present to some degree at the sinking of the Titanic [ !
]
It is this "animal instinct" or "cultural tradition," warns
Morgan, which causes a social group to close ranks when it
is threatened from without, and provides the impetus
to
move from patriotism to nationalism to war (1957, P- 38).
Nisbet (1970) writes about "the community-making
property
of war" and "the power of war to create
a sense of moral
meaning"
:
Func 1
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ness of participation in a moral crusade.
Society attains its maximum sense of organization andcommunity and its most exalted sense of moral pur-
P° se * • • • (Nisbet, 1970, pp . 38-39).
Finally, Nisbet, in describing the effect that the crisis
of war had on its people and its men in battle, seems to
strike at the essence of communal motivation:
The presence of mass numbers was lightened, the imper-
sonality of existence was transfigured and, even if alarge amount of personal anonymity remained, it was,
in a curious and paradoxical way, an identified anony-
mity (1970, p. 41 ). “
Of course the authors we have quoted are not suggesting
that we go to war to find community. Rather they are
demonstrating that one of the dangers of the lack of the
sense of community in society is that war has the capacity
to act as a stimulus that would easily arouse the sense of
community
.
McWilliams, in his book The Idea of Fraternity in
America ( 1973 ), discusses this danger: (The concept of
fraternity as used by McWilliams is closely related to our
concept of the psychological sense of community in that
we are discussing community in the context of relatively
small collectivities. In the fragment that follows the
author is in the middle of an argument against "universal
community" in favor of a "limited society" which forms the
emotional basis for fraternity.)
Only in one situation does the alienation of
brothers from the community seem to end. During the
period of crisis and war the shamelessness and fear-
ii4
lessness of brethren, their willingness to lose lifeand their fascination with death, become needs ofsociety, not dangers to it. War and crisis aretemptations of those false brothers for whom frater-nity is not enough, who would escape alienation inorder to re-enter community.
. .
* • Fraternity is in any case at odds with the
continuous community; its values include at least the
commitment that physical survival can come at too hich
a price (McWilliams, 1973, pp. 30-31).
The death of a leader is also often used as an
illustration of crisis as a bonding mechanism. Two exam-
ples should suffice. Ardrey, in The Territorial Imperative
(1966), describes his experience as he stood among a mas-
sive throng that waited outside the Vatican as Pope John
lay dying:
Contrary to those reports published widely abroad,
it was not a religious experience.
. . . But there was
a silence quite unbelievable in Italy. The throng
stood in shadowed, tight little knots, watching the
lighted window, all with heads slightly tilted
. . .
I lingered, I lingered. I could not go home. I
found myself gripped by an absurd emotion, one as
pure as any I had ever known. ... If it was a re-
ligious experience that united us ...
,
then it was
an experience of pagan order.
The death of a Pope or even of a president may
unite the world in grief or shock. The union may last
for hours or days, yet brief though its stay may be,
we cannot ignore it. The union transcends all boun-
daries, all seas, all ranges of mountains however
high (1966, pp . 298-299).
And similarly, Mendes-Plohr (1976), in explaining Buber’s
concept of the "Centre” provides the following quote from
Buber’s essay, "What Is Man," to illustrate "the Gemein-
schaft between men which emerges from the common realiza
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tion of a shared Centre": (We would guess that this would
be Buber’s answer to what lies behind crisis as a bonding
mechanism.
)
[Observe] the close union which is formed for a fewdays among the genuine disciples and fellow workers of
a movement when an important leader dies. All imped-iments and difficulties between them are set aside, and
a strange fruitfulness, or at all events, incandes-
cence, of their life with one another is established.
Another transient form is seen when in the face of a
catastrophe which appears inevitable the really heroic
element of community gathers together within itself,
withdraws from idle talk and fuss, but each is open to
the other and they anticipate in a brief common life,
the binding power of a common death (Martin Buber as
cited in Mendes-Plohr
,
1976, p. 19).
Crisis, Territory and Biological Morality:
Ardrey’s Territorial Imperative
(
4-
We have provided some examples of how war and the
death of a leader have been seen as illustrations of the
"binding power" of crisis. These stand at the extreme end
of a continuum of crisis; other less extreme situations
which nonetheless also tend to promote unity and solidar-
ity are discussed throughout the literature. Some examples
are the "communion mechanisms" of persecution and hardship
discussed by Kanter (1972) and the economic precarious-
ness of a college that tended to solidify the community
(Duberman, 1972). Now we shall turn our attention to the
question of what may explain the phenomenon of a communal
response to crisis.
As we stated earlier, nowhere have we found any
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theoretical discussion of this issue. What is it that
seems to innately compel humans not only to act_ in unity in
face of a threat (where common sense provides the answer of
"strength in numbers"), but to feel unity, to feel an
"exalted sense of moral purpose," a "union that transcends
all boundaries," a "strange incandescence," to experience
an "identified anonymity," a "psychological sense of com-
munity," if you will? One possible answer comes not from
a profoundly religious or profoundly sentimental source,
but from one author who, as a playwright, has dipped into
both of those sources, and moved over, as an amateur, into
a source that is profoundly scientific— the "new" biology
—
in order to learn more about the human condition.
The author is Robert Ardrey who, in his book The
Territorial Imperative ( 1966 ), "... brings into focus a
single aspect of human behavior which [he believes] to be
characteristic of our species as a whole, to be shaped but
not determined by environment and experience, and to be a
consequence not of human choice but of evolutionary inheri-
tance" (Ardrey, 1966, p. v) . For our purposes we have not
concerned ourselves with the whole of Ardrey’ s interpreta-
tion of what natural science has to say about human (and
animal) behavior in the context of territoriality. We are
concerned only with those aspects of territorial behavior
and the "sense of territory" that may hold some implica-
tions for this study of the "sense of community" and to see
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particularly what light it may shed on the issue of crisis
and human bonding.
The territorial imperative is the "inherent drive
to gain and defend an exclusive property" (Ardrey, 1966,
p. 3). The bulk of the author’s treatment of the subject
is devoted to sociological illustrations of territorial
behavior with a running undercurrent of the argument that
man is by nature, not nurture, aggressive. Skipping over
those chapters we arrive at the chapters dealing with
the "amity-enmity complex" in which discussion is directly
focused on the question of the place of danger, the value
of threat, in inducing solidarity among the inhabitants of
a territory. Although Ardrey continues to drive home his
point about the biological basis for human aggressiveness,
we find that this point is balanced by another argument:
that morality exists in nature, "that human morality is a
simple evolutionary extension of a form of conduct which
has existed in nature for many hundreds of millions of
years" ( 1966 , p. 260). He reviews the cultural anthropo-
logical literature, including the later writings of Dar-
win, which essentially support this view by showing that
groups whose members were more cooperative than other
groups were more likely to survive, in an evolutionary
sense. Thus amity has a selective value. Now the question
becomes does enmity have a selective value; the answer
Here is where the concept of threatcuriously is yes.
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(hazard) and the amity-enmity complex become relevant to
our present inquiry, particularly when Ardrey informs us
that he is writing about
•
t
•
-a biological morality to describe that conduct
dictated by innate command which sacrifices individual
interest for~~a larger or longer good
. 7 7 (1966, p.
24 5, emphasis added).
Ardrey does not define "amity" for us, so we
understand the word by its common definition, a state of
peaceful, friendly relations. Although "amity," strictly
speaking, does not carry the connotation of "community,"
we are basing our discussion on the idea that, because
amity is discussed in the context of a common territory,
we may at least cautiously apply Ardrey’ s findings to the
idea of community. When we consider that the author inter-
sperses notions of "biological morality," cooperativeness,
and "sacrifice of individual interest for the larger good"
amid his pronouncements about amity, we feel we are not
leaping too great a distance to go from one concept to
the other.
Two additional ingredients of the amity-enmity com-
plex need defining; these are "enmity" and "hazard," both
definitions of which are supplied by the author:
By enmity I refer to those forces of antagonism
and hostility originating in members of one’s own spe-
cies. By hazard I mean those threats which do not
originate in one’s own species ( 1966 , p. 249 ).
119
The complex itself is expressed by Ardrey as a
simple equation: A = E + h. The formula is explained
this way:
The amity, in other words, which an animal expres-
ses for others of its kind will be equal to the sum
of the forces of enmity and hazard which are arrayed
against it (1966, p. 249).
The author then provides a long list of natural and super-
natural examples of hazard ending up with the comment that
"All [natural hazards] for the moment or for the month
brought forth amity among men" and "In the history of human
affairs . .
.
,
[supernatural hazards] made an honorable
contribution to social amity. ..."
In general, Ardrey tells us, amity is in short sup-
ply most of the time among most of the species, while "E
grows truly on trees." According to the complex theory,
amity is inextricably linked to cooperativeness, and coop-
erativeness to the presence of a common danger, in this
case, enmity or hazard, Ardrey explains:
. . .
Since amity exists no longer than mutual purpose,
then when the purpose is either achieved or permanently
frustrated, amity will end. Unless a new joint pur-
pose arises to channel joint energies, individuals
will return to a normal condition of mutual animosity
(1966, p. 251).
Taking another look at the equation, A = E + h, it
can be seen that "as h goes up, so E comes down"; in other
words
,
... to produce a given quantity of amity in a social
group every increase in hazard which the group faces
reduces the need for enmity. ... A human community
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facing extraordinary hazard may well have no need of
enemies at all to attain the most perfect social amity
and concerted action (Ardrey, 1966, p. 253).
It is apparent that, if Ardrey had his choice, he
would stimulate fellowship with hazards rather than with
enemies. He makes the rather provocative observation that
our technological ability to eliminate hazard in our en-
vironment could ironically lead us into a search for ene-
mies and hence war. Perhaps the nostalgia for hazard is
made palatable by again considering what we have termed
the communal mechanism of crisis. Ardrey* s rendition of
this theme will by now sound familiar to the reader:
The simplest of arithmetic will demonstrate that
as h rises, then to produce an effective amity, E may
fall. But let us forgo the dismal swamp of even the
simplest arithmetic and recall those experiences of
fire and flood and sudden storm, of natural emergen-
cies which as if by spontaneous combustion produce
instant mutual aid, unthinking sacrifice, smiles on
the faces 1of strangers, intimacies exchanged which
have never changed hands before, a gladness and trust
that leave us sorry when the emergency has passed
(1966
,
p~! 319
,
emphasis added) .
Although the principal motivation in territoriality
is the defense of property, therefore making the primary
concern enmity rather than hazard, for our purpose it is
sufficient to recognize, in theory at least, that either a
crisis of hazard or of enmity has the effect of being a
bonding mechanism in a social group. However, as in any
attempt to reduce human behavior to an equation, there is
always the danger of neglecting important variables, par-
ticularly those that other schools of thought would attrib-
121
ute not to ’'motivation” but to intrinsic, instinctive or
otherwise internally induced behavior. Thus we have to
ask, what of compassion, altruism, love, etc.? Even if
such things are conditioned, is there no permanence of
reasonable habitual stability, in this case, of amity,
without the press of E or h? Or, more in keeping with the
nature of our inquiry, must there always be "something out
there" to induce a sustained community?
For Ardrey, the answer is an unequivocal yes:
. . . Granted that enmity is the root of all goodness
—a concession which [the human psychologist] is un-
likely to make—will there not be some conditioned
residue of affection, loyalty, trust that will continue
to motivate the pair, family, or larger social group
even when common defense no longer unites them? Must
there always be enmity? What about love, for God’s
sake?
I hasten to confess that I have nothing against
love and indeed should lack the courage—a most salient
point—to contemplate existence without it. But I do
not believe that long association in amity or long
conditioning of individuals to a habitual way contrib-
utes measurably to the human outcome. . . . Where
goes real estate, there goes love (1966, pp . 252-253)-
Lest we be unfair to Ardrey, we should point out
that he is no doubt using his playwright's license to in-
dulge in absolutes and hyperbole to drive home a point, a
privilege not bestowed upon the pure scientist who must
mask his absolutes and avoid exaggeration whenever he at-
tempts to reduce human qualities to mathematical state-
ments. In the end, the author confesses that he came up
with amity-enmity equation as a "private joke on those psy-
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chologists" who do just that, and that he recognized its
failure to include "the infinite ranges of human variabil-
ity" including "minor symptoms of original or residual
amity which exist though insufficiently to effect social
organization" (1966, p. 318).
A second concept introduced by Ardrey to explain
why man acts as he does is essentially a triple need-
motivational theory which would explain the phenomenon of
human territoriality using psychological rather than phys-
iological factors. Two of the motivational needs are bor-
rowed from animal territory theory: security—provided by
the interior of the territory, or the "nest site"—and
stimulation—provided by the periphery of the territory
—
"where the fun goes on." To these the author adds a third
need: identity
,
with which
. . . Through a fixed and unique relationship with
something larger and more lasting than himself [man]
has defeated the pressures of anonymity (1966, p.
158 ).
. . . More permanent than the animal itself [he has
found] a place, whether social or geographical, [that
is] his and his alone ( 1 9 6
6
,
p. 308).
The three needs are then arranged in hierarchical order:
. . .
There are few exceptions to the rule that the
need for identity is the most powerful and the most
pervasive among all species. The need for stimulation
is not far behind. And security, normally, will be
sacrificed for either of the other two ( 1966 , p. 310).
After introducing the second concept, the author,
we feel, fails to adequately treat the question of how it
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would combine with or relate to the amity-enmity complex.
If we put both of the concepts within the perspective of
the underlying theme of his book perhaps the interaction of
the dual concepts can be appreciated. While we are con-
cerned exclusively with the problem of community we must
not lose sight of the fact that Ardrey's main concern is
that as long as man (like other animals) is programmed to
seek identity, stimulation and security (in that order),
and as long as man (like other animals) requires common
enemies or hazards to keep him in community (so as to de-
fend a territory) there is always the danger, when the ele-
ments that would satisfy these needs are scarce, or when
hazard or enmity are in short supply, that man will be
driven to war . For we have seen in our own review that
war is the example par excellence of what can cure the
deficit in the societal sense of community; now Ardrey would
simply add to that the notion that war is also the ultimate
cure for anonymity (a deficit of identity), for boredom (a
deficit of stimulation), and for anxiety (a deficit of
security)
.
We find one possible inconsistency in Ardrey's ar-
gument, particularly as we attempt to reconcile his need
theory with his amity-enmity theory. It would appear to
us that enmity and hazard (in addition to "fun") may both
be considered to occur at or near "the periphery of the
territory," and hence are occurrences which answer the
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"need" for "stimulation." Needs, by definition, are ends
in themselves (except insofar as they have survival value),
and therefore typically require no further inducement to
be called into action other than the prior satisfaction of
those needs higher up in the hierarchical order. What is
incongruent, it seems to us, is the author's dogged refusal
to view "amity," itself as a human need, even though he
talks about its "selective value" and "biological moral-
ity." Maslow, for example, included love as one of the
basic instinctoid needs, but Ardrey explicitly rejects
Maslow' s conception by asserting that he regards it "not
as a human need but a human answer" (1966, p. 309). This
may be too facile an assertion when we consider that Ardrey
views enmity and hazard (forms of stimulation) as answer-
ing, in a sense, the "need" for amity. Without moving
further into the proverbial chicken/egg trap, we would
simply suggest that perhaps "community," seeing that it
subsumes love, amity, security and identity, and that its
basis is a "biological morality," may be viewed as a high
order of need that has evolved out of the swamp of
terri-
torial defense and possession. The question is
does the
sense of community require for sustenance a
constant diet
of some form of stimulation, tension,
resistance "at the
periphery," and the preservation of safety
and security
"at the interior of the territory?"
Tentatively we would
findings would suggest that the answersay that Ardrey ’s
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is yes. Crisis can then be seen as just one example of
peripheral stimulation that causes members of social
groups to close ranks and. feel as one in the interior of
a territory—in the community
. To make this clearer let
us turn to examples other than crisis.
What we have not discussed so far are those in-
stances of transient
,
intense sense of community resulting
from communal experiences of joy, celebration and ritual.
Such instances were alluded to by Sarason in the fragment
quoted above in which he was trying to illustrate the sen-
sation called the psychological sense of community. Most
recently we saw this in the response to our U.S. Hockey
Team victory over the Russians in the 1980 Olympic Games
or in the Panamanian street scenes viewed on the news re-
ports following the Roberto Duran victory in his champion-
ship bout with Sugar Ray Leonard: momentarily social de-
fenses seemed to have been shorn, the boundaries of the
self seem to have been obliterated and a massive merger
of selves appeared to have come into being. (The writer
witnessed this to some degree in a recent street festival
that took place in the Puerto Rican neighborhood of Hart-
ford, Connecticut. But the sense of community there ap-
peared to have been of the more permanent kind; it was
there before and will have continued to be there after the
festival. It is not an uncommon scene to see mainland
Puerto Ricans, who presumably are "strangers," greet and
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converse with one another as they pass in the street or
meet at an event. Is this not an example of the amity-
enmity complex at work? And what happens when the ingre-
dient of a victory celebration is added to a neighborhood
festival? The psychological sense of community—a phrase
that does not do justice to the moment—is at its height.)
Where does this phenomenon fit into our discussion of
crisis? There is a common denominator here that as yet we
have not identified; it logically must be a larger cate-
gory that would include crisis, celebration and ritual
(not an exhaustive list) on the same level.
With these added elements, does territoriality
still provide the unifying principle? Hazard and enmity
would conceptually include crisis. Stimulation, one of
the three hypothesized territorial needs, by the same token,
should include joy and ritual and the like. If this is so,
even though joy and ritual are not at first glance part of
the anity-enmity process, they do fit in nicely with Ar-
drey’s threefold need theory. First, their inclusion in
the theory might offer an explanation as to why people
seem to be drawn to these experiences (an alternative
to
the pleasure principle), and second, since joy and ritual
induce a communal response, and given that amity
has group
selective value in terms of the evolutionary
concept of
the survival of the "most cooperative," it
would then fol-
low that these could be conceived of as
examples of stimu-
N
/
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lation "at the periphery of the territory."
The over-all answer (at least from the perspective
of Ardrey ’ s conception of territorial behavior) that may
possibly explain the intense binding power of the kinds
of conditions or events we have been discussing may be
provided in the form of chain hypotheses concerning be-
havior which is "a consequence not of human choice but of
evolutionary inheritance "
:
(1) Persons in groups who share a common "territory"
have an innate need to be mutually interdependent
and cooperative— the best condition in which to
"defend" their territory.
(2) Persons, however, tend to live in a normal condi-
tion of mutual distrust, animosity or simple in-
difference, in which the sense of a common terri-
tory is only dimly felt at an unconscious level.
(3) Because of the needs of identity, stimulation and
security and because these are tied to conditions
and events that are related to the common terri-
tory, the repressed sense of commonality is aroused
to consciousness under conditions of
(a) crisis, whether of hazard or enmity, and/or
(b) communal experiences of joy, celebration,
ritual, etc., related to such shared owner-
ship and which meet the three needs of iden-
tity, stimulation and security.
(4) The repressed sense of commonality rising to
consciousness is experienced as a "psychological
sense of community."
Alternative Hypotheses
In the beginning of this chapter we introduced the
subject of crisis by relating it to the phenomenon "of the
intense feeling of community" that frequently accompanies
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it. Through a review of Ardrey's work we considered how
his conceptions about territorial behavior might illumi-
nate this issue. Such illumination has suggested some
hypotheses and raised some questions deserving of further
study. To do justice to exploring the relationship between
territoriality and community would require a whole and sep-
arate study. In general, this task is taken up by the
discipline of environmental psychology and social psychol-
ogy, where such issues as the stability of social organi-
zations, role relations, status hierarchy, self/other
boundary, the regulation of social interaction, and commun-
ity safety are discussed as territorial concepts. (An
example of the treatment of some of the issues mentioned
may be found in an article by Patterson [1978]. His ex-
tensive bibliography provides rich ground for further
exploration
.
)
Furthermore, there are many alternative hypotheses
which we did not touch upon. Bakan, for example, in his
Duality of Human Existence ( 1966 ) writes about the duality
communion-versus-agency . (By "agency" Bakan means that
which is centered on individual interest.) His concept of
"the repression of communion" in society may possibly ex-
plain the sudden appearance of communion in situations of
emergency (or victory celebrations), on the theory that
"communion is repressed because of its threat to the agentic
ego" (Bakan, 1966, p. 16) and that the ego drops this de-
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fense at peak moments and emergencies. Another hypothe-
sis might be that crisis produces the equivalent of an
"undermanned setting" (see our discussion. Chapter IX)
thereby creating the sense that "every one belongs and is
needed." Or consider Nisbet's idea (1970) that crisis,
for the moment, frees us of the sense that there is an
all-pervading power (i.e., the State, etc.) and instead we
experience the sense of interpersonal reliance and trust,
where "the veil of alienation is momentarily dropped
. . . and we experience a personal sense of function and
authority." Added to these would be an hypothesis sug-
gested by the community psychological findings mentioned
A
earlier in this chapter to the effect that persons are more
open to others and others' influence in times of crisis.
Not unrelated is the concept of synergy discussed by Mas-
low in regard to a notion of management which he labeled
"Eupsychian" (Maslow, 1965, p. 65). All of the examples
which we have mentioned are consonant with one another,
and not inconsistent with the chain propositions we have
derived from Ardrey . Readers who are uncomfortable with
the deterministic orientation of our propositions because
they involve such elements as instinct or "the unconscious,"
are encouraged to think about these matters through
other
frames of reference. We will mention just a few examples.
There is a social psychological concept in the
field
of group dynamics known as plurali stic ignorance.
This is the
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. . . condition in which the members of a group in-
correctly believe that "everyone else" in the group
holds a certain attitude, whereas they themselves
do not (Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey, 1Q62
p. 269).
Let us assume that a particular culture-specific "mental
set" exists in our society such that all or most persons
believe, through pluralistic ignorance, that "everyone
else" feels self-sufficient and has neither the need to
be reached out to or cared about, nor to reach out and
care. Those of us familiar with the group process will
know that one of its principal mechanisms, sharing
,
has
the effect of "breaking down" this kind of ignorance, the
results of which might explain the common experience of
the "high" of encounter. Could it be that experiences of
mutual danger, celebration of victory, or mass ritual, and
the like, might have a kind of revelation effect, not un-
like the encounter phenomenon, in which pluralistic ignor-
ance is momentarily cast aside?
Finally, we should mention Maslow's concept of the
peak-experience elaborated upon in his Toward a Psychology
of Being ( 1962 ), if only because there appears to be some
surface resemblance to the kinds of experiences we have
been describing. Perhaps the individual differences in
the responses to identical events of the sort we have
been discussing can be explained according to the degree of
"self-actualization" or the talent for making "B-cognitions
.
We shall tempt the reader with one quote and then leave
it
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to him or her to follow through:
One aspect of the peak-experience is a complete
Uiough momentary, loss of fear, anxiety, inhibition ?defense and control, a giving up of renunciation
d^lay and restraint
. . . . This too implies a greater
openness of perception since fear distorts.
Since it is in the world "it represents a kind of
fusion of the Freudian "pleasure principle" and "real-
ity principle."
. . .
We . may therefore expect to find a certain "per-
meability" in people who have such experiences com-
monly, a closeness and openness to the unconscious,
and a relative lack of fear of it (Maslow, 1962, p.
And, we may ask, what is lurking in that "unconscious"?
Perhaps Ardrey has a pre-historic answer.
Summary and Discussion
We began by reviewing some behavioral scientific
notions about the impact of crisis. There was some evi-
dence which suggested that crisis has the potential of
providing therapeutic and social side-benefits. Noted was
the tendency of crisis to lead people to openness to
others, to promote the restructuring of unstable situations,
to make people more sensitive to others' influence, to
allow them to depart from conformity, and to stimulate the
development of resources. We saw that crisis tends to
bring persons into more significant contact with one another,
and that it may contribute to emotional integration and
provide a more unified sense of purpose.
The idea was explored that territoriality, which
132
Ardrey defined as "an inherent drive to gain and defend
territory," may be a factor in the creation of community
feeling and at the same time may serve as one explanation
of the communal response to crisis. The amity-enmity com-
plex as described by Ardrey provided the Dasis for under-
standing how danger and threat have value in terms of their
ability to induce solidarity among the inhabitants of a
territory. In this context we saw how human morality may
be conceived of as a "biological morality" derived from
the evolutionary survival value of group cooperation. Thus
Ardrey talked of "the selective value of amity," and of the
phenomenon of hazard which was seen as the necessary condi-
tion in which such a biological morality would be induced
—a response to an "innate command which sacrifices individ-
ual interest for a larger good." Psychologically, the ter-
ritorial imperative was viewed as being propelled by three
basic motivational needs: identity, stimulation and secu-
rity. This theory suggested to the writer that the idea of
community comes out of the satisfaction of these needs.
Thus community may be conceived as a psychic parallel to
territory
.
Discussed in addition to crisis were other kinds
of communal stimulation: joy, celebration and ritual. These
kinds of events were hypothesized by the writer to be capa-
ble of unleashing from the primitive unconscious innate
feelings of territoriality which are consciously experi-
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enced as a "psychological sense of community." A number
of alternative hypotheses which could explain the communal
response to crisis were presented.
It is now time to consider the implications of these
In respect to our main topic; that is, in general,
how do we relate any insights we have gained regarding the
communal mechanisms of crisis, celebration, ritual and joy
to the problem of maintaining or creating the psychological
sense of community?
We shall begin by stating the obvious: that to
promote community in an institutional sense we certainly
do not recommend going to war, invoking disasters or the
deaths of leaders, economic brinksmanship
,
mass orgies,
encounters or evangelistic revival. What is_ recommendable
?
For as McWilliams succinctly puts it:
. . . There is no simple tactic which can produce
brotherhood ( 1973
,
p. 93)-
The following are examples of "territorial" principles
suggested by our findings that may be considered if the
psychological sense of community is to be preserved or
promoted in a setting:
1. Encourage, do not discourage, regularity of contact
of the membership; assemblies for one purpose or
another
.
2. Encourage celebration; the observance of traditions.
3. Provide safe and secure conditions within.
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4. Develop a consciousness of the setting with clearly
stated set of goals, values and standards for that
setting that are known to all.
5* Recognize and reward individual contributions to
that setting which reflect its values, standards
and goals.
6. Develop a consciousness of boundary such that a
member knows unambiguously when he is in and when
he is out of that setting.
7. A member whose behavior consistently is at odds
with the values and goals with the setting cannot
remain a member; a person may not be admitted unless
she or he demonstrates congruence with such values
and goals.
8. Encourage activities, entertainment, athletic events,
on a communal scale. Allow release time for such
events
.
9. Promote interaction with other similar settings.
Encourage competitive events.
10.
Keep total membership informed of the state or con-
dition of the setting particularly in terms of situ-
ations that would call for celebration or the clos-
ing of ranks, the good news and the bad news.
We shall stop here; the list can go on and on but we believe
we have made our point.
Since these are the kind of "territorial" principles
suggested by the material discussed in this chapter, then
we believe a caution is in order. A perusal of this list
should put a sense of fright in the heart of anyone who is
familiar with the tragic misuse of similar "principles" in
the recent history of the Western world; this is a list,
innocuous in the abstract, unattached to any value system
except the "value of community." We believe that unless
such a value were informed by the "higher" values of democ-
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rac^r and humanism, then the principles of the amity-enmity
complex, and of "identity, stimulation and security,"
though effective, are potentially extremely dangerous tools.
Demagogues have always used the cry of "enmity and hazard"
as a tool of massive manipulation. Palmer (1977), for
example, makes a distinction between "true" and "false"
community, Ihe most notable example of false community,"
he writes, "is the totalitarian society to which the de-
cline of true community leads.
. . . What was Nazi Germany
except a demonic form of community life?" Clearly, Hitler’s
propaganda machine made extensive use of the territorial
principles, particularly "enmity" in the form of scape-
goating. And what better recent example of the "demonic
form of community life” is there than the Jonestown tragedy
in Guyana?
It now appears to us that we have to turn to a human-
istic source, to find a higher set of principles that would
explain the basis not only of a transient sense of commun-
ity that is the psychological or biological accompaniment
to a multitude of phenomena, but of a more enduring kind.
For this purpose we shall turn to Martin Buber.
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introduction to his translation of a collection of Buber’s
lectures and essays (Buber, 1965):
;
• * 1 -Th°u is the primary word of relationship itis characterized by mutuality, directness, presentnessintensity and ineffability
. Although it is only with-in this relation that personality and the personal
really exist, the Thou of I-Thou is not limited to men,
ut may include animals, trees, objects of nature, and
uoa
. i-lt is the primary word of experiencing and
using. It takes place within a man and not between him
and the world. Hence it is entirely subjective andlacking in mutuality. Whether in knowing, feeling, or
acting, it is the typical subject-object relationship.
It is always mediate and indirect, dealing with objectsin terms of the categories and connections, and hence isincomprehensible and orderable. It is significant onlvin connection and not in itself. The It of I-It may
equally well be a he, a she, an animal, a thing, a
spirit, or even a god, without a change in the primary
word. Thus I-Thou and I-It cut across the lines of our
ordinary distinctions to focus our attention not upon
individual objects and their causal connections, but
upon the relations between things, the dazwischen
("there in-between"). Experiencing is I-It whether it
is the experiencing of an object or of a man, whether
it is "inner" or "outer," "open" or "secret."
. . .
. . . Man can live continuously and securely in the
world of It, but if he lives only in this world he is
not a man (Friedman, 1965, pp . 12 - 13 ).
Later, in his introductory essay, Friedman, comment-
ing on Buber’s 1956 lecture, "What is Common to All" (Fried-
man, 1965, pp. 89-109), brings to mind a question that is
of weighty significance as we contemplate the issue of the
"quest for community": can we in fact, or should we, con-
duct a direct, self-conscious search for the experience of
the psychological sense of community? Although the section
that Friedman is commenting on deals explicitly with Buber's
criticism of the report by Aldous Huxley on "the astonish-
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ing effects of mescalin intoxication," we believe there is
a relevant message to be gleaned here. For that reason it
would be worthwhile to quote both the commentator and the
author. First we hear from Friedman who, lumping William
James in with Huxley because of James’ Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience
,
accuses James of setting the fashion
".
. . for extracting the mystical ’experience' from
.
the whole religious reality by turning it into a psychologi-
cal content—an experience that a person has ..." Fried-
man goes on:
. . . it also leads to the pragmatic inversion that
causes James and Huxley to encourage others to cultivate
these experiences so that they too may know these "real
effects." The great mystics did not have experiences,
they were had by them. They were seized by them in
their total being and just thereby knew themselves to
be in contact with a larger reality than themselves.
The modern cultivator of experience, in contrast, knows
no truly independent reality since "experience" has be-
come for him something he possesses, an internal, es-
sentially psychological reality whose effects on him
are far more real than the sources of these effects. It
follows, by the same token, that he does not "experi-
ence" with his whole being, but only with that part of
him which registers the effects, while the other part
of him, the one that seeks the experience, remains per-
force the detached observer separated from his experi-
ence by his very knowledge that he is having it (Fried-
man, 1965
, p . 44 )
.
Familiar to many of us are the transient "highs" of
the weekend encounter and other such experiences that seek
in vain to create an enduring sense of community. While
they are unlike the drug experience described by Huxley in
that they often do provide participants with lasting tools
with which to reach out to others, they nonetheless stop
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short of reshaping the institutions and organizations (from
which these participants make their pilgrimages) into via-
ble Gemeinschaft-like communities. Let us now turn di-
rectly to Buber’s text in which he neatly and succinctly
explodes the myth of "chemical communion" so widely espoused
by the counter-culture in the sixties and seventies and to
which Huxley referred as "the urge to go beyond the self":
. . . But in reality the consumer of mescalin does not
emerge from this net into some sort of free participa-tion in common being; rather merely into a strictlyprivate sphere given to him as his own for severalhours.
.
...
The fugitive flight out of the claim of
the situation into situationlessness is no legitimate
affair of man. And the true name of all the paradises
wbich man creates for himself by chemical or other
means is situationlessness. They are situationless
like the dream state and like schizophrenia because
they are in their essence uncommunal
.
~
7 (Buber, 1965
,
p. 100, emphasis added).
In a more recent commentary on Buber’s thinking,
Mendes-Flohr (1976) explicates Buber’s ideas regarding the
possibility of achieving a sense of community in modern
industrial society. (As we shall soon see, Buber would
certainly reject our use of the word "achieve" in this con-
text.) Unlike Tonnies, Buber, according to Mendes-Flohr,
did not believe that Gemeinschaf
t
".
. .is forever locked
in the past" ( 1976 , p. 17 ). Buber, says the reviewer, in-
troduced the idea that gemeinschaftliche relations persist
on the interpersonal, sub-institutional level. Here he
quotes Buber from an early work: "Gemeinschaft exists
ywhenever individuals open themselves to one another . .
CHAPTER V I
BUBER’S CONCEPT OF "THE CENTRE"
Community and the "Living Center "
Martin Buber's classic work, I and Thou (1958),
originally published in 1923, represents an early state-
ment on his existentialist position in regard to the rela-
tion of man to man; "existentialist" because he derives
his concepts as to what is human from experience rather
than abstract thought. Buber's thought is brought into
this report primarily to discover if his well-known concept
of I-Thouness
,
originally set in a dyadic context, is
applicable to man as a communal being. As we shall see,
the answer is yes, but a qualified yes that takes us into
the realm of a "metasociology" and complexities of thought
that we were not quite prepared to undertake. The question
is can we derive some important pragmatic message for use
in the micro-society of a college campus from ideas of this
eloquent thinker?
To understand Buber's concept of community or what
Mendes-Flohr refers to as The Centre (1976), we must first
begin with a brief introduction to the more basic concept,
I-Thou. For that purpose we can do no better than to re-
peat Maurice Friedman's explanation which appears in his
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[whenever] immediacy is established between one human being
and an other” (1976, p. 18). Mendes-Plohr believes that
the understanding of this interpersonal structure would for
Buber constitute the foundation for the renewal of Gemein-
schaft
. Undoubtedly,” writes Mendes—Plohr
,
"this concern
underlies, in part, the central work of Buber's life, I and
Thou
,
and much of his subsequent writings."
However, Mendes-Plohr points out the chief differ-
ence between I-Thouness and Tonnies' concept of Gemeinschaft :
the I—Thou relation does not include ",
. . any institution-
al warranty which assures its continuity." On the other hand,
the writer believes that the frequent renewal of an I-Thou
relation would resemble a kind of "constancy." He adds:
In this context, one should perhaps speak of the I-Thou
relation as a Zwiegemeinschaf
t
. The transition from
the Zwei - to the Vie lgeme in- sc ha ft is, of course, the
central problem. When speaking of a Gemeinschaft
embracing a group of individuals (what I have called
the Veilgemeinschaf
t
) Buber preferred the term die
Gemeinde
,
which for him denoted community qua enduring
social fact (Mendes-Plohr, 1976, p. 18).
What causes or maintains this "enduring social fact"
(i.e., the psychological sense of community)? Let us turn
directly to Buber for an answer:
True community does not come into being because people
have feelings for one another (though that is required
too) but rather on two accounts, all of them having to
do with a living center and they have to stand in a
living reciprocal relation to one another. The second
event has its source in the first, but it is not immed-
iately given with it. A living reciprocal relationship
includes feelings but it is not derived from them. A
community is built upon a living center (Buber, 1958,
p7 87, emphasis added).
1A1
Mendes-Flohr quotes extensively from the many works
of Buber to demonstrate that the concept of the Centre is
the philosopher’s chief contribution to the understanding
of community. That there must be a Centre in order to have
community there is no doubt, but it is not altogether clear
just what the Centre is. We suspect that Buber knowingly
left its precise meaning obscured. Here are a few fragments
from Buber which Mendes-Flohr quotes in his essay: The
Centre is "the sphere of ultimate values"; "a true, charis-
matic leader"; "a transcendent central Thou shared by num-
erous individuals"; "a metaphysical sensation that accom-
panies the effort to build a just, organic community." And
then Mendes-Flohr offers several examples from Buber illus-
trating the idea of a shared Centre. Interestingly, one of
the significant examples given relates directly to the theme
addressed in the preceding chapter, the question of why
great upheavals and disasters tend to instill in the persons
experiencing them an intense sensation of community. The
example is that of the death of an important leader which
has the effect of galvanizing a community and having men,
at least for that moment, lay aside their differences.
It is just this short-lived quality, the inherently
discontinuous nature of what Mendes-Flohr refers to as "situ-
ational revelations" that makes us look for something more
in the explanation of community. That something more that
we are looking for may be provided in Buber's concept of
Ik2
social renewal
. Mendes-Flohr says it this way:
* * * BY? havinS °nce undergone the exalting occasion
of
\ a Veilgemeinschaft , men thirst for something spread
out over time, for duration. Thus institutional reli-gion is born: the Centre becomes God-object. Con-
comitantly, men also "thirst for something spread outm space, for the representation in which the community
of the faithful is united with its God." The cult of aCentre-God thus arises. Both religion and cult ini-
tially serve to supplement the founding acts of relation
of the Vielgemeinschaft
,
but in time they become sub-
stitutes for these relations. What is more, religious
dogma and cultic practices tend to weaken one's atten—
tiyeness to the address of the eternal Thou. A group's
relation to the Centre must be renewed in every situation
,
or else it ceases to be a genuine Veilgemeinschaft or
Gemeinde (Mendes-Flohr; 1976. p. 20. emphasis added).
We said earlier that we were curious to see if the
I-Thou concept had any implications in our search for an
understanding of sense of community. We now see that Buber
makes this rather explicit when he speaks of a center as be-
ing an "eternal Thou"; that is, a community is not merely a
collection of I-Thou relationships. How then does the I
become a We? Apparently it does so when a group of persons
turns to a "Centre." This is what Buber refers to as the
"essential We." Mendes-Flohr quotes Buber (1976, p. 20):
"When a culture is no longer centered in a living and con-
tinually renewed relational process, it freezes into an
It-world . . . When the essential We is present, there pre-
vails within a group an outer directness which is the
decisive presupposition of I-Thou relations."
Mendes-Flohr, who is a sociologist and not a theo-
logian, is concerned with how Buber's idea of the Centre,
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which is primarily conceived of as an "eternal” or "tran-
scendent Thou," may be applied in a social context. And we
too, in this paper, are seeking to discover concepts that
may be useful in what we are calling the communal context of
an educational setting. Buber’s answer is at once striking
and disappointing. (This great master is not in the busi-
ness of providing easy solutions to worldly problems.)
Mendes-Plohr (1976, p. 22) reports that "Buber admits that
the Gemeinde
,
as conceived by him, cannot be comprehended
by ’current sociological categories.'
. . . the Gemeinde
is not to be associated with any particular social structure.
An essential We can arise in every kind of group, but it
cannot be understood from the life of any single one of the
groups'." This is the section that is at first glance dis-
appointing in terms of the topic of this paper. Buber re-
jects the idea that Veilgemeinschaf
t
can be purposefully
created! You cannot cause it; you cannot will it; you
cannot intend it
!
The point here is that community, sense of community,
or Veilgemeinschaf
t
is not determined by institute onal or
social structuring. As a sociologist, Mendes-Flohr ’ s in-
terest in Buber is not to learn how to build better socie-
ties that are bonded by some sort of common "Centre." Ap-
parently, his interest stems from the recognition that there
are profound sociological consequences of the response of
institutions and societies to a common "Centre."
Where does this leave us in our quest? As in a mes-
sage from the tradition of mysticism, we are told, in
effect, that we cannot rationally plan and then build and
structure either a society or a setting with the goal of
creating an enduring community, that we cannot seek directly
that which we seek. What Buber does, in fact, is bring us
full circle back to the I-Thou proposition. For Buber be-
lieved that "social renewal was not primarily a function of
<
institutional change, but of a fundamental transformation of
interpersonal relationships" ( 1976
, p. 22 ). (This is very
close to Sarason's observation [ 1974
,
p. 276 ] that building
a sense of community is not a matter of "technical-engineer-
ing" but rather a matter of needing "to understand how the
nature of our culture produced the situation we wish to
change.") And so Mendes-Flohr designates Buber’s philoso-
phy of "the Centre and social renewal" as a "metasociology,
independent of social life" in which genuine community de-
pends for its emergence on the religious principle of peo-
ple’s responsiveness to an "eternal Thou." However, knowing
that Buber's thought is in the existentialist tradition and
therefore rooted in man’s day-to-day world, we are not sat-
isfied with Mendes-Flohr ' s dismissal of Buber’s concept of
the Centre as merely religious or metasociological . To
pursue this we should like to turn again to Buber's essay,
"What is Common to All" ( 1965 , pp . 89 - 109 ).
Buber begins his lecture by discussing the pre-
145
Socratic philosopher, Heracleitus, whose symbol Is fire and
who is associated with the world principle of change or
flux. Logos— or the Word—is "the ultimate reality" or
"the meaning of being," but it is not a fixed reality. It
is not the Word as content but the Word as process that is
important for Heracleitus. For Buber, too, the importance
of the word is process
,
that is, what takes place "between
man and man." The expression, "the essential We," which
appeared in a previous quote, is conceived of as having its
origin in this process, that is, in the relation between the
I and the Thou, which is represented as the Word or "the
common." Says Buber (1965, p. 107):
Man has always had his experiences as I, his experi-
ences with others, and with himself; but it is as We,
ever again as We, that he has constructed and developed
a world out of his experiences.
. . . Thus the cosmos
is preserved amid the changes of the world images.
Buber's writing, to us, has the quality of dealing at one
and the same time with the lofty, such as with the idea of
the "cosmos," and with the down-to-earth, such as the
interchange between persons. He makes of this "between-
ness" someting cosmic. Somehow, this says to us that
the idea of the Centre, even if put in terms of an "eter-
nal Thou," is really made of the stuff of plain human
relations that could happen in someone's living room. When
Buber says ". . .he who existentially knows no Thou will
never succeed in knowing a We" (1965, P- 108) he is telling
us that to have community we must first begin by entering
into direct, mutual, intense and ineffable relationships
with significant others, for "only men who are capable of
saying Thou to one another can truly say We to one another"
(1965, p. 39). (The converse of this was expressed by
Fromm [1956] in his dictum that loving relationships are
not authentic unless the loving partners each feel a fellow-
ship with the rest of mankind, or with the others in the
community.) Essentially, Buber’s conception is that inter-
personal communion and communal strength are inextricably
bound, the one concept embedded in the other.
Summary and Discussion
We have examined how Martin Buber's ideas of the
I-Thou relationship and of "The Centre" and "social renewal"
relate to the concept of community and sense of community.
To begin with, there was the admonishment that community
as a psychological experience is not something that you seek
and then "have." Buber likened the idea of "having" or
"seeking" such an experience to that of the experience of
mind altering drugs: no more than a transient high, pri-
vate rather than communal, and "situationless." Communi-
ty was seen as that condition that occurs when people
stand "in a living reciprocal relation to one another fac-
ing a center— a living center." This center was conceived
of as an "eternal Thou.
"
Since "men thirst for something
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spread out over time and space"—a thought implying that man
has an inherent need for transcendency—they need a Centre
that takes them beyond "situational revelations." The
Centre is the nucleus of a continuing social renewal,
transforming a mere collection of I-Thou relationships into
community. Social renewal, was seen as not being attain-
able simply by institutional or social structuring, but
rather by "fundamental transformation of interpersonal re-
lationships" (I-Thou).
In the final analysis we have to ask if Buber's
thinking on the relationship of man to man and to his God
or to his "Centre" has any bearing on the question at hand;
that is, how does it contribute to understanding of how a
sense of community is formed and maintained. At first glance
we would have to say that Buber would be very skeptical
about man's ability to build a sense of community, that is,
to deliberately set out to create such a spirit. Similarly,
his concept of the Centre presumes an already existing force
and seems to allow little if any room for the idea of the
Centre as a force which could emerge from the conscious
efforts of social planners. However, we believe this view
fails to take into account the existential nature of Buber's
propositions. It seems unthinkable that Buber would stop
short in a metaphysical realm and not have his thoughts be
relevant to the day-to-day world where man must encounter
man within the context of institutions, especially when the
quality of life in those Institutions may be a direct out-
come of how Its members relate to a "Centre" If indeed there
is a center.
It has been all too commonly observed that we live
m a pluralistic society, a society, therefore, which pro-
duces the antithesis of an "eternal Thou" or "The Common,"
or in the context of this discussion, the "Centre." Reli-
gion, of course, was the force which institutionalized the
gathering together of souls who faced a common center. The
mass-society theories of the lack of a sense of community
in our culture very clearly take into account the role of
the loss of religion in national and community life. What
is directly apropos to our subject is the role that religious
denominations played in the founding of colleges in our
country. Institutions that grew out of that tradition had
just that: "tradition." The "force" was already in place
which provided the necessary central gravity that held
these communities together. If not through religion, then
some of the other colleges grew out of some other center-
ing tradition, such as the land grant institutions, or the
state agricultural or normal schools. The secular, small
private colleges which have developed some sort of central
tradition, some raison d'etre known and felt by their popu-
lations and their alumni, probably succeeded in providing
the necessary "Centre" that tended to promote a sense of
community in much the same way as the denominational schools.
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If we were to look to Buber for guidance in terms of
how to promote PSC in a setting that is bereft of any kind
of centering tradition, then perhaps we might extract from
his "metasociology" the following guidelines:
(1) The setting would be structured around a central
value such that each person and each unit of
persons within that structure is committed to
that value, from the board of directors, to the
president all the way to the supporting personnel,
maintenance staff, etc.
(2) All programs in the institution would radiate from
this value, would be informed by it and would be
structured and operated accordingly.
(3) Interpersonal relationships, and both formal and
informal close-knit subgroups would be supported
and encouraged on the principle that "he who
. . .
knows no Thou will never succeed in knowing a We."
A club or a "clique," for example, in this context,
would not be considered an obstacle to community,
the theory being that if the overarching value of
an institution is the sense of community, then no
individual in that community would be in isolation
unless by choice.
(4) A corollary value that would be pervasive within
the above structures would be dialogue . For Buber
(1965, p. 4l) ". . . it is not enough to experi-
ence ’any mere feelings of group unity’— these must
be accompanied by a genuine listening; not just
the content of speech but the process— the ' . . .
in between in the dialogue between man and man.’"
(5) To avoid the pitfall of "the modern cultivator of
experience" in which the possessing of an experi-
ence becomes an end in itself or simply a psycho-
logical event, there would be something in the
institutional goals more than individual growth and
enhancement, something which transcends the person-
al and the organizational; we would call this a
transcendent value. A concrete expression of this
value would be the fostering of concern and rela-
tions with the community in which the setting is
embedded; and beyond that the various stages of
community that are layered one upon the other, from
family to neighborhood, to town, to state, to
nation, to world.
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(6) Finally, the I-Thou relationship would be threaded
and woven throughout the first five structural
principles. Community
, like charity, would begin
at home. To be avoided is that proverbial char-
acter who would love humanity but hate people.
If we were to choose a contemporary writer and
worker in our field whose life’s work and written work best
exemplifies ouberian values applied to the day—to—day
world of the helping professional, we would have to name
Seymour Sarason, to whose work we shall next turn.
CHAPTER VII
SARASON' S CONCEPT OF
"THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF COMMUNITY"
Community in Human Services :
Culture, Settings and Networks
In our search for an understanding of the concept
sense of community we were directed to the work of Seymour
Sarason who has taken what he calls "the psychological
sense of community" (PSC) to be the central issue in any
effort to deliver effective human services and educational
systems. Not so much concerned with a theoretical exposi-
tion of the psychological sense of community, Sarason pri-
marily addresses himself to workers in the field of human
services, particularly to those engaged in community psy-
chology. In the preface to his book. The Psychological
Sense of Community
,
Sarason (197*0 explains that he "could
not write a book about community psychology without putting
into center stage [his] belief that the dilution or absence
of the psychological sense of community is the most destruc-
tive dynamic in the lives of people in our society." The
remainder of the book essentially is an argument for the
proposition that the psychological sense of community should
be used by the community psychological profession as its
guiding principle for action. Writes Sarason:
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field which purported to be concerned with
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be concerned with and based on thee elopment and maintenance of the psychological senseof community (1974, p. viii).
n x i
This would require
, ,
• • • that any change in any significant aspect ofthe community
. . . be scrutinized from the standpoint
of what its possible effects would be on the psycho-logical sense of community (1974, p. 152).
The definition of the term psychological sense of
community as conceived of by Sarason is scattered in parts
throughout his writing. He introduces the expression by
describing it as
. . . the sense that one was part of a readily avail-
able, mutually supportive network of relationships
upon which one could depend and as a result of which
one did not experience sustained feelings of loneliness
that impell one to actions or to adapting a style of
living masking anxiety and setting the stage for later
and more destructive anguish (1974, p. 1).
In a more positive vein Sarason elaborates on the "network
of relationships," adding the elements of a "give and get"
availability, the "expression [of] our need for intimacy,
diversity, usefulness and belongingness" and a "willing
identification with some overarching value" (1974, p. 2).
Later he describes PSC as
. . .
the sense that one belongs in and is meaningfully
a part of a larger collectivity; the sense that al-
though there may be a conflict between the needs of the
individual and the collectivity, or among different
groups in the collectivity, these conflicts must be
resolved in a way that does not destroy the psycholog-
ical sense of community; the sense that there is a
network of and structure to relationships that . . .
dilutes feelings of loneliness (197^, p. ^1).
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In discussing how "community" is perceived and
conceived, Sarason supplies yet another definition:
. . . The perception of similarity to others, an ac-
knowledged interdependence with others, a willingness
to maintain this interdependence by giving to or doing
for others what one expects from them, the feeling that
one is part of a larger dependable and stable structure
—these are some of the ingredients of the psychological
sense of community. You know when you have it and when
you don’t. ... It is at its height when the exist-
ence of the referent group is challenged by external
events, by a crisis like the air war over London in
19 ^ 0
,
or a catastrophe like an earthquake; it is also
at its height, for shorter periods, in times of celebra-
tion, during a political victory party or an Easter
mass. It is one of the major bases for self-definition
and the judging of external events (197^, P- 157).
And finally he offers this definition in Work, Aging
and Social Change (1977) from a somewhat different perspec-
tive :
The psychological sense of community is a response
to the knowledge that you are a part of a network of
relationships, reciprocal in nature, and possessed of
qualities that prevent or dilute or shorten the disin-
tegrating effects of severe or prolonged loneliness.
. . .
[It] is a psychological phenomenon, but its pres-
ence or absence is a manifestation of political-eco-
nomic structure and organization and their underlying
values. This is the case whether one is dealing with
an entire society or a particular institution within
it (1979, P. 280).
In an interview with Sarason ( 1980 ) the writer ex-
pressed his curiosity about the addition of the word "psy-
chological" to the expression "sense of community":
jyx . # . . Originally, when I thought about this I
thought
it was kind of a redundancy—or that maybe you had
something in mind that I was not grasping. I do
use your term and I assume the literature has adopte
it
.
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S. frankly
,
I think it 1
s
redundant, you see. And ifyou were to ask me why I added "psychological" I
couldn’t answer you. Well—except that—well, for
an audience of psychologists if the word "psychology"isn’t in there— I mean, they're not likely to, youknow, pay attention to it
. . . . i really think it's
redundant. And I remember that, in fact/ it bothered
me a little bit.
Glynn (1977) makes the observation that Sarason's
description of a "total intervention in a total institu-
tion" (a state residential facility for juvenile offend-
ers—described in Chapter 8 [Sarason, 1974] provides what
"may be considered a preliminary and partial operational
definition of PSC . " The goals of the intervention tech-
niques which were employed by the intervention team are
summarized by Glynn this way: (The "team" was part of a
project sponsored by the Yale Psycho-Educational Clinic of
which Sarason was director and founder.)
The intervention team sought to strengthen and
increase the following among both staff and residents:
knowledge and awareness of the resources available
within the institution and the surrounding community;
a sense of uniqueness that included common concrete
goals for the institution; involvement and interaction
between and among individuals, groups and the sur-
rounding community; feelings of responsibility and
obligation to each other; and most importantly, a
sense of interdependence among staff, residents, and
the surrounding community, a realization that they
were part of a system where an act of one affects
others (Glynn, 1977, p. 15).
In looking back on this project in Work, Aging and Social
Change (1979b, pp . 283-284) Sarason concludes that "while
it is possible to improve the experience of work by en-
gendering a sense of community . . . the effort will con-
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stantly encounter obstacles and probably defeat, because
it cannot deal with or influence 'the larger system' to
which . . . the psychological sense of community is for-
eign." This remark is a reflection of one of Sarason's
major themes in relation to the need for a psychological
sense of community in the context of human services: when
there is no true feeling of community, people tend to
exclude, send away, or isolate for "special treatment"
those who are seen as "sick" or "deviant." He introduces
this theme in the preface to The Psychological Sense of
Community :
What I wanted to do was discuss [PSC] in terms that
would illuminate our culture at the same time that it
would have obvious relevance for community psychology.
The problem was easy for me to resolve because thirty
years of experience in schools and institutions led
me (finally!) to understand that segregation (in
special classes, mental hospitals, "reform" schools,
institutions for the retarded), justified as it always
is by "humane" considerations, was cause and symptom
of the dilution or absence of the psychological sense
of community (197^, P* ix)
.
"The fact is," writes Sarason in concluding his "total
intervention" chapter discussed above, "that members of
our communities experience little or no sense of commun-
ity and, therefore, when confronted with problems of
deviancy, remove it in one way or another from their
midot
always justifying the practice so as to make a virtue out
of a necessity" (197^, p. 213). (Philip Cowan [1975, P-
298 ]), in reviewing Sarason's book,
takes this idea one
of segregation for
step further. To him the consequence
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treatment is the maintenance of the status quo regarding
theories of treatment since it "eliminates the necessity
of considering innovative ways of integrating [persons with
special needs] into a heterogeneous and cohesive community.")
A related issue for Sarason is the importance of the
internal sense of community, that is, the idea that in-
corporated in the notion of the psychological sense of
community is that in addition to serving the clientele,
all those in any given work setting would also be served by
this principle. The problem, observes Sarason, is that
this "internal sense" falls "victim to the work ethic"
in which the criterion of helping the client diverts at-
tention from what is happening to the helper (197^, p. 271).
This is one of the important themes of Work, Aging and
Social Change (Sarason, 1979b), in which he sees the devel-
opment of this sense as "an integral part of the experi-
ence of work." There he maintains that teachers, for ex-
ample, including university professors, experience lone-
liness basically because the selection system and the
reward system tend to discourage the development of the
psychological sense of community He makes this assertion
again in his interview with the writer (1980)
:
This will tell you why I think schools will
never be much different than they are: . . . the
university [should be] a place where the conditions
are created whereby the faculty can learn, change ana
grow. . . . And unless those conditions exist, it s
going to be a lousy joint. Now if you were to as
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teachers ... to justify the existence of the ele-
mentary school the answer is always going to be "It's
a place for kids."
You cannot create the conditions of learning and
changing and growing unless you see that
. . . not
everything is "for the kids." But what we're bypass-
ing is that we're not making conditions that can help
teachers grow and change.
Moreover, Sarason maintains that agencies and
institutions which hope to have some semblance of a psycho-
logical sense of community must, in addition to giving at-
tention to their own clientele and personnel, pay atten-
tion to the larger community as well as other individuals,
agencies and institutions which have similar or related
missions in the larger community (Sarason, 1972, 197^,
1978; Sarason et al . , 1977). Discussing the college (in
response to a question posed by the writer) as the referent
social system, Sarason sums it up in this manner:
It's a microcosm. You see, you can talk of a
psychological sense of community on a continuum in
terms of geography, of an institution, of an agency.
You can talk about the college, for example, as a
community and what are the ways in which the college
works for or against that sense of community so that
people within it have that sense of belonging, the
sense of wanting to belong, the sense of a kind of
protection of a sort . In the case of a setting like
the college, however, I would argue that that sense
of community in part is a function of how that set-
ting relates to the larger geographical setting in
which it is embedded. At some point that becomes a
factor . . . which can make for a better sense of
community ... But in terms of the welfare of the
system, the viability of an institution. over time,
that is always related to how it_ as an^ institution
relates to the surrounding community (19o0).
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A recurring theme in Sarason’s works is the asser-
tion that agreement on values in the operation of a given
setting does not necessarily mean that there will be
agreement on a course of action. His concluding chapter
of The Psychological Sense of Community (1974, pp . 268-
277) essentially is a cautionary statement to the effect
that, although the dominant message of his book is that
the psychological sense of community should be seen as
the "overarching value that informs action," this in it-
self does not ensure the desired outcomes. And yet he
asserts, agreeing with B. P. Skinner, that "when there is
tension or conflict between the individual and the group
(or between groups), the decisive consideration for action
is the maintenance of the sense of community." Sarason
leaves us hanging with this circular contradiction. Un-
comfortable with this contradiction, Cowan (1975, p. 278),
in his review of Sarason’s book (1974), is fearful that
under Sarason’s philosophy of favoring the one extreme
("community") there would not exist "a healthy dialectic
tension between two or more sets of needs or values. . . .
The field [community psychology] must not be allowed to
fixate on arrangements at either pole of the dialectic
;
community psychology could most prolitably and
excitingly be defined as a search for a synthesis, a map
of the elusive territory of the meeting place
between sta-
bility and change, between autonomy and community.
How
ever, it may be that the reviewer missed this statement
by Sarason:
159
. . .
The psychological sense of community is a
transient experience that is always preceded and sooner
or later followed by some kind of conflict or tension
between individual and group norms or interests, or
between different groups. The tension is Inevitable
or avoidable
.
The destructive situation is one in which individ-
uality is completely overwhelmed or inhibited by the
larger group, or one in which individuality is treas-
ured to the point where there is no sense of commun-
Clearly
,
then, Sarason is not "fixated" at the extreme end
of the community pole, to the detriment of the individual.
as might be the case, for example, of cultist followings
la Jonestown in Guyana. (This case is briefly discussed
in our interview with Sarason [1980] .
)
To get a truly comprehensive view of how Sarason
would "put into practice what he is preaching" (to view
his "map of this elusive territory") in relation to
all the
themes discussed so far (i.e., the sense of community
as
an action-informing value, the "supportive
network of re-
lationships," the "political-economic structure"
of organ-
izations, dealing with "the larger system,"
the avoidance
of segregation as a principle of
treatment, the inter nal
sense of community as well as external,
the avoidance of
relying on the agreement of values
alone as an insurance
against failure, and finally managing
to jug0le sy
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cally between the poles of individuality and communallty )
,
one would have to look to his writings before Psychological
Sense of Community and after.
In two of his earlier books, one relating to change
in terms of an existing setting ( The Culture of the School
and the Problem of Change [1971], hereinafter referred to as
Culture ) , the other relating to the "creation of a setting"
( The Creation of Settings and the Future Societies [1972],
hereinafter referred to as Settings ) , we find no mention of
the expression "psychological sense of community." However,
in retrospect—that is, after reading The Psychological
Sense of Community— it appears that the three books taken
together represent a developmental progression on basi-
cally the same themes: all having to do with leadership
in educational or human service settings in the context of
a community as against an individual psychology.
In Culture (1971), for example, Sarason drives home
the idea that a successful leader (or teacher) must under-
stand the history, the anthropology, the values, etc.,
of
the school, its membership and its community hence
the
culture of the school." In Settings (1972), this
idea is
further developed in a thoroughgoing analysis,
with case
illustrations, of what makes a setting fall in
spite of the
best intentions of its creator. How this
all progresses
toward the present theme of the
psychological sense of
community may become clearer by attending
to this statement
that Sarason makes in Settings in his defense of B. F.
Skinner's "view of man in society" as elaborated upon in
Walden II:
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. . . Skinner’s citizens are not selfless or automa-
tons but rather individuals who have a crystal clear
commitment to the survival of their community. And
they are happy people. What Skinner describes is far
from utopian because it is one of the most frequent
characteristics of the earliest phases of the creation
of a setting, namely, an unconflicted willingness to
be a part of a larger group, to give priority to its
needs and values .... In earlier chapters I have
tried to understand why this happens, why it is such
a brief period in the life of a new setting, how it
comes about that individual needs become dominant over
group needs (and the level of unhappiness increases),
and the setting loses its momentum and purpose. The
point is that it is possible for the values of the
group to be dominant over individual ones without
_
loss of freedom and dignity (Sarason, 1972 , pp. 265-
266 ) .
Two years later, Sarason named the "unconflicted
willingness to be part of a larger group" the psychological
sense of community with the publication of the book by
that name. In Culture , where Sarason discussed the "lone-
liness of the teacher," or "the ecological approach" to
the problem of change (in which the impact ot the setting
on attitudes and behavior is studied rather than the im-
pact of personality), or the problem of the values of the
"change agent" being frozen by the very "culture"
in which
he attempts to effect change—these and other
elements may
now be seen as being subsumed under the
dominant theme
that "emerged" in the book. The
Fsychologlaal Sense of Com
munlty (whose subtitle is Prospects for a
Community rs£-
chology)
.
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Three years after the publication of the last men-
tioned work, Sarason and his colleagues (1977) published
Human Services and Resource Networks
,
yet another addition
to the "continuous architecture" of the author's thought of
which the psychological sense of community remains the
cornerstone. The publication in 1979 of Work, Aging and
Social Change is a further extension taken from a different
angle, that of the experience of the worker (rather than the
setting) over the course of one's professional life. Let us
return to Settings (1972) to see how Sarason laid the
ground work for what was to come.
A setting is ". . . any instance in which two or
more people come together [in a relationship] over a sus-
tained period of time in order to achieve certain goals"
(Sarason. 1972, p. 1). Although at first glance resembling
the sociological definition of "organization" (i.e.,
"a social device for efficiently accomplishing through
group means some stated purpose" [Katz and Kahn, 1978]),
it becomes evident that the author is talking about some-
thing related but importantly different when he provides
the examples of marriage (the smallest setting) and revol-
ution or the creation of a new society (the most "ambiti-
ous" instance). The word "creation" suggests that Sarason
is interested in the dynamics of such relationships at
their onset rather than as organizational entities.
The use of marriage as an example is also an impor-
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tant clue and serves to shed some light on the issues
of s i z
e
and romantic love in relationship to the success
of a setting. With the known high failure rate of marriage
in our society it becomes instantly evident that, while
smaller collectivities tend to cohere more easily than
larger ones, the smallest possible collectivity, the dyad,
embedded as it is in a complex of dynamic and cultural
variables, cannot sustain itself merely because of size
or even "love."
The theme of "good intentions" or "love is not
enough" is also woven into this work, woven around and
through what Sarason refers to as "the matrix of factors"
of the social reality of a setting:
. . . I felt that what needed emphasis was that the
creation of settings (in its earliest phases) almost
always (if not always) takes place in a context con-
taining conflicting ideas and values, limited resour-
ces, a sense of mission and superiority on the part
of some, and a need to preserve traditions on the part
of others, the need to protect the setting from outside
influences, and that this context almost always includes,
or quickly is seen as impinging upon, a large number
of existing settings (1972, pp . 57-58, emphasis added).
In his analysis of how settings are created and
then come to fail Sarason develops most of the themes that
were to be later synthesized in his conception of the
psychological sense of community which we discussed earlier.
Very telling in this respect is the fact that the author
chooses to state the "relevant conclusions" of the Creatio
n
of Settings in the concluding chapter of The
Psychological
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Sense of Community (1974, pp . 269-276).
Before we leave Settings there are two further
points that should be made, both of them relating to the
larger theme of community. One has to do with Sarason's
conceptualization of the issue of leadership in the crea-
tion of settings and in the maturing setting. Some of the
implied imperatives of the leadership issue are: (1) A
leader must not only have knowledge of a setting and its
related historical organization but have "a way of think-
ing which [mirrors] the complexity of interests and con-
flicts out of which the setting emerged" (1972, p. 49);
(2) The leader should avoid the tendency to want to "pos-
sess" the setting; (3) The leader should combine "openness"
(about "internal doubts") with the maintenance of group
solidarity through a process of "mutuality"; (4) The leader
must be less concerned with his status and sense of super-
iority than with the welfare and growth of his staff, and
the leader must be interested in not only what is done for
others but what happens to those who "man the setting"
(1972, p. 53).
The last point we will mention is the notion, de-
veloped by Sarason in Settings , of "buildings as distrac-
tions." Very much related to the theme of community, is
the idea that ". . .in the area of human services, putting
up new buildings tends to perpetuate the problem
of limited
resources, contributes to the inadequate services they
or-
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dinarily provide, and separates the setting from the larger
society" (1972, p. 160) .
The ground has thus been broken for a further syn-
thesis of Sarason’s notions of how a community orientation
leads to productive ideas in the area of human services.
The synthesis is realized with the publication of Human
Services and Resource Networks (Sarason et al
. ,
1977,
hereinafter referred to as Networks ) . All the elements
that are thus far in place in his previous constructions
are brought into use in his blueprint for the setting up of
networks and are used as a framework for evaluation and
analysis. Sarason and his colleagues had the benefit of
his having already formulated his major statement on the
concept of the psychological sense of community; a number
of references to the concept appear throughout the book.
"The concept of resource exchange," notes Sarason in our
interview (1980), "comes right out of the [idea] of the
sense of community."
The chief elements from Sarason’s previous works
that coalesce in the concept of networks are the fact of
limited resources, the establishment of mutually produc
tive relationships" by one setting with another,
and, more
obviously, "the readily available, mutually
supportive
network of relationships" which is an integral
element of
Sarason 's definition of the psychological sense
of com-
munity. It is not within the scope or
purpose of this
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study to report in great detail the theory and practice of
networks as they are presented in this work by Sarason and
his colleagues (and are further elaborated upon from a
somewhat different perspective in a later work. The Chal-
lenges of the Resources Exchange Networks [Sarason and
Lorentz, 1979 ]). Rather we shall report on some of the
statements and ideas that may have some implications vis-
&-vis the developing of human resources in a college set-
ting in conjunction with the fostering of a sense of
community
.
Early in their book Sarason et al . distinguish
between simple acquaintanceships and the concept of net-
works :
. . .
Each of us knows, has met, and has had commerce
with countless people, but what the label networks
ordinarily suggests is that with a portion of these
people we have a relationship permitting us to "ap-
proach" them. And we may approach them with the de-
liberate aim of asking them to help us establish a
similar relationship with a person we do not know
(Sarason et al
. ,
1977
,
p. 3 ).
The book essentially provides the reader with case mate-
rial derived from actual network systems. The principal
case was one in which a network emerged (networks are not
created insist the authors) out of the need of some agen-
cies (schools) to enrich educational experiences, out of
others (universities) because of the need to both provide
educational opportunity in the form of meaningful involve-
ment of students, internships, etc. and to be involved in
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research projects as part of graduate education, and out of
another agency’s need (the government) to find ways to
improve the quality of the environment
. Networks emerge
because persuasive and/or influential persons in decision-
making positions in related settings have their eyes and
ears tuned to possibilities of inter—setting cooperation
for mutually beneficial purposes. Such people create
. the conditions for noncompetitive, mutually satis-
fying exchanges of information, plans and resources"
(Sarason, et al
. , 1977, p. 24) to take place between per-
sons and/or agencies. And all this would be accomplished
with no exchange of money. Such exchanges are seen by
Sarason et al . against the familiar backdrop of a social
system generally devoid of a sense of community and peopled
with isolated, alienated, lonely individuals or collections
of individuals (i.e., agencies or "settings"). This in-
cludes workers in human services settings "where the per-
ceived gulf between available resources and requests for
services is large" and where "people within the agency feel
they are unappreciated by the outside world" (1977, pp.
22-23). The galvanizing force that seems to be implied is
the need for a sense of community coupled with the prag-
matic needs of agencies. (A third ingredient is the notion
of "undermanned settings" borrowed from Roger Barker; it is
discussed in this study in Chapter IX.) "What is insidious,
the authors add, "in this absence of the sense of community
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is that there is no viable way
. . . „hereby agencies can
even know what the problems, dilemmas, and plans of other
agencies might be" (1977, p. 23). It remains then for the
leadership and the influential persons in the community
to begin the process of talking.
Once the network process begins, the phenomenon of
"resource release" occurs which "adds a distinctively
positive qualitative factor to people’s sense of personal
productivity and interrelationships" (1977, p. 115). And
beyond increasing individuals’ sense of competency, it
has also been found that ",
. . the availability of net-
works and people's willingness to use them" may be major
factors in the ability of individuals to cope in crisis
situations (1977, pp . 164-165).
The importance of "the general meeting" in maximi-
zing the effectiveness of network systems is discussed
at some length by the authors. Although this would appear
to be a commonplace in the general managing of democratic
and participative organizations, it is here presented as an
absolutely crucial factor in the operation of networks.
Further it is seen as the major underpinning of the network
community
:
From our perspective, it is not enough that each of
the different subgroups has cohered as a group and
has even become interconnected with other networks.
That is cause for satisfaction, but if these sub-
groups "go their own way," they rob themselves and
the rest of the network of a sense of common origins
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and of
network
belonging to a larger, mutually supporting
community (1977, p. 177).
We will end our discussion of network resource ex
changes with an extensive quotation from the text which
succinctly supplies us with the essence of the concept
better than a summing up can do:
The Essex network did not start at a particular
point
. in time, but it existed as a possibility in
the mind of Mrs. Dewar. What that sentence is in-
tended to convey is that for a good part of her adult
life this individual had become increasingly aware
of and bothered by two characteristics of institu-
tions (for example, hospitals, schools): the com-
plaint that they lacked the resources to do what they
should do, and their failure seriously to consider
how they might gain resources by developing ways
whereby "outside people" normally unconnected with
the agency would be given learning experiences pro-
ductive to their own growth at the same time they
were contributing to the setting. Put in another
way, our communities contain many people eager to
enlarge their knowledge, experience, sense of worth,
and social contribution, but community agencies seem
not to recognize their existence and potential con-
tributions, and, furthermore, when their existence is
recognized and utilized, it is on a "one-way street"
basis. That is to say, the individual from the com-
munity is asked to volunteer time and energy to do
something for the agency even though the performed
task will minimumly, or not at all, be experienced
as growth producing. Explicitly, the satisfaction
the individual should expect is in the sense of al-
truism, not in the quickening of the sense of learn-
ing. What Mrs. Dewar came to see was that agencies
viewed community people (the "outsiders") not as
potential learners and contributors but as objects
of limited utility. Agencies saw the world in terms
of their narrow definitions of needs and purposes,
thereby shutting themselves off from potentially val-
uable resources. How, Mrs. Dewar asked, can one get
agencies to view the community differently and to see
the value of more mutually rewarding relationships?
But this question went far beyond the relationships
between agencies and individuals . . . The same ques-
tion had to be asked about agency-agency relationships
(Sarason et al
.
,
1977, PP • *10-41) .
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Summary and Discussion
We have reviewed a number of the works of Seymour
Sarason, the proponent of the belief that the "psychologi-
cal sense of community" should be community psychology's
guiding principle for action. The assessment of every
action, policy or decision would be based on the question
What effect does this have on the psychological sense of
community? PSC was defined as the sense that one is a
meaningful part of a larger collectivity, of a dependable
and stable structure, accompanied by an acknowledged inter-
dependence with others in that setting. The sense further
implies an awareness of resources available to members,
a feeling of uniqueness and of shared common goals and of
mutual responsibility and obligation. The isolation for
special treatment of members of a community identified as
different, deviant or sick was seen by Sarason as a sig-
nificant sign that PSC is lacking in a community. PSC
encompasses the concern for staff as well as clients (in
a treatment or educational setting, or in an institutional
setting in general) and the concern for the community in
which a setting is embedded. Sarason stressed that agree-
ment on values does not necessarily lead to agreement on
the course of action.
Some basic themes were seen to emerge as Sarason
developed his "community psychology" in his series of
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books. To successfully create or lead a setting he under-
scored the importance of being knowledgeable about the
culture of that setting, i.e., its history, values, etc.
In several references to Skinner, Sarason developed the
idea that it is possible for the values of the group to
be dominant over individual ones without loss of freedom
and dignity. In his view, the "change agent" is always
in danger of being unaware that his own values may be
frozen by the very culture he wishes to change. A set-
ting was defined as any instance in which two or more
people come together in a sustained relationship to
achieve specific goals. The dynamics that occur at the
outset of a creation of a setting were carefully scruti-
nized by the author through the presentation of case
material, particularly throwing light on the reasons for
a setting's ultimate failure. "In spite of the best in-
tentions of its creator," Sarason concluded that a setting
may fail if (1) the leader-organizer's thinking does not
reflect "the complexity of interests and conflicts out of
which the setting emerged"; (2) the leader comes to be
possessive about the setting; (3) the leader fails to have
a mutually open relationship with the staff; and (4) the
leader becomes too much concerned with his own status and
concerned about the clients to the exclusion of any con-
cern about the staff. Finally, we learned that, for Sara-
the idea of "resource network" embodied the chiefson,
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elements of his thinking on the psychological sense of
community; the fact of limited resources produces the
need for interdependence and mutual support. The network
is one practical application of this cluster of facts;
i' e *» it represents inter-setting cooperation for mutual
benefit. The consequence is "resource release": the
exchange of information, plans, services, etc., that is,
resources
. Sarason stressed that the availability of
networks is an important factor in how populations cope
with crises.
Hopefully, our review of Sarason has demonstrated
the interrelatedness of the various issues dealt with in
his writings: a school's culture, the creation of viable
settings, the psychological sense of community, and net-
works for the exchanging of resources. It would seem that
he has not only arrived at a synthesis that would re-
solve the dialectic tension between the needs of the in-
dividual and the needs of the community, but a synthesis
that would desolve as well the Gemeinschaft/Ge sell sc haft
dichotomy. Here we see that it is possible for people and
agencies to enter into essentially contractual (instrumen-
tal) arrangements that nonetheless have as their basis the
development of a sense of community.
By now it should be evident to the reader that the
definition of the psychological sense of community is as
vague and diffuse and as varying as the definition of com-
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munity itself; and further, it appears to vary as the
subjective (or even objective) perception of community
varies. At the same time, it can be seen how weighty,
significant and important the concept is thought to be,
particularly as we become aware of how much attention it
has received, if only in a vaguely defined manner. Sey-
mour Sarason, more than anybody else, has raised the level
of inquiry concerning this subject from one of suspicious
sentimentality and patronizing curiosity to one of serious
intellectual investigation which poses a forceful chal-
lenge to the professional psychological community.
CHAPTER VIII
GLYNN'S CONSTRUCT DEVELOPMENT OF
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF COMMUNITY
Review of the Study
In a social psychological doctoral thesis, "Con-
struct Development and Initial Measurement of the Psycho-
logical Sense of Community," Thomas Glynn (1977) has re-
sponded to Sarason's challenge by brilliantly executing an
attempt to move from the level of concept to the level of
theoretical construct
,
particularly a psychological con-
struct "that is both bounded and measureable . " Glynn's
aim was two-fold: to start the process of developing the
PSC concept into a construct; and, then, building on
this development, to design an instrument with which to
measure its degree of presence in community settings.
His methodology was essentially a series of refinements
ranging from a search through the literature on community
to the actual design and validity testing of an initial
measure
.
His literature analysis identified five character-
istics of communities which affect PSC: geography, pat-
terns of interaction, history, function, and degree of
autonomy. The most often stated qualities found to be
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associated with PSC were homogeneity, interdependence,
shared responsibility, face-to-face relationships and
common goals. The erosion of PSC was found to mostly
effect two basic areas of community life: "competent
functioning" and "satisfaction with life in the commun-
ity."
With this analysis as a starting point, Glynn
arranged this set of community characteristics, qualities
and behaviors into a sentence completion instrument which
he administered to elicit a wide range of perceptions from
a large population, thereby generating a pool of PSC-
related attitudinal items. These were, in turn, refined
by having a group of experts (selected from the membership
of the APA Division 28 a Community Psychology) rate the
strength of the items on the basis of their "strongest
contribution to PSC." After a final sifting, the items
were arranged into the end product, a rating scale instru-
ment designed to measure PSC. For reasons which will soon
be apparent, half of the items were designed to elicit
perceptions about actual PSC and the other half about
ideal PSC
.
Glynn’s next task was to find the settings whose
populations could be administered the initial measurement
the result of which would yield comparative data with
which assessment of the instrument’s validity could be
made. For this purpose he chose three different communi-
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ties which were perceived to possess the five necessary
community characteristics mentioned above but in varying
degrees, such that the first community (an Israeli kib-
butz) had a higher degree than the second (a small Amer-
ican town)
,
and the second a higher degree than the third
(another town)
. To arrive at a construct validity, Glynn
predicted that the Real PSC scores of the three popula-
tions would vary in the same order as perceived while the
Ideal scores would not significantly vary.
He also hypothesized that higher community satis-
faction levels and higher community competence levels are
positively correlated with higher PSC levels; that respond-
ents who differ in their Real and Ideal perceptions of PSC
are correspondingly less satisfied and less competent than
those who do not differ; and finally, that community satis-
faction and community competence are positively related.
All the hypotheses were supported. The first one,
that the instrument would correctly discriminate between
the three communities on the basis of their Real PSC is
the "cornerstone" of the study, since it is the basis upon
which the hypotheses that follow could have any important
meaning of their own. On the basis of these findings,
Glynn cautiously concludes "PSC may have the properties
of a construct" (1977, p. 112), which of course means that
given some future refinement studies, his instrument has
the potential of being useful as a measure of PSC. While
Glynn’s methodology clearly demonstrates that community
satisfaction is positively correlated with PSC, as well as
community competence, it does not establish any causal
relationships, nor for that matter does it show that the
instrument is actually measuring three separate and dis-
tinct constructs. (A ’’sense of community competence," a
’’sense of community satisfaction," and a "sense of com-
munity may all be the same thing.) However, for the pur-
poses of our own investigation, such distinctions are less
important than the finding of the close relatedness of the
concepts. As Glynn suggests in his conclusionary remarks,
the findings support Sarason’s view that the proper value
orientation for community psychology is the use of PSC
as a guide for policy and action
. Conversely, it may be
that the aims and methods of community psychology, which
we shall be discussing, particularly as they relate to
developing access to community resources (i.e., competence
and the resourcefulness of community members, are directly
in line with the development of a psychological sense of
community, even if unstated as a goal. To complete the
picture, perhaps we would only have to add Sarason’s
dictum that in terms of PSC, addressing the needs of the
helper is equally as important as addressing the needs of
the helpee.
An important incidental finding by Glynn is that
the data suggest individual differences regarding one's
178
ideal definition of PSC can effect one’s perception of
real PSC. This could mean, for example, that a person
with "high” expectations regarding PSC may perceive a lower
level of PSC in a given community than a person with lower
expectations in the same community. The data also suggest
to Glynn that as the number of components that go into an
individual’s definition of PSC increase so does the like-
lihood that the individual's PSC would increase, and that
the inclusion in one's definition of the "idea of neigh-
borhood" would also tend to predispose one to a higher
level of PSC. Finally, Glynn found that the number of
years that a person expected to live in the community and
the number of persons one could identify by a first name
were factors that could predict PSC. All in all, it was
the former factor—the number of years one expected to live
in the community— that was found to be the strongest pre-
dictor of PSC.
As was stated earlier, Glynn’s initial measure
was built around ideas extracted from his review of the
literature which were expanded through the process of an
open-ended questionnaire and then refined through a pro-
cess of expert judgment. These processes yielded yet
another related set of "behaviors and sub-concepts asso-
ciated with PSC." These were "knowledge of the physical
layout, perceived safety of living in the community, pres-
ence of conflict issues, and the perceived ability of the
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community to deal with adversity."
In his discussion of the literature Glynn does not
explicitly cite "who said what" about most of the asso-
ciated concepts mentioned and which were employed in his
item construction. Much of his written review is devoted
to the idea of the decline and erosion of PSC "as an in-
tegral part of Western culture," explained in terms of a
"rural-urban shift" similar to the "lost community" trend
discussed earlier in this paper. Starting with the obser-
vation that "PSC has always had a rural association,"
Glynn traces some of the literature on community from
Tonnies to the present day but reports of no direct dis-
cussion of PSC per se. We suspect that many of the asso-
ciated sub-concepts which he built into his items used
to measure PSC were derived from statements about commun-
ity rather than about the psychological sense of community.
Our assumption is that Glynn found it not a very far
conceptual leap to go from one to the other. On the other
hand, the writers reviewed who described the erosion of
the sense of community apparently contributed little in
regard to a theoretical exposition on PSC itself.
What we were looking for and what we finally found
in Glynn’s study was a detailed exposition of the meaning
of PSC. We found a total of five conceptual definitions
of PSC. One of these was Sarason's which we quoted earlier;
one was a restatement of this definition found in a review
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of Sarason's book by Cowan (1975): ”... the feeling of
belonging, of being needed, of identification with a
social milieu, in which there is mutuality and interde-
pendence.” One was a fragment from the definition of
community by Minar and Greer (1969) also quoted above:
".
. . vague yearnings for a commonality of desire, a
communion with those around us.
. .
." The fourth quote
is from Brownell (1950): ". . . the cooperative fullness
of action, the sense of belonging, the face-to-face asso-
ciation with people well-known.” And, finally, his fifth
and last definition is from Poplin (1972): ". . .a sense
of identity and unity with one’s group and a feeling of
involvement and wholeness on the part of the individual."
Beyond this conceptual approach to the definition of PSC
is the operational one, examples of which are found not
in the body of Glynn's report but in the appendix portion
which contains the measurement instrument developed by the
author. Here among the attitudinal items is to be found a
rich mine of the raw material of PSC which the author
represented in the body of the report as "refined" abstrac-
tions. (Glynn, himself, recognized the value of the oper-
ational perspective when he observed that Sarason's compre-
hensive definition of the psychological sense of community
is contained not in his statements about PSC but in his
description of a "total intervention" at The Connecticut
School for Boys which is the contents of a chapter in The
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P syc hQlQgical Sense of Community [Sarason, 197*0.) In fact
some of these abstractions, such as "competence" and "sat-
isfaction," were left undefined in the report itself, except
for the fact that fortuitously Glynn's presentation of an
item factor analysis connected these and other sub-concepts
associated with PSC with specific items in the instrument.
For clarity and for further illumination we list
some of the factor loading clusters below under their re-
spective abstract headings: (Only those factors from the
Real Scale that were found to be significant are included
here; they are listed in order of significance. Senten-
ces that were originally in the negative form we have made
positive
.
)
Objective evaluation of community structure
This community has goals for itself.
The community government works with the well-being
of this community in mind.
The community government here gets a lot done.
People here have a say about what actions this
community takes.
Satisfaction with life in the community
There is plenty to do in this community.
I get a lot out of being a member of this com-
munity
.
I like living in this community.
I feel that I belong here.
This community satisfies what I want in relation-
ships with other people.
Living in this community gives me a secure feeling.
i
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Presence of supportive relationships In the community
I have friends in this community who know they
can depend on me.
There are people in this community, other than
my family, whom I really care about.
If I Just feel like talking I can generally find
someone in this community to talk to right
away
.
If I am upset about something personal there are
people in this community to whom I can turn.
There are people in this community, other than
my family, who really care about me.
I have friends in this community on whom I can
depend
.
Listed below are some of the factor clusters that
although less statistically significant that the above
Items do fill out the picture that describes the real
"psychological sense of community" that is being measured
here
.
Similarity and relationship patterns
The type of people that I am most similar to live
in this community.
Being a member of this community is like being
a member of a group of friends.
My best friends live in this community.
I am quite similar to most people who live here.
Individual Involvement in the community
I feel useful in this community.
My role in this community is to be active and
involved
.
It is important to me that this community do well.
There has been at least one problem In this
community that I had a part in solving.
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I try to keep up the community news in thenewspaper. zn
If someone does something good for this commun-ity
,
that makes me feel good.
Quality of the community environment
This is a good community to bring children up in.
There is less crime here compared to other com-
munities in the area.
Most people seem to care about the appearance ofthis community.
Quality of community securit y
The police in this community are generally friendly.
The police in this community are effective.
Living in this community gives me a secure feeling.
I feel safe in this community.
And, finally, the following cluster of items throws light
on what Glynn means by community competence :
People take an interest in what you are doing
here
.
Most of my friends in this community are here
to stay.
The community government here gets a lot done.
What is good for this community is good for me.
People here have a say about what actions this
community takes.
(Glynn’s conception of competence is also revealed in his
discussion of the possible uses of his instrument. Thus,
he states "If low competence levels were indicated, a spe-
cific program might be instituted to better inform the
residents of the resources available to them and how to
use them.")
Next, to complete the conceptual picture, we list
1QI\
the factor loading items of the Ideal Scale. (In the in-
strument itself all items begin with the phrase "In an
ideal community" and some sentences are in the negative.)
Structure of community relations
The community would not be divided into small,
snobbish groups.
People would know they could get help from the
community if they were in trouble.
People would take an interest in what you were
doing.
It would be easy to make good friends.
You can be yourself.
There would be people, other than my family, who
would really care about me.
People I do not know would be willing to help me
if I had an emergency.
Objective evaluation of community structure
The community government would work with the
well-being of the community in mind.
The community would have goals for itself.
The community government would get a lot done.
Overall assessment of the community and the individ-
ual * s role in it
I would enjoy living there.
It would be a good place to bring children up in.
I would feel useful.
I would feel that I belonged there.
Community as self-sufficient and provider of most needs
If you did not look out for yourself, others
would
.
I would seldom feel lonely.
Most of your phone calls would be to people or
places within the community.
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Active Involvement In the community
I could help change some things If I were to try.
I would try to keep up with the community news inthe newspaper.
I would have a part in solving at least one com-
munity problem.
My role would be to be active and involved.
Interdependent/reciprocal nature of the community
You would get something out of being a member
of the community.
If I called a community agency with a complaint,
I would get quick service.
I would have friends who would know they could
depend upon me.
"Every man for himself" would not be a good de-
scription of how people would act.
If there were a serious community problem the
people could get together and solve it.
Individual commitment to the community
Most of your friends would be there to stay.
What would be good for the community would be
good for me.
You would choose to move in for a particular
reason
.
I would feel that I belonged there.
Individual feeling of being at ease in the community
I could find my way anywhere.
I would have friends upon whom I could depend.
There would be people, other than my family,
that would care about me.
Similarity of community residents
I would be quite similar to most people who lived
there
.
The type of people that I am most similar to
would live there.
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The people would have a lot in common.
Potential for reciprocal support
If someone I did not know had an emergency I
would be willing to help.
There would be plenty to do.
I would have friends who would know they could
depend on me.
Ready availability of support
Your best friends would be living there.
There would be people to turn to if I was upset
about something personal.
If I felt like talking there would be someone to
turn to right away.
One question that we have about the instrument it-
self is whether the use of the word "community" throughout
the questionnaire might tend to "stack the deck" in favor
of PSC
.
(We do see the necessity of using the word be-
cause of a design which calls for a comparison between an
Ideal Scale and a Real Scale.) For example, if we were
looking for the degree of presence of a sense of community
on a college campus might it not be better to construct
items beginning with "In this school" rather than with "In
this community"? People living in a town or a neighborhood
probably take it for granted that they live in a community.
In relation to a school, common parlance would refer to
the town as the community, as distinguished from the campus.
On the questionnaire, calling one's attention to the campus
as a community may act as a suggestion that could possibly
inflate the PSC "score" in absolute terms. In comparing
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one campus with another, however, the use of the term
community should not prevent the instrument from discrim-
inating between relative levels of PSC.
Summary and Discussion
We have reviewed Glynn’s study, an attempt to treat
PSC on a construct level as the first step in developing
a measure of that quality. Our primary interest was to
see what information such an effort would yield in regard
to an understanding of PSC. We noted that Glynn’s
search of the literature initially resulted in the iden-
tification of five "characteristics" which effect PSC:
geography, patterns of interaction, history, function
and degree of autonomy. (These elements bear a resemblance
to some of the components of community formation which
appeared in Knop ' s formulations discussed earlier in this
report.) We learned from the responses to questionnaires
which Glynn used to develop his measurement items that
the most often-stated qualities associated with PSC
were homogeneity, interdependence, shared responsibility,
face-to-face relationships, and common goals. The
responses also confirmed his literature finding that
the erosion of PSC reduces competent functioning and
satisfaction with community life. Armed with such
notions, Glynn built his initial measure. From a reading
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Of the actual measurement Items which appeared In the ap-
pendix to his study we were able to construct an opera-
tional definition of PSC based upon the respondents' per-
ceptions of the "real" psychological sense of community
which they were experiencing in their communities, and
their conceptions of an "Ideal" PSC. The "real" scale
yielded the following definition: PSC is
. . . the sense that things that are beneficial t-npeople's well-being get done here as the re 1 ofthe various community structures (e.g., particioative
liffhere
6
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el secure here; that we have asay what goes on here; that we know what the re-sources are and how to use them.
The "ideal" scale responses suggested that PSC is
... the sense that people feel they belong to a
whole collectivity which they could rely upon forhelp, friendship, and acceptance; that governance
works for the well-being of people; that most of our
needs could be met here without going elsewhere; that
I could have a useful impact here; that there is apervasive sense of interdependence and reciprocal
support, comfort, commitment, and similarity to others.
Finally, the experimental design of Glynn’s study
allowed the author to test hypotheses regarding the psycho-
logical sense of community and its relationship to other
concepts. It was found that there is a positive correla-
tion between community satisfaction and PSC, between com-
munity competence and community satisfaction, and between
each of these and PSC; that as respondents differ in "real"
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and "ideal" perceptions of PSC, they are correspondingly
less satisfied and less competent. Glynn also found that
one could predict a higher level of PSC response from re-
spondents who had lower expectations of PSC, whose defi-
nitions of PSC had a larger number of components, whose
definition included "the idea of neighborhood," who could
identify a larger number of first names, and who expected
to live in the community for a greater number of years.
This latter factor of individual differences was found to
be the strongest predictor of PSC.
Glynn’s study provided a means of operationalizing
the concept "psychological sense of community" by describ-
ing it on the behavioral level. This was accomplished by
constructing an instrument based on widely accepted con-
ceptions of PSC gathered from a sample of community psy-
chologists, administering the instrument to inhabitants of
three communities whose PSC levels were presumed to vary in
step-wise fashion, and finding that the three sets of re-
sponses to the Real Scale varied accordingly while the
three sets of responses to the Ideal Scale did not vary.
While neither the author nor we were completely convinced
by the data that PSC stands on absolutely solid ground
as a construct, we are nonetheless impressed that a giant
step has been taken in the direction of an empirically
testable social-psychological condition or state of being.
For us, the most important implication of the study is in
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the relationship found between psychological sense of
community and community competency and satisfaction which
gives empirical support to Sarason's notion that PSC and
community psychology as a discipline should be conceptually
linked. As we shall see, competency and satisfaction have
been traditionally viewed as "manlpulable variables" that
form part of the basic repertoire of community psychology.
CHAPTER IX
PREVENTION, COMPETENCE AND GROWTH:
THE COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE
Community Psychology
In reviewing Sarason 's book, The Psychological
Sense of Community ( 1974 ), in Chapter VI, we focused
chiefly on the author’s development of that concept. Pri-
mary on the author’s mind, however, as implied in the sub-
title Prospects for a Community Psychology
,
was an exam-
ination of the field of community psychology, of which he
is reputed to have been ’’one of the fathers" (Cowan, 1975) .
According to Sarason, community psychology emerged as the
answer to a question that had been nagging at mental health
professionals for decades: can we do anything more than
merely help people cope with the devastating effects of
the "absence or dilution of the psychological sense of
community?" Writes Sarason:
. . .
The question was answered in different ways
by different people, but there were, nevertheless,
some underlying agreements: focus had to shift from
an emphasis on intrapsychic factors to understanding
and changing larger social contexts; adapting such a
focus would require new conceptualizations and tactics;
and the major criterion by which these new efforts
would be judged was the degree to which they led to a
greater psychological sense of community (197^, P* 155).
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In this section we will be looking at how other writers
have conceived of this shift of focus from "intrapsychic"
factors to factors of "social context" within the commun-
ity psychological model. In the later sections of the
chapter, related "social context" approaches will be sur-
veyed, concluding with models applied explicitly to the
college campus.
Zax and Specter (197*0 describe community psychol-
ogy as
. . . an approach to human behavior problems that
emphasizes contributions made to their development
by environmental forces as well as the potential
contributions to be made toward their alleviation by
the use of these forces ( 197*0 p. 3).
Thus, they see community both as a causative factor in
such problems and as a potentially therapeutic agent. In
their book. Psychology and Community Change (1977), Heller
and Monahan describe what they call the "stance" of com-
munity psychology:
(a) A community and ecological focus
(b) A concern with problems of human functioning
that includes a focus on the prevention of dis-
order, but that goes beyond problems tradition-
ally designated in "mental health" terms
(c) A stance that includes a concern for coping,
adaptation and competence, not just an emphasis
on disorder
(d) A willingness to promote multidisciplinary,
collaborative research
(e) A commitment to empirical, experimental approa-
ches to social intervention
(f) An avoidance of inappropriate medical overtones
(Heller and Monahan, 1977, P* **21).
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The medical overtones" are described by Iscoe and Spiel-
berger (1970, p. 64) in terms of "the clinic model" in
which there appears to be "
. . .a predilection for
working with select persons who exhibit certain kinds of
symptoms, a greater feeling of responsibility toward
persons who happen to become clients rather than people
with common social problems."
The style of delivery of mental health services
is a key issue in the development of community psychol-
ogy as a discipline. The "alternative community paradigm,'
as it is referred to by Jason (1977), emerged out of the
conceptual shortcomings of the medical model with its
"passive receptive stance," "late focus of treatment,"
"one-to-one mode of service," and "authoritarian" outlook
toward patients (Jason, 1977
, pp . 60-61). In reviewing
the community psychological literature, Jason describes
three defining characteristics of the new community model:
1. geometrically expanding the reach of services
through the use of paraprofessionals and consultation,
2. evaluating and modifying environmental influences
on development; and 3- actively intervening at those
times (crises) and with those individuals (children)
having the most potential for change (Jason, 1977, p.
61 ).
He presents a two-dimensional schema to help locate and
identify community interventions. The two dimensions are
time (primary, secondary and tertiary interventions) and
target (individual, group, organizational, community, and
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system interventions); i.e., at what point do interventions
take place and at what level are they directed?
Various writers in the field, of course, would
stress different points on this two-dimensional schema.
Scribner ( 1968 ), for example, sees community psychology as
directly focused on the system, organization or institu-
tion "
. . .to help design and introduce changes
. . . which
are thought to lead to certain specific changes in people's
behavior." On the other hand, some, such as Zax and Specter
(197*0, would stress intervention at the interpersonal
level, looking for changes in individuals that will, in
turn, have community-wide influence. There is no question,
however, that the primary prevention level is the principal
time dimension in which community psychology operates.
Primary prevention is a concept borrowed from the
older discipline of community mental health. It has been
classically seen (Caplan and Grunebaum, 1970) as a strategy
that would forestall outbreaks of mental illness in the
general population by dealing with sources of environmental
stress. However, the community psychologist, in addition,
would employ this basic strategy in working toward the
broader goal of fostering human development.
An important feature of the primary prevention mode
of community psychology is the emphasis on the developing
of resources . Caplan and Grunebaum (1970), writing from a
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psychiatpic perspective, express the concept of resource
development as follows:
Any individual’s attempt to cope with his environment
will, of course, vary over the long and short term.
Similarly, the human environment varies widely in its
richness, organization and comprehensibility. We may
call these environmental factors which impinge on the
individual resources
,
if it is clear that we are not
merely interested in the quantity of a resource but
also in its timing, duration, quality and other rele-
vant variables.
. . . Over the long term, the likeli-
hood of psychological dysfunction is increased if
specific resources are not adequately provided for the
population: these resources may be classified as
physical, psycho-social and socio-cultural
. A pro-
gram of primary prevention will seek to evaluate These
resources and ensure their optimal provision in the
population (Caplan and Grunebaum, 1970
,
p. 74
,
empha-
sis added)
.
Heller and Monahan (1977, pp . 130-137) discuss
resources in terms of "supportive social structures" whose
availability are crucial at times of stress, particularly
stress brought on by crisis situations. This concept in-
cludes the availability of "opportunities for direct action"
which can forestall the tendency to "fall back on intra-
psychic processes." While the authors assert that "suffi-
cient social organization and cooperation are necessary for
the development of mastery through reciprocal help-giving
relationships," at the same time they remind us that there
is a sparcity of research that supports the notion that
supportive structures minimize the development of patholog-
ical responses during times of stress. They do report one
case in which investigators found that depression and so-
matic complaints were related to perceived low levels of
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social support from fellow workers and supervisors. Thus
Heller and Monahan suggest that an appropriate intervention
m such cases would be the community psychological strategy
of forming natural helping networks." Their explanation
typifies the philosophy of community psychology:
. . . We need not perpetuate a mental health system
that requires introspection and self-examination.
. . . Clearly there are ways of enhancing coping
skills and environmental mastery such as the stimula-
tion of helping networks in the community. It is pos-
sible for helping functions to be adopted by groups
in the community without excessive reliance on profes-
sional intervention (Heller and Monahan, 1977, p. 133).
To some extent this approach mirrors the primary
preventive one of Kelly, writing from an ecological per-
spective more than a decade earlier, with the exception
that Kelly pays more attention to the personalities of in-
dividuals interaction with a given environment as the tar-
get of change. Notwithstanding, the ecological approach
similarly views the client
. . . as an individual in a specific social situation
with the consequence that expressive behavior is
assessed in terms of the structure and function of the
social setting in contrast to an analysis of intra-
psychic motivation (Kelly, 1970a, pp . 58 - 59 ).
The ecology model proposed by Sarbin (1970) is more in
keeping with community psychology in that the target is
"the structure of social identity." Thus, he sees the main
role of the community psychologist as one of designing
interventions, direct or indirect, that would "reorganize
the conduct of selected target persons. The aim would be
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to modify "systems of relationships" for "more effective
placement of target persons in the social system" (Sarbin,
1970, pp. 90-112) .
One of the chief elements of community psychology
is the concept of competence or the "competent community,"
which, as we have seen in Glynn’s study, is intimately
connected with the issues of resources and the psycholog-
ical sense of community. Ira Iscoe, former president of
the Division of Community Psychology, delivering an ad-
dress before the annual meeting of the American Psychologi-
cal Association (1972), describes the concept this way:
. . . In its simplest form, the concept of the
development of the competent community involves the
provision and utilization of resources in a geograph-
ical or psychological community so that the members
of the community may make decisions about the issues
confronting the community and competent coping can be
instituted in dealing with the problems presented to
the community. To be noted is the absence of the word
solution. Community psychology . . . recognizes that
solutions are also parts of problems. Competent coping
is stressed rather than adjustment, in keeping with
the positive activist point of view. Conceptually,
then, the competent community is one that has avail-
able to it, utilizes, develops, or otherwise obtains
resources
,
not of course excluding the development
of the resources of the human beings in the community
itself (1972, p. 2) .
Iscoe concludes his discussion of competency by pointing
out the parallels between the concept and that of the con-
cept of "positive mental health" in which the index of
mental health uses as a criterion the degree of the "util-
ization of resources rather than the absence of symptomol-
ogy" ( Iscoe, 1972, p . 3)
•
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Before community psychology was conceived of as a
discipline, another writer, Argyris (1964), an organiza-
tional psychologist, looked upon competence as an extremely
important factor in facilitating "organizational effect-
iveness." He begins with the premise that all human beings
need to feel a sense of competence, defining competence
as " . . . the solving of problems by developing solutions
that prevent their recurrence, and doing so with minimum
utilization of energy" (1964, p. 24). Armed with this
premise and definition, Argyris develops his theory of the
relationship of competence to the production of "psycho-
logical energy" which contributes to organizational ef-
fectiveness. In summary he says:
Organizations have many sources of energy. We are
able to focus on only one of these—the psychological
energy of individuals. This energy is hypothesized to
increase as the individuals' experiences of psycho-
logical success increase, and to decrease with psycho-
logical failure. In order to experience psychological
success, three requirements are essential. The indi-
viduals must value themselves and aspire to experience
an increasing sense of competence. This, in turn,
requires that they strive continuously to find and to
create opportunities in which they can increase the
awareness and acceptance of their selves and others
(Argyris, 1964
,
p . 33)
.
Although stemming from an organizational context, Argyris'
construction of the idea of competence appears to have
something to contribute to the broader field of community
psychology. More important than the question of whether or
not one conceives of competence as necessarily involving
rather than the means of "coping" (on this"solutions"
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question, as we have seen, Iscoe and Argyris are not in
agreement) is the issue of "psychological success" and
how it might relate to the enhancement of a sense of
community
.
Consultation and Community Organization
The community psychologist has at his disposal
the whole range of techniques employed by the community
mental health worker and the organizational specialist.
As Heller and Monahan caution, "Consultation is not psy-
chotherapy . .
. ;
the content focus of consultation is
on work problems, not personal problems" ( 1977 , p. 209).
They warn that an experienced clinician who would assume a
community consultative role requires additional training in
community and organizational consultation and a greater
understanding of community functioning. Such training
would include familiarization with the various modes of
consultation: client-centered
,
with the focus on how the
consultee can help the client; consul tee -centered , with
the emphasis on how to overcome the difficulties that the
consultee is having; and program-centered , with the focus
on helping the system , in general, to maximize its ef-
fectiveness in meeting its goals in the most psycho-
logically sound and humane manner (Heller and Monahan,
1977, pp . 209 - 225 ). The last mentioned mode is, of
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course, the most relevant to our present study of the
psychological sense of community, especially as it "offers
the greatest potential for significant and enduring chan-
ges in an organizational system."
Also related to the concept of consultation is the
field of organizational development with its variety of
techniques that are applied ordinarily to work settings
with the twin objectives of achieving better structure and
better working relationships. While to some these objec-
tives are looked upon as euphemisms for the instrumental
corporate values of better efficiency and increased pro-
duction, others see them as being congruent with the hu-
manistic values of personal fulfillment and job satis-
faction (Heller and Monahan, 1977 ). The ideal assumption,
of course, is that "OD" encompasses both sets of values.
In any case, the community psychologist may add OD to his
or her repertoire of strategies, or at least be familiar
with its principal methods. These have been described in
detail by Schmuck and Miles ( 1971 ), and Heller and Mona-
han ( 1977 ), among others. For our purposes it should suf-
fice to mention the most common types of intervention,
most of which are well-known to group and sy stems-oriented
counselors and psychologists: sensitivity training, sur-
vey feedback, force-field analysis— these are known as
"process intervention"—and a variety of technical and
structural approaches known as " sociotechnical systems in-
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tervention" or "technostruetural activity" (Schmuck and
Miles, 1971) which attempt to directly modify "how the
job gets done."
The disciplines of community development and
c ommunity organization
,
while chiefly lying within the do-
mains of social work and other applied social sciences,
contain elements that would be of more than passing inter-
est to the practitioner of community psychology. Nelson,
Ramsey and Verner (I960), describe community development
as
. . . the process involved in educating community
members to take deliberate action for community
change
,
the nature of which is determined by them
in terms of their own value systems (Nelson, Ramsey
and Verner, i 960
, p. 30, emphasis added).
They describe four basic steps in the process: (1) Sys-
tematic discussion of common felt needs by community mem-
bers. (It should be noted here that it is the field of
community development which perfected the so-called small-
group and large-group discussion methods—a significant
contribution in itself.) (2) Systematic planning to carry
out the "self-help" programs selected by the members; ( 3 )
Optimal "mobilization and harnessing of the physical,
economic and social potentialities of local community
groups"; and (4) "The creation of aspiration and the de-
termination to undertake additional community improvement
projects" (Nelson, Ramsey and Verner, I960, pp . 418-421).
These authors view community organization as that disci-
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pline which scientifically studies and analyzes "patterns,
form, structure, and function of activities in community
life." They feel that the term should be clearly distin-
guished from "community development" which is the actual
process for effecting changes in structure and relation-
ships .
Cox et al. (1970) conceive of the relationship be-
tween these two fields in a different manner. In fact,
they see community organization as being the larger cate-
gory which subsumes the concept of development as one of
its parts. As such, community organization is understood
as comprising three modes of community interaction: local-
ity development, social planning, and social action.
Locality development—here equated with community develop-
ment—is the process which emphasizes "democratic proced-
ures, voluntary cooperation, self-help, development of
indigenous leadership and education" to achieve change
through the broadest possible participation and "the full-
est possible reliance on the community's initiative."
Social planning refers to the technical process of solving
social problems by finding ways and means of improving
the delivery of services and goods to those in need. The
third community organization model, social action, seeks
to redistribute "power, resources, or decision making in
the community or changes in basic policies of formal organ-
izations" in order to meet the needs of "a disadvantaged
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segment of the population" (Cox et al., 1970, pp. 4-5).
As Heller and Monahan observe, "Advocates of community
organization assume that social institutions cannot change
in any significant degree without important changes in
the distribution of power within a community" (1977, p.
371).
An Example of a Community Psychology Model
~of Intervention: The Concept of "Strain*’
1° illustrate one community psychological approach,
let us take a look at Heller’s and Monahan’s model of com-
munity intervention based upon their conception of social
or community strain (Heller and Monahan, 1977, pp. 373-
410) . Strain is the product of impaired relations among
the parts of a system and the resulting community disequil-
ibrium. "[It] develops as changes occur in the composition
and value structure of society which are difficult to
assimilate into ongoing community life" (Heller and Mona-
han, 1977, p. 373). The first step in a consultation pro-
cess would be an assessment of the kind and degree of com-
munity strain. For this purpose the authors develop a
yardstick based upon four states or conditions of community
life: (1) a homogeneous community not experiencing strain
—a stable and satisfied membership unaware of any serious
problems (intervention is seen as unnecessary; (2) communi -
ty-wide strain— the community is experiencing strain and
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is motivated for action. Social regulators (defined by the
authors as those workers and leaders in the community "who
are accessible to and representative of the broadest spec-
trum of community interests" and "who are capable of reduc-
ing community strain") are pressed for a solution. The
consultation strategy is to help the community or organi-
zation adopt better problem-solving processes "which allow
constituencies access, involvement, and input into pro-
posed solutions." (The authors note that this is similar
to the OD approach which attempts to lower "restraining
forces"); (3) strain limited to "culture-bearing " ("confi-
dent") groups—majority feels strain but specific "excitor"
groups do not. (The authors provide the example of teen-
agers, made up of members of the "dominant culture," who
become rowdy because of the lack of a local teen facility
and who clash with the police who are attempting to enforce
community standards.) The basic consultation strategy is
to provide alternatives to harsh forms of suppression; and
(4) strain limited to minority ("alienated") groups—
here the dominant culture may not at first perceive the
strain and "may only become sufficiently aroused when it is
clear that the problem can not be solved easily." The appro-
priate intervention would be "the education of the unrespon-
sive majority in problem awareness." If this fails then
a community organization ("marshalling the power
resources
within the alienated community") approach is suggested—
or
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or an "alternative institution" approach. (An example of
the latter from the writer's experience was the establish-
ment of a special "study dorm" to accommodate an "alien-
ated minority"—in this case, "serious" students—who felt
oppressed" by the otherwise "unserious" majority of a
college campus.)
Heller and Monahan summarize their view of "opti-
mal community life" this way:
... A community that does not foster a sense of
cohesion among its citizens can be a sterile place.
The community should not be simply a neutral field
upon which other forces play. ... A sense of cohe-
sion develops as an attitude built upon the ability
to work toward the fulfillment of common aspirations.
We are not talking about a mystical or ethereal qual-
ity but one that depends on the availability of growth-
enhancing structures ( 1977 , p. 395).
Thus we see an echoing of Sarason’s insistence that the
psychological sense of community should be the criterion
by which to judge the efforts of community psychology.
Let us now turn to an examination of what the authors mean
when they write that such a sense "depends on the avail-
ability of growth-enhancing structures ."
In general a growth-enhancing structure is any
systemized component of a community or organization which
serves to optimize community life. Examples would include
any of the "structures" already mentioned in our discussion
of the community psychological approach: use of parapro-
fessionals; networks; resources; opportunities for direct
action; opportunities for psychological success; opportun-
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ities for feedback and discussion; democratic procedures;
and an example from the authors' community intervention
model, the interaction between "social regulators" and
citizens
.
"Manning" of "Behavior Settings"
One very significant example of a growth-enhancing
structure is "the availability of behavior settings and
the manning of such settings," a concept developed by
Barker (1968) and referred to by every writer we have
reviewed who has an interest in community psychology or
other person-environment approach. Behavior settings are
social structures which tend to elicit certain behaviors
regardless of the makeup of the individuals who participate
in those structures. Heller and Monahan see such settings
as "growth-enhancing" and promoting of a sense of commun-
ity particularly when they allow "individuals to develop
links to others outside their normal family circle" (1977,
p. 384). According to Barker this condition of a setting
is more likely to occur when the behavior setting is
"undermanned" rather than "optimally manned." In Barker's
own words:
. . .
undermanned behavior settings in comparison
with optimally manned settings impose more and stronger
forces on their inhabitants in more varied directions;
the forces are, however, more prevailingly directed
inward and toward other inhabitants. According to
this, undermanned behavior settings have stronger
internal interdependence and cohesiveness; they are
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stronger things vis-^-vis their inhabitants than opti-mally manned, behavior settings (Barker, 1968, p. I 85 )
Reporting on the findings of earlier studies which compared
high school students in small schools with those in large
schools Barker concludes:
(1) They report twice as many pressures upon them
to take part in the programs of the settings.
In the small schools, marginal students (students
without the abilities and backgrounds that facilitate
school success) report almost as many pressures to
participate as do regular students (students with the
abilities and backgrounds for school achievement).
But within large schools, the marginal students report
about one-fourth as many pressures to participate as do
the regular students.
. . . The small behavior settings
with modest activity programs generate more forces
toward participation than the large settings with
ambitious programs.
(2) They perform in 2.5 times as many responsible
positions, on the average; and for crucial, central
positions, such as team members or chairmen of meet-
ings, they perform in six times as many positions.
. . . Furthermore, the students in the small school
fill important and responsible positions in twice as
many behavior setting genotypes as their counterparts.
The schools with the smaller and less varied settings
are, for their students, functionally larger and more
varied than the schools with the more populous and the
more varied settings.
(3) They report having more satisfactions related
(a) to the development of competence, (b) to being
challenged, (c) to engaging in important actions, (d)
to being involved in group activities, (e) to being
valued, and (f) to gaining moral and cultural values
(Barker, 1968
,
p. 199).
Ideally, then, a behavior setting would accommodate all
those who would wish to participate in the particular
behavior which that setting invokes in order to achieve a
sense of community; this would also prevent the exclusion
of "marginal" participants, or, as Heller and Monahan
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explain, it would "insure that a community would not be
atomized by the presence of large numbers of unaffiliated
or chronically rejected persons" (1977, p. 384). An
example offered by them is that of a school drama production
which can only accommodate 15 players from among a total of
50 applicants. A "community wise" administrator (i.e.,
"social regulator") would call for the expanding of the
various elements of the production—or even suggest that
the director choose a different play. A more far-reach-
ing strategy suggested by the authors might be "to consider
the reallocation of resources to support a greater number
of productions each year."
Organizational behavior
,
another field from which
the community psychologist borrows insights with which to
ply his trade, also has something to say about Barker's man-
ning of behavior settings theory. Argyris (1964), writing
about the staffing of organizations, asserts that this idea
has significant applicability in the work setting and re-
lates it to his own theory (discussed earlier in this chap-
ter) of the connection between psychological success and
organizational effectiveness. However, he adds this caution
It would be a tragic mistake for these comments to
be interpreted as meaning that indiscriminate speed-up
is good for people. It would be self-defeating if
organizations were purposely undermanned in order to
manipulate the workers to produce more
.
An undermanned organization will probably have its
predicted effects (1) if the tasks available permit
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individuals use their important abilities, (2) if
the employees believe that the undermannedness is"
legitimate, and (3) if they are sharing the fruits ofincreased productivity. The motive in developing
optimally undermanned organizations should be to in-
crease the probability for self-expression, self-
responsibility, commitment in individuals, and the
flexibility in, and vitality of, the organization.
If this is successful, the resulting work should be
more deeply satisfying. However, if an organization
undermans itself without concomitant enlargement of
jobs, increasing mutual influence and control, and
deepening its own purpose, it will tend to find that
the entire program may backfire (Argyris, 1964, p. 228).
The College Setting :
The "Ecological Perspective'* and
"Student Development" Models
Barker, whose concept of the behavior setting we
have just examined, was trained as a social psychologist,
but writes within a discipline which has come to be called
ecological psychology
,
again, another field which has some-
thing to say to community psychology. Kelly, in an article
entitled "Toward an Ecological Conception of Preventive
Interventions" (Kelly, 1970b), presents his case for the use
of "the ecological analogy, both for studying social envir-
onments and for changing them." Kelly explains:
The translations of this particular ecological
analogy affirms that as the structure and functions of
social units vary, modes of dealing with disruptive
events also shift, with a corresponding variation in
the behavior of individuals who perform adaptive and
maladaptive roles in the specific society. Interrela-
tionships between the functions of social units and
the participation of individual members then become a
primary focus for designing programs of interventions
where the intervention rearranges the interrelation-
ships or couplings between individual behavior and
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social functions as much as it alters the behavior of
one social unit of the expressive behavior of any one
member of the society (Kelly, 1970b, p. 127).
Following Barker and Kelly and others, the "ecologi-
cal perspective," as it came to be called (Banning and
Kaiser, 1974), began to be adopted during the early seven-
ties, particularly as an expansion of the definition of
"counseling" on some Western campuses (Huebner, 1979a)
•
The cause was taken up by the Western Interstate Commission
for Higher Education (WICHE) and dubbed the "ecosystem
model" (Aulepp and Delworth, 1976). The model is described
as
. . .
a design process utilizing an ecological approach.
The essence of an ecological approach is the interac-
tion between persons and their environment or how an
environment affects people, their work, their leisure,
and their personal growth . ... In using the ecosys-
tem approach to campus, the model becomes a tool for
the creation of campus environments that can foster
both educational and personal growth (Aulepp and
Delworth, 1976, p. vii, emphasis added).
Their system is a rather technically explicit one
which depends heavily on measurement and assessment tech-
niques designed to elicit students' perceptions of particu-
lar environments (e.g., cafeterias, dormitories, student
centers, etc.) and their own reactions to such environments
with the hope of utilizing such data to "design optimum
campus environments."
Huebner (1979a), in her historical overview of this
model, traces a number of its central concepts to
ideas
initially presented by community and counseling
psycholo
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gists," but points the finger at those disciplines for not
having incorporated the "data-theory base" (derived from
the earlier work'of K. Lewin, E. C. Tolman, B. F. Skinner
and others) into the practice of their psychology or human
services delivery. Continuing her discussion of the theo-
retical rationale behind the ecosystem' approach, Huebner
writes
:
iQvno
h
K
com
^
ni
^ psychology movement of the 1960s and1970s brought with it a return to the ideology andvocabulary of interactionism [the claim that behavioris the result of the interaction between organism andenvironment] and the concern with the immediate person-
environment situation. The campus-based version ofthis movement, with which we are concerned, took holdin the early
. 1970s and has remained a force within the
student services and counseling literature of thedecade. While community psychology in general and
campus ecology in particular cite the interactionist
and situationist [believing that behavior is a function
of cues and reinforcements in the environment] litera-
ture of . the past fifty years as rationale and defense
for
. their orientation, their advocates have made only
minimal attempts to predicate intervention strategies
... on this data-theory base (Huebner, 1979a, p. 4).
She goes on to observe that the data-theory base has been
used more in the community psychology domain (meaning non-
college) than it has in campus intervention.
The typical ecosystem approach involves seven steps:
(1) gaining institutional support; (2) establishing a
planning team; (3) designing the project; (4) collecting
data; (5) data analysis; (6) effecting interventions based
on the data and disseminating the data; and (7) reassessing
the environment after interventions have been made.
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According to Paul and Morrill ( 1979 ), the criteria for
evaluating the operation of such a system would be the
reduction of "student-environment mismatches" along with
the reduction of "stress and strain" and an increase in
the "output" or "productivity" of student and university.
Presumably, "retention" would be an example of productiv-
ity in a college setting (Paul and Morrill, 1979
, p. 94 ).
"Personal growth," mentioned earlier in our quote
from Aulepp and Delworth (1976 ) is one of the explicit
goals of this model, and, as such, may be viewed as being
encompassed by and serving the major "student affairs"
mode on today's campuses: the student development model,
popular and in vogue since the middle 1960s. The American
College Personnel Association published a statement (ACPA,
197*0 on student development as an outgrowth of a "model
building conference." The paper, in describing the ration-
ale for student development, states:
The concept of student development . . . affirms
that in post-secondary education cognitive mastery of
knowledge should be integrated with the development
of persons along such dimensions as cultural awareness,
development of a value system, self-awareness, inter-
personal skills, and community responsibility . Self-
determination and self-direction can best result when
both cognitive and affective development are consid-
ered essential (ACPA, 197*1, p. 2, emphasis added).
The paper then goes on to describe the three basic
"strategies" for achieving student development goals:
instruction, consultation, and milieu management . The
term "milieu management" captures our attention because
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the words appear to connote a community-environment approach,
an approach which would subsume the ecosystem model described
above. Notice again how the concept of community receives
some passing attention as the goals of this model are
spelled out
:
. . . This change strategy calls for marshalling all
pertinent resources of the campus community in an
attempt to shape the institutional environments in
ways which will facilitate desired change and maximize
student development. . . . The role of the student
affairs professional is one of coordinating and inte-
grating activities to establish a developmental milieu
designed to facilitate change toward achieving the
desired goals of student self-direction, community
maintenance and an enlightened democratic citizenry
( ACPA, 1974
,
p. 4, emphasis added).
From this brief review it can be seen that both of
these systems place emphasis on the environment or the
milieu as a means toward achieving what can be thought of
as the primary goal of all educational institutions, that
is, the development of the individual student. Both
emphasize "educational and personal growth." The ecosystem
model stresses the adjustment of the environment and de-
emphasizes the psychotherapeutic model of individual adjust-
ment. By stressing "development" rather than adjustment,
the student development model would favor the growth of the
individual by the utilization of proactive strategies rather
than reactive interventions.
A parallel approach which emerged along with the
ecosystem and student development models, and which
maxi-
mally utilizes the types of community intervention
strate-
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gies discussed earlier in this chapter, is the community
mental health model. As we shall see, this mode of campus
intervention is closer to the major concern of this study,
the idea of a psychological sense of community, in that a
"cohesive, organized community" is one of its goals. An
example of this approach is supplied by Nidorf (1970).
A Community Mental Health Model
Applied to a College Campus
Nidorf reports on his development of a "student
service center" at San Fernando Valley State College which
was initially modelled after a comprehensive community
mental health service. Premised on the idea that "the
campus is a community," Nidorf reasoned that preventive
social psychiatry, using the tools of research, consulta-
tion, community organization, education and intervention,
should be applicable to a campus population as it would be
to any community population. Emphasizing field work, i.e.,
"going into the community" rather than waiting for problems
to arrive at the administrator’s desk, the intent of the
program was "to aid the student in coping with the stresses
of a large college and to help and encourage the enhance-
ment of his life" (Nidorf, 1970, p. 19).
It is interesting to see how Nidorf’ s description
of the contemporary student's cultural milieu, comparing
it to the past, parallels that of the "lost community"
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sentiment expressed by a number of the writers reviewed in
this study. Here are some fragments:
In the past, the college campus was able to deal
with the adolescent crisis by serving as a community
that provided a milieu to impart not only knowledge and
skills, but also values and beliefs pragmatically
relevant to the times. The student was encouraged to
clarify and redefine himself in terms of this relatively
clear tradition.
. . .
Today such pathways and guidelines are anything
but clear. ... We contribute to the student’s anx-
iety by providing a hostile environment consisting of
competitive examinations, huge reading lists, frag-
mented knowledge, and patterns of values that lack
relevance to the present. ... We are perpetuating
a social structure that is antithetical to the psycho-
logical needs of our students.
. . . to be a responsible citizen in a democratic
society requires a sense of being able to participate
in determining one's destiny and a sense of the common
good . . . . A sense of the common good requires a
cohesive, organized community . . . . and the demo-
cratic use of power requires an organized community.
. . . The sense of community within student bodies is
minimal . The organization of students into a commun-
ity is hampered by structural characteristics of
college life (Nidorf, 1970, pp . 20-21, emphasis added).
Thus the author provides a backdrop which becomes
his rationale for using the community mental health model
as the "ideal agent" for influencing "the many dimensions
of vested interest maintaining the status quo." The shift
is from the focus on psychotherapy to community organiza-
tion and social intervention where "the mental health
worker assesses the felt needs of the community and encou-
rages the community to organize to meet these needs on
its own terms" (1970, p. 22).
Nidorf’ s community mental health model for his
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Student Service Center consists of four major strategies:
community organization, intervention (including crisis
intervention and environmental manipulation), social action
projects (e.g., sponsorship of student-faculty discussions
on the meaning of general education; seminars on the psy-
chology of women), and consultation (with organized student
groups who are seeking solutions to "work difficulties").
Clearly, all four of these strategies are congruent with
the community psychological orientation. With our focus
on the issue of sense of community, however, our attention
falls mainly on Nidorf' s application of community organiza-
tion theory to the college campus.
Nidorf sees community organization as a process
which "helps members of a community accept responsibility
for doing things they believe to be prosocial" ( 1970 , p.
24). The student affairs worker is then cast in the role
of what the author refers to as an "encourager , " who facil-
itates maximum participation by reinforcing prosocial
forces which already exist in the community. A sense of
competence is what community organizers say develops among
community members who engage in such participation, and,
says Nidorf, "a sense of self, a sense of generosity, and
a sense of common good."
A six-stage model is used in the organization pro-
cess (Nidorf, 1970, p. 24):
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(1) Exploratory research
a. Assess needs.
b. Assess resources.
c. Identify active and concerned people.
(2) Organizing
a. Identified persons are brought together in a
"nuclear" group.
b. Problems are identified.
c. Commitment is made to find solutions.
d. Identify leadership.
(3) Planning
a. Needs analyzed.
b. Brain-storm solutions.
c. Weigh alternatives.
d. Settle on feasible plan.
(4 ) Project
a. Implementation of plan.
b. Evaluation of project.
(5) Continued action
a. Develop new plans.
b. Implement new plans.
c. Merger into larger groups with larger-scale
projects
.
(6) Professional staff "encourager" withdraws from
nuclear group
a. System is evaluated for "prosocial" accomplishment.
b. System is evaluated for presence of group self-
momentum.
It may be that Nidorf's model strikes a familiar
chord for those of us in student affairs circles on today’s
campuses, although these principles may be couched in
the more up-to-date terms of student development or ecosys-
tem management . In theory what sets his system
apart is
his stated goal of developing a "sense of common
good” m
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in addition to "developing students." It falls short of
our interest in developing a psychological sense of com-
munity only in the sense that the mental health model is
narrowly focused on "the alleviation and prevention of
personal trouble in the student community" (Nidorf, 1970,
p. 22).
In the same year that Nidorf' s report appeared,
another article, entitled "New Requirements in Educating
Psychologists for Public Practice and Applied Research"
(Roen, 1970), extolled the virtues of the community approach
. . .
In its attempts to intervene effectively in
the lives of troubled people, community mental health
would seem to be asserting that the context in which
the problem at hand is embedded is of great, if not
pivotal significance. Not content with the under-
powered concept of behavior being overdetermined, it
looks seriously at the hospital as an institution,
the school as an environment (Roen, 1970, p. 64).
A similar but much broader statement is made by Cowen
(1973) as the concluding remarks to his extensive review of
the "social and community interventions" movement in psy-
chology. It would be fitting to quote him here to end
this discussion of our findings in this area. Cowen states
. . .
Notwithstanding the fact that its fine de-
tails remain fuzzy, the evolving SC [social and commun-
ity] framework offers a genuine alternative to prior
dominant MH [mental health] approaches. It is active
rather than passive and accords far greater importance
to prevention than to repair. Its key components
include analysis and modification of social systems,
including engineering environments and man-environ-
ment combinations, that maximize adaptation. Its
person-oriented prongs stress such approaches as . . .
crisis intervention, and consultation which vast y
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extend reach and promise more nearly geometric payoffincrements from finite resources. ... As such, it
focuses attention on the person-shaping attributes
of communities and their primary social institutions
and suggest that topics such as the schools ... are
at least as germane to the field of disordered
behavior as traditional topic units such as paranoid
schizophrenia or drug addiction (Cowen, 1973, p. 460,
emphasis added)
.
One final word is in order. All of the writers in
the field of community psychology whom we have reviewed,
particularly Sarason and Iscoe, agree that this field is
a model of delivery that requires of its workers an activist
stance . Thus community psychologists often find themselves
in the role of "change agent" within the various target
dimensions outlined by Jason. As Zax and Specter observe
"some would even go so far as to eject themselves into the
power structure where they could, themselves, hold the
administrative reins" (1974, p. 3).
Summary and Discussion
We have reviewed some of the essentials of the
community psychological approach. Beginning with Sarason
we saw that this approach would de-emphasize intrapsychic
factors and instead underscore the understanding and chang-
ing of social contexts. In his view the psychological
sense of community is the major criterion by which to judge
the impact of such an effort. (A fuller discussion of
Sarason's views was presented in Chapter VII.) Heller and
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Monahan considered prevention to be the primary focus
rather than disorder; they stressed that the medical model
should be avoided with the emphasis placed instead on
coping, adaptation and competence. An important feature of
their mode of intervention is the concept of alleviating
community strain through the employment of various consul-
tation procedures and the establishment of growth-enhancing
structures. These would include the use of social regula-
tors (defined as persons who represent and are accessible
to the spectrum of community interests), helping networks,
and optimally undermanned behavior settings. An important
goal would be the fostering of a sense of cohesion. Jason
stressed the importance of geometrically expanding the
reach of services by the utilization of paraprofessionals
and consultation which would provide crisis intervention
and directly effect environmental changes. The community
psychiatric perspective of Caplan and Greenbaum maintained
that primary prevention (the forestalling of outbreaks of
mental disorder) and resource development should be the
major focus of a community psychology. Three classes of
resources were identified: physical, psycho-social and
socio-cultural . Iscoe proposed that the key component of
this approach should be the developing of the competent
community; i.e., optimizing competent coping and using,
developing, and sustaining resources. The organizational
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notion of competence proposed by Argyris was discussed: in
the work setting worker competence leads to psychologi-
cal success which in turn generates organizational energy,
and hence effectiveness.
A brief review of consultation techniques, seen as
one of the tools of the community psychologist, followed.
Heller and Monahan identified three classes of consultation:
client-centered, consultee-centered and program-centered.
The last mentioned was seen as the most relevant since it
has the greatest potential for effecting enduring changes.
Organizational development (with its chief goals described
as bettering work structures and relationships) was dis-
cussed. Productivity versus human fulfillment and the need
for a synthesis for the two was presented as one of the
dilemmas of the field. Community development and community
organization were also presented as potential tools of the
worker in community psychology. One set of authors (Nelson,
Ramsey and Verner) presented community development as that
discipline which undertakes to systematically promote
self-reliance and community change through discussion meth-
ods, education and the mobilizing of community resources,
distinguishing it from community organization which was
viewed as the purely analytical component of community
intervention . Cox et al., on the other hand, maintained
that community organization is the larger category of which
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community development is a subset. They viewed community
organization as consisting of three elements, each a
distinct model of intervention: development, planning and
action.
Barker’s concept of the undermanned behavior set-
ting was examined as an example of a "growth-enhancing
structure." Behavior settings were described as social
structures which tend to induce specific behaviors in their
inhabitants irrespective of individual differences.
Barker’s findings supported the idea that an undermanned
setting—manning refers to how the setting is populated
—
promotes participation by a larger percentage of its inhab-
itants than would an optimally manned setting. Thus the
inhabitants have a greater sense of being needed and valued
as members. We saw that Argyris agreed that this concept
is valid in an organizational work setting but that he
cautioned against the deliberate application of the theory
in an organization without the allowance for certain pre-
conditions designed to promote a sense of competency, self-
esteem, and psychological success.
We examined three models of community based inter-
ventions applied to the college campus. The ecosystem
perspective proposed by Huebner and others was presented
as a highly systematic, technically explicit approach that
places a heavy priority on survey measurements, data coi-
223
lection and assessment of the student-environment interface
which lead to specific team-designed changes that are later
assessed for their effectiveness. The criteria for evalu-
ation of the ecosystem model were identified: reduction of
student-environment mismatches and stress and strain (Paul
and Morrill) and personal growth (Aulepp and Delworth).
Since personal growth was viewed as a goal, we concluded
that the ecosystem perspective was a methodology that
serves the larger concept of student development. It was
seen that the student development model of student affairs
has the objective of promoting student growth by integrat-
ing cognitive mastery of knowledge with personal development
along various dimensions. Its primary strategies for
accomplishing this objective were identified as instruction,
consultation, and milieu management (ACPA)
.
The third campus-based model which we examined is
the community mental health design proposed by Nidorf
(1970) who reported on an actual system established by the
author. He described a six-stage model similar in design
to its ecosystem counterpart except that the interventions
were described in conventional terminology rather than in
the more contemporary systems jargon, and the objectives
were more closely aligned with a community perspective.
Thus the emphasis was on the fostering of a sense
of com-
petence and common good and the establishment of
a cohesive,
organized community. The strategies employed
were community
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organization, crisis intervention, environmental manipu-
lation, social action and consultation, with the student
personnel worker cast in the role of prosocial organizer.
Finally, it was observed that the community psy-
chology model connotes an activist stance for its workers
(Iscoe, Sarason, Zax and Specter; most of the writers in
the field)
. There was the suggestion that the community
psychologist might serve as more than a counselor, con-
sultant or change agent; i.e., he or she might hold deci-
sion-making or policy-making positions within a power
structure
.
It is our contention, having surveyed the field to
our satisfaction, that community psychology is not a set
of techniques or a discrete collection of intervention
strategies, but rather a professional attitude associated
with a community orientation and informed by a central
value that one calls upon as one goes about the business
of "helping" others. Some, like Sarason, make explicit
what that value is: the psychological sense of community,
incorporating the idea of the viability of a community
as community , and the growth and development of all in
that community. While none of the models presented are in
themselves antithetical to the idea of a psychological
sense of community, and one of them, in fact, espouses at
least in theory, the goal of "community maintenance. we
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would ask whether each might not benefit by emphatically
incorporating the idea of a psychological sense of com-
munity as a central value.
The ecosystem model, for example, operates on a
hit or miss value system, and appears to be setting itself
up as a vehicle for improving the creature-comforts of
campus residents, or at best, to put this in loftier terms,
"improving the quality of life," whatever that happens to
mean to any one group of students who are asked to "per-
ceive" their "environmental referents." To some this may
mean adding a vegetarian diet to the cafeteria menu; to
some perhaps the addition of a bus shuttle or locks on
shower stalls or lighting on dark walkways; others may
perceive the need for a space that will encourage the
interaction and interdependence of persons. The list can
be endless and therefore it would seem that such a system
would need a hierarchical set of values with which to
prioritize suggestions for environmental modifications
derived from needs assessments and other measurements.
Our guess would be that in practice student devel-
opment as a model has fallen short of its promise to pro-
mote student development precisely and ironically because
it has emphasized personal growth to the detriment of the
sense of community as a value. This last assertion, of
course, would have to be borne out by research; we
make the
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point here only to suggest that such research might be
undertaken in light of the findings of this report.
If one were to build upon and expand Nidorf's
concept of community mental health so as to include the
development and well-being of all members of the college
community— the students and the faculty and the staff
—
and incorporate what appears to be the extremely valuable
concept of the student personnel worker as a "prosocial
encourager," then we may tentatively view such a model
as being consistent with the overarching value of a psy-
chological sense of community. "Prosocial," of course,
would be understood to mean being informed by such a
value
.
Our original objective in studying the concept
sense of community was to discuss any knowledge so gained
in the context of life and work in the college setting,
particularly in relation to the role of the person who
is typically charged with overseeing "the quality of life"
in such a setting: the dean of students. The next two
chapters will be devoted to this issue. As we begin to
engage in that discussion, it seems prudent to seek the
answer to the question In what sense (or senses) may the
college be construed as a community? That is the task of
the following chapter.
CHAPTER X
%
THE COLLEGE AS COMMUNITY
What Is College Community?
Earlier in this report we quoted a line by Mc-
Williams from his The Idea of Fraternity in America to the
effect that the campus " . . .is one of the last analogues
of the polis . ..." The full paragraph reads:
Social processes in which such educational practices
[referring to the discouragement of "cliques based
on ’mere friendship'"] play a role increasingly shift
the place of rebellion, the stage of fidelity, to
the college campus. The campus is ideal in another
sense: it is one of the last analogues of the polis ,
a society in which there is considerable unity between
the expressive and purposive universe of the indi-
vidual. And, of course, the college cannot help
increasing the awareness of alternative values, of
ideals lacking in contemporary society (McWilliams,
1973
, PP. 86 - 87 ).
McWilliams is alluding to the sense of fraternity that
arose on college campuses during the years of protest that
accompanied the Viet Nam War. But he recognizes that the
"unity" which follows the integration of expression and
purpose soon diminishes after the crisis, and there is a
return to "established individualism." As in our dis-
cussion in Chapter V, when we examined the communal
response
to crisis, the author sees this as in part
reflecting
"... the necessity of any mass movement to speak
to the
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values and the desires which already exist in the mind
of many” (1973, p. 87). But in spite of the analogy to
the polis
,
McWilliams does not address himself to the
I
issue of the college as a community unto itself, that is,
with its own core of values and its own ability to inspire
the integration of purpose and expression. Let us take a
different perspective of college life, one that was ex-
pressed by C. P. Snow (as quoted by Minar and Greer in
their book The Concept of Community [1969]) as he nostal-
gically recalled his own college days:
For many it was a profound comfort to be one of a
society completely sure of itself, completely certain
of its values, completely without misgivings about
whether it was living a good life. . . . there were
men varied enough to delight anyone with a taste in
human beings—but . . . none of them ever doubted it
was a good thing to be a fellow. They took it for
granted, felt they were enough, felt it was right
they should be envied. . . . The college was the
place where men lived the least anxious, the most
comforting, the freest lives (C. P. Snow, as quoted
in Minar and Greer, 1969, p. 182).
However, Minar and Greer had made the point previously
that Snow was not referring to the university as a whole,
as in this quote from that writer:
The University was poor; no one left it money, it
was too impersonal for that, men kept their affection
and loyalty and nostalgia for the house where they
lived in their young manhood (C. P. Snow, as quoted
in Minar and Greer, 1969, P* 178).
By using these passages, Minar and Greer were attempting
to introduce into their discussion of the concept of com-
munity the idea that places like colleges may contain
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community or may even be examples of community. Commun-
ity, as we have seen in Chapter II of this study, is an
elusive concept, and so the question of whether or not the
college campus may be construed as a community is not one
that lends itself to an absolute response. Klien ( 196 5 )
,
observing that students at a college are not all residents,
that most retain home addresses and "have only a limited
commitment to a predetermined period of community member-
ship," questions whether the campus is an appropriate
analogue for communities generally. On the other hand,
he concludes that since most of the features of community
are present (e.g., physical size, population density, loca-
tion and resources, "guiding values," "distribution of
power and authority, and patterns of communication"), the
campus may, indeed, be considered a community (Klien,
1965, p. 308). In addition, writers in the field of
higher education invariably refer to the college as com-
munity at some point in their discussion, albeit in an
unquestioning and unwitting manner. (For example, we
examined every issue of the NASPA Journal , from 1966 to
present, and found not one article that dealt with the
management of student affairs that did not contain the
word community when referring to the campus population.
At the same time, we found that rarely did any of
these ex
plicitly treat community as an idea , i.e., conceptually.)
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An early view of the residence college as commun-
ity is expressed by Price (1941) as she begins her "diag-
nosis" (from a social work perspective) of the student
problems at Stanford:
A college or university community differs from a
community in the outside world in several important
respects. In the first place, a campus community has
a limited and concentrated age range, the great major-
ity of inhabitants being between sixteen and twenty-
two years of age. The residence campus community also
has a lack of continuity, inherent in the college
situation where over one-fourth of the student group
leaves the community annually. On the other hand,
the older generation, the faculty, who comprise approx-
imately one-fifth of the community, is relatively
permanent
.
The life rhythms and interests of these two groups
differ in a number of respects. For example, the
faculty on the whole are settled in their vocational
and family relations; the students are frequently not
settled in their choice of vocation, are frequently
living away from their homes, and are in a relationship
of dalliance with the opposite sex. The faculty live
in their own homes, frequently at some distance from
the main center of college life; the students are
congregated in groups of their own age, in university
residences or fraternity houses which tend to increase
their contacts and interest in one another. In addition
to these characteristics, the natural and artificial
selective factors which determine the clientele of
an institution operate to make the student group more
homogeneous in interests and activities than would
be true of a non-selected group of young people in
a community in the outside world.
The campus community is partially isolated from
the outside world by its very nature of partial with-
drawal for study. It is none the less affected by the
major economic and social currents and cataclysms in
the larger culture (Price, 1941, p. 309).
The "isolation from the outside world" and the
f life of the residential school ledencompassing way o
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Goffman (1957, pp. 43-44) to include the residential school
in his list of total institutions which are organized
"for technical tas^s." (Prisons, mental hospitals, monas-
teries are the more obvious examples of the total insti-
tution.) Hillery, Jr., in his book. Communal Organizations
(1972), argues the case that the total institution may
not be considered community, the principal reason being
that there "is a basic split between inmates and staff
[!] such that they form separate worlds" (Hillery, Jr.,
1972, p. 130). Cooperation, one of the " focal components"
of the "vill" (Hillery 1 s sociological case equivalent of
community), rather than occurring between the "staff and
inmate segments" occurs within them. And, most important
for Hillery, since for him community "is the consequence
of cooperation among families in a given location" (Hill-
ery, Jr., 1972, p. 145), the absence of the family in the
total institution setting clearly bars such a setting
from consideration as a "local community." He concludes
that, rather than as a community, "the total institution
may be studied as a type of complex or formal organization.
Nisbet is one of those who would argue that when
talking about community in relation to higher education
the referent group is not one that arises out of a delib-
erate effort to create "community," but one that has
evolved over time around the common pursuit of knowledge.
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In Buber’s terms this would be the "Centre"; in Nisbet's
terms it is "the academic dogma": knowledge is sacred
in and for itself. Nisbet's book The Degradation of the
Academic Dogma (1971) is based on the charge that the
"academic community," having abandoned this ideal along
with other essential elements of community, and having
replaced these with "the higher capitalism," "the cult of
individuality," and the "deluge of humanitarianism, " is
no longer a true community. What is a true community?
Nisbet writes that every community "worthy of the name"
is built around seven crucial attributes, all of which
are incorporated in the idea of academic dogma. The
first is function
,
around which it is first established.
Dogma
,
the second essential, is its "profoundly held
value." Communal authority
,
"unwritten, unpre scrip ti ve
,
and drawn from common experience" is third. Hierarchy
is the fourth attribute, the sense of solidarity (incor-
porating the "we-feeling" and sense of normative duty)
fifth, and the sense of honor or status , the sixth. Nis-
bet's final essential is the sense of superiority (to
the "surrounding world") (Nisbet, 1971, PP* ^-^5)*
The university as "therapeutic community, an exam-
ple of bending to the cult of individuality, he treats
with utmost disdain. Referring to programs and colleges
"founded to deal with real or imagined student needs oi
psychological character," Nisbet complains:
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Within a short time the able faculty members,
the bright and motivated students, who find themselves
wily-nily participating in these forms of communitar-
ianism lose interest and
. . . move to where challeng-
ing problems and situations can be found. The most
dedicated in these programs are characteristically the
least bright, the least intellectually oriented, and
at their worst, unable to concentrate mentally even
to the point of reading a book. They require inces-
sant attention, love, diversion, and companionship.
Never having experienced authority in their homes,
in many cases, they are incapable of enduring even
the authority of an intellectual discipline in
college (Nisbet, 1971
,
p. 194 ).
Later he adds:
. . . Community for its own sake has never proved
to be of lasting interest in the history of human
behavior. People come together, not to be together,
but to do things that cannot be done alone (Nisbet,
1971
, PP. 204 - 208 ) .
A profoundly opposite view is expressed by Palmer,
writing from a Quaker, intentional community perspective:
Others among us may be called to build community
in the places where we go to school and work. These
have become the major arenas of hierarchy and compe-
tition. ... In them we are pitted against one
another so that something called "higher performance"
may be achieved. But when we destroy the community
of work we get unethical products and degrading
service. When we destroy the community of scholars,
dehumanized teaching and learning are the result.
We will build community in these places only if we
see that performance at the expense of community is
no achievement at all (Palmer, 1977 , P- 25 ).
Similarly, in an essay describing the Quaker idea
of a "meeting for learning," Palmer explains:
the idea or text is never given the prominence
of * doctrine . If the metaphor of meeting means any-
thing to Friends, it means that experience _ is honored
over doctrine. Only as doctrine has experiential
validity can it be honored at all. . . . Whether the
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subject is literature or atomic physics, the testis always experiential (or experimental) (Palmer
1976, no pagination).
And he concludes
The most important consequence of any meeting[for learning] is the nurture of community.
Education (as contrasted with training) comes from
community and creates community. When a meeting breaks,
the community goes out to embrace people and events
in new and more powerful ways (Palmer, 1976, n.p.).
A Professor’s View of '’Community ”
and College Survival
A different approach to the idea of college as
community is taken by Snyder (1974). Because his is the
only article we have found that deals explicitly with the
two major foci of this study, the idea of community and
the small college as community, we shall spell out his
viewpoint in a more protracted way. Concerned about the
survival of the small liberal arts college, Snyder makes
a cynical and challenging attack on what he terms the
"anachronistic and heavy emphasis on community among
leftist and liberal student activists and faculty."
Rejecting as "superficial" the explanation usually offered
by social commentators which holds that the loss of the
sense of community is a mass societal problem, he suggests
that the trouble lies in " . . .a last strong emphasis
on a particular belief system [the liberal arts dogma]
before such beliefs die and are replaced by others"
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(1974, p. 181).
Snyder condemns "... the role of the mystique of
community in our society generally, as well as the history
of such values in academia.” He takes a jaundiced view of
the "romantic" notion of community which
. . . implies an idealized, integrated, exclusive,
closed and static system of norms and values that*
provides meaning for the individuals who participatein it (Snyder, 1974, p. 182).
He dismisses this "fascinating cultural mythology" as hav-
ing no place in any hard-nosed discussion about survival
of the small liberal arts college. In fact, complains
Snyder
,
"it does great damage to our objective understand-
ing of the structure and functioning of higher education."
He continues:
. . . The Romantic ideal of the primal community— the
family—is always with us and, like love, it appears in
our dreams, advertisements, and speeches of our poli-
ticians. It is emphasized most, however, in those
particular periods and areas of the social structure
in which we are experiencing very rapid social change
and a resultant loss of meaning in our lives. This
is why the concentration on community is so intense in
higher education at the moment (1974, p. 182).
Reviewing the changing roles of the college and
the professor, he describes them as having risen from the
"churchly origins" of higher education. The expectation,
for example, that the professor should take a personal
interest in his students is seen as an outgrowth of the
"sacred" or "moral" role derived from the clerical history
of college instruction. At the same time, the professor’s
"secular" role, that of imparting knowledge, places him
in a conflict difficult to resolve. In addition to the
clerical background of higher education, its aristocratic-
elitist origins, asserts Snyder, serve to deepen and sharp-
en the role conflict of the professor who is caught between
a "cultivation" role and a "training" role. He describes
the typical nineteenth century liberal arts college as con-
trolled by the elite, and as small, hierarchical, authori-
tarian, "and operated much in the fashion of localized,
extended, patriarchal communities or guilds" (1974, p.
185). He concludes that the changing roles of the college
and the professor account for a large portion of student
complaints concerning the lack of a sense of community.
Other factors observed by Snyder are mass education, the
resultant student activism of the sixties, the weakening
of "guild-like," "vertical" student organizations that used
to serve as entrees to elite occupations, the trade union
movement, changing value systems, accelerating social,
technological change, rapid mobility, and secularization.
Snyder reminds us that during the sixties students
chiefly rebelled against the growing bureaucratization, the
irrelevance of courses in terms of "preparation to fit into
the social order," and "the welter of rules and regulations
[which] were at odds with the feeling that everyone was
beautiful and should be able to do his own thing." This
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thought is followed by a somewhat contradictory statement:
; h
'
* P1® form of organization supposedly desired wasthat of the communal family, though a family in whichone had responsibility only to his own self, desires
and wishes. Was this desire for community a cry for
more_ freedom or was it rather a reaction to an already
unbearable excess of freedom, i.e., a cry for thelimitation and control of individual wishes and desires 9
I would assert the latter, arguing that the quest for
community in this case was a cry for the elimination
of the tyranny of unlimited choice— freedom (1974
p . 187) . ’
Although Snyder introduces his subject by proclaim-
ing the irrelevancy of the "Romantic" ideal surrounding
higher education's (and society's) preoccupation with the
quest for community, he does not demonstrate why such an
ideal is out of place in regard to a discussion of the
structure and function of the small liberal arts college.
He simply states why such a quest is so pervasive, an
explanation not dissimilar to the "lost community" state-
ments we have reviewed. The main thrust of Snyder's
article, and the place where he brings quite a surprising
perspective to our topic, appears in the final half of his
argument in which he presents a prospectus for changing
the academic organization and restoring a sense of commun-
ity .
He begins his analysis by turning to the "faculty
as community" with special attention on the small college:
. . .
The sense of community engendered at prestigious
institutions is a hierarchical guild-like one that is
strongly felt; it is based on a substantial foundation
in real power residing in the faculty as a body. Having
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said this, .it is important to point out the seeming
contradiction that the primary loyalties of individu-
als go to their respective departments and increas-ingly to a particular profession as a whole while theseindividuals show only token loyalty to the institution
at which they might happen to be on the climb to aca-demic fame and fortune
.
Turning to the other end of the spectrum of aca-
demic prestige— the small colleges, junior colleges
and community colleges—we find that the faculty
usually wield little power in the governance of these
schools.
. . . Much use is made of the term ’'commun-
ity” at such institutions
. .
.
,
but the use is
strictly symbolic and ritualistic, acting as a smoke
screen to cover the lack of faculty power in the
governance of the institution .( Snyder
, 1974, p. 187 ).
From these remarks one might guess that Snyder's
definition of a sense of community incorporates the notion
of a sense of power. To gain a sense of community, many
faculty and students, says Snyder, raise the cry that they
must run the colleges, an apparent longing for "the old
image of the university as a free association of scholars
banded together for the common good." However, cautions
Snyder, colleges cannot become communes, adding "the asso-
ciational guild-like structure of a community of equals
may have functioned satisfactorily in a bygone era; it is
no longer appropriate to the needs and changing functions
of the educational enterprise of the present."
The colleges of the future as envisioned by Snyder
will be managing their own affairs less and less, and in-
stead will be under the watchful eyes of "educational
technocrats" from regional and national centers who will be
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performing cost-benefit analyses, and systems analyses
and the like. "Their perspective [will be] one which tran-
scends the local campus 'community,' being oriented instead
to the larger educational enterprise and society generally."
Snyder, himself, does not appear to be remorseful about
such a prospect. In fact he sees these centralizing tend-
encies as inevitable, and necessary to combat the ineffi-
ciencies he finds in the schools, and to meet the problem
of rising costs, decreasing revenues, and "the educational
needs of the huge and diverse student body we now serve."
Snyder’s answer to the problem of community and the
future of the small liberal arts college is intimately tied
to this diverse student population. Essentially, his blue-
print for insuring the future of the small college as
community, is to revamp the small liberal arts college so
as to meet the training needs of a specialized student
body. Snyder concludes his argument thusly:
. . . It would appear reasonable to assert that
the future of the small liberal arts college may lie
in serving more narrowly delimited student popula-
tions rather than the more diverse ones they now serve.
The renaissance of the small college and the libera l
arts will not come about by the ritual invocation of
"community" with all its comforting expressive over-
tones
,
but rather through a rigorously instrumental and
technically hard data approach to the restructuring of
higher education as a whole. Once the educational needs
of today's varied student populations are empirically
identified and appropriate delivery systems are designed
to meet them we may suddenly discover that a sense of
community has been somehow magically restored on campus.
The "magic" will prove to be that, in the process of
restructuring higher education to meet the needs
of particular populations of students, we' have also
engineered a restoration of meaning and thus created
the materials necessary to construct an appropriate
sense of community 1 " —
... We shall probably continue to witness thedeath of a growing number of small liberal arts col-
leges. They represent an affluence of inefficiency,
irrelevance and meaninglessness our society refuses’ to
support any longer.
. . . Those that survive will
offer programs for particular groups of students
(Snyder, 1974, p. 194, emphasis added).
Working for a Sense of Community
on the Campus
Friendly, cohesive, work-oriented campus: the
environment is supportive and sympathetic; there
is a feeling of group welfare and group loyalty that
encompasses the college as a whole; the campus is
a community and has a genial atmosphere.
The above is the description of the "Community "scale taken
from a manual accompanying the College and University Envi-
ronmental Scales or C.U.E.S. (Pace, 1969 ), an instrument
which, as its title suggests, attempts to measure the
campus environment in terms of the above and other scales
(Practicality," "Scholarship," "Awareness," "Propriety").
If we were to add the senses of "belongingness," "commit-
ment" or "identity" with the institution, then the defi-
nition of the psychological sense of community would approach
congruency with the meaning of that expression as discussed
in Chapter II. The university environment has also been
described in terms of "student culture" or "subculture"
(Clark and Trow, 1966), a theoretical classification
system based upon the extent to which students are
"identified with their college" and/or are "involved with
ideas." What must be recognized in regard to these scales
and dichotomous variables is that none of them alone has
full claim on the meaning of community in a way that would
incorporate the conceptions of such writers as Sarason,
Buber, Nisbet, and others. Certainly Sarason would object
if a survey of the environment were limited to assessment
of the student culture only; certainly Buber would object
if we were to omit the transcendent centering value; and,
similarly, Nisbet would object if we were not to place an
equal community value on "Scholarship" as compared to
"Community," or "ideas" as opposed to "identity." And to
add to this collection of "community words," let us con-
sider three more: solidarity, unity, harmony—all of
which have appeared at one time or another in the writer's
official descriptions of duties as a dean of student af-
fairs. In this section we shall be looking at what others
have said or done about conditions which may be related to
the achieving of a greater sense of community in the college
setting, understanding that the meaning of that term will
vary in scope and density as it is used by various
authors.
Tollefson ( 1976 ) begins his introduction to his
survey of trends in college student development
with the
assertion that small colleges are fortunate in the respect
that they, because of their size, almost automatically
achieve and maintain a sense of community on their cam-
puses. His survey reviews some of the "successful" pro-
grams at larger universities which have incorporated
one or more of the "key factors" which he believes are
"essential to turning an aggregation of students, faculty,
administrators and other people who work in a college
environment into a community" (1976, p. 87). (We question
Tollefson's assumption about smallness as a guarantee
of community; we shall return to that issue later in
this chapter.) The key factors are (1) transcendent
values, "those values within a given group or community
that have a preeminence or surpass all others for that
group" (examples given are the small, private denomina-
tionally affiliated colleges, colleges with unusual fea-
tures—not necessarily religious, or of a single interest
—etc.); (2) frequency and intensity of contacts between
people— the knowing of others and their names; (3) peer
influence— "a potent resource in the service of total
student development" and (4) the honoring of the student's
" territoriality "—i.e., "the student’s turf" as against
the faculty's, etc. (Tollefson, 1976, pp . 87-90).
The following are summaries of the program exam-
ples which the author refers to as "some Illustrations of
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Community”: (1) Setting up of coed residence halls on
the basis of philosophical categories of learning,
physically modified and equipped in keeping with the phil-
osophical model; advisors are chosen according to aca-
demic discipline. (2) Another "living-learning" model;
students assigned to small "colleges" based on living
groups. (3) Academic advisors assigned to dorm units
where advisees are resident. (4) Small learning groups
within larger university—based on special needs; e.g.,
career exploration, maturation, etc. (5) Another living-
learning conception within large university; self-selected
"hot-house" conditions: "ideal student type" matched
with "ideal teachers." (6) Weekly group meetings with
students, faculty, administrators. (7) A "Union Center"
for all segments of community "to serve the non-classroom
educational purposes of the university community" focus-
ing especially on PSC
. (8) Conversion of former presi-
dent's mansion to a Social Center where various organi-
zations may meet and dine— a retreat. (9) Peer group
concept
—
groups of ten live together separated from others.
(10) An elective course, "The University and Modern
Society," eliminates barriers, etc. (11) Outward Bound-
type activities followed by campfires at which college's
activities are explained. (12) A set of at t i tudes_ rather
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than a "program, " is adopted by a university; e.g.
,
president committed to student development ideal; a vice-
president implements orientation; the dean of students is
a psychologist whose attitudes and interests "foster a
developmental rather than a controlling or managerial
orientation among his staff"; morning rap sessions.
(13) Commuter community college adopts New England type
town meeting led by president. (14) Community partici-
pation program in which student interns volunteer service
in community agencies (Tollefson, 1976, pp . 90-100).
The author concludes his presentation of the
above examples with this observation:
All of these examples incorporate one or more of
the factors important in fostering a sense of commun-
ity. Seldom are any of the key factors involved in
creating a concept of community explicitly stated.
In fact, it is not always evident that those respon-
sible for these programs are consciously aware of the
fundamental factors underlying their efforts. But
there is a consistency to the principle that these
efforts are addressed to creating or enhancing a
sense of community and by doing so have produced
educational benefits (Tollefson, 1976, p. 100).
Tollefson’ s survey presents a comprehensive array
of the kinds of programmatic efforts at "community build-
ing" that began to appear on university campuses in the
early seventies concommitant with the rise of the student
development movement. Programs like these have all but
become standard practices at American universities,
most
of them designed to reduce the alienating effects
of
largeness, and the impersonality of institutional envir-
onments. These have fallen in the categories of physical
and organizational rearrangements such as the living-
learning dormitory, "cluster colleges" (Gaff, 1970),
"colleges within colleges" (Schmidt, 1971), and campus
governance approaches designed to broaden participation
(Evergreen, 1971a). We have not found any trend, however,
that reflects the "attitudinal" approach suggested by
Tollefson's example (#12 above) in which the commitment
to community building is permeated throughout the system,
from "the president on down." The Evergreen approach,
cited above, warrants some further attention since it
appears to incorporate this ideal.
The "Evergreen experiment," as it was called,
particularly its system of governance, was specifically
designed "to facilitate, among other goals, a sense of
community." Thus it did not present to its community a
handbook containing "a list of specific prohibitions and
essentially negative rules," but rather a "social contract
A "College Forum" was established "to meet regularly. . .
to think together; to talk, listen and reason together."
It was to be led by the president with an open-ended
agenda. It was not a decision-making body; it was
"...
a place where hard questions can be asked, and
dreams can
be told, where plans for a better college may
first see
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the light of day." The important principle regarding
decision-making was called "locatability"
; that is,
"decision-makers shall he easily identified and account-
able to the community . " Another principle adhered to was
that there were to be no standing committees, just "...
disappearing task forces." Community service depended
upon a random selection process and voluntarism. Finally,
information, communication and record-keeping received
great stress. A Center was set up to publish a newslet-
ter and a college calendar tied to a communications and
computer network. The Center was to coordinate "imagin-
ative record-keeping procedures" in order to develop a
"continuous chronicle of the Evergreen experiment," and
to locate various resources, i.e., "responsible and
accountable people
. . .
when problems need to be solved"
(Evergreen, 1971b).
In their classic review of the literature on
"the impact of college on students," Feldman and Newcomb
(1970) do not deal specifically with the issue of the
sense of community on the campus, but they consistently
emphasize their concern for "the conditions for campus-
wide impacts." By "impacts" they mean the developmental
consequences of the interaction between the student and
his college experience. Although the term impact is
neutral, it appears to be employed by Feldman and Newcomb
2^7
more often with a positive connotation. Leaving aside
the question of individual differences (i.e., the back-
ground and personality of students) the authors conclude
that
:
The conditions for campus—wide impacts appear to have
been most frequently provided in small, residential,
four-year colleges. These conditions probably
include relative homogeneity of both faculty and
student body together with opportunity for continuing
interaction, not exclusively formal, among students
and among students and faculty (Feldman and Newcomb.
1970, p. 331).
Thus the authors emphatically advise that universities
develop settings "for maximizing impacts on students,"
settings that presumably would attempt to replicate "the
social and psychological conditions that have often been
provided on small ’intimate’ campuses." They observe that
"there have been odd corners of larger universities"
that have had marked impacts on students, however, with
this qualification:
. . .
A university consisting of congeries of small
loci of diverse impacts might, indeed, be the apotheo-
sis of effective higher higher education. Such
"local impacts" within large universities, however,
have more often been attributable to good fortune,
probably, than to systematic arrangements designed
to make them occur (Feldman and Newcomb, 1970, p. 332).
It is just these "systematic arrangements" to
which Tollefson addressed himself as he looked for examples
of programs that would tend to develop community, making
it appear to us that there is a coincidence of meaning be-
tween conditions for campus-wide impacts and the community
aspects of a campus. Feldman and Newcomb refer to such
arrangements as horizontal organization which they de-
scribe as
. . institutionalized arrangements concern-
ing interrelationships at the same or immediately adjacent
’levels’" (1970, p. 336). They make the point that it is
not the size of an institution that determines the nature
of its impacts (and we would add, its sense of community)
but rather whether or not its internal organization, i.e.,
hori zontal organization, is appropriate to its size.
However, they add that "at any given horizontal level
. . . size does matter." From that assertion Feldman and
Newcomb develop two "general propositions" which we shall
quote in full because of their immediate relevance to
the concept of the psychological sense of community:
1. Insofar as the goals of an organization prominently
include psychological changes on the part of its
members, as ends rather than only as means to other
ends, its goals can be furthered by processes of
mutual support and mutual stimulation among mem-
bers of whom changes are expected. (Kurt Lewin
put it this way: "It is often easier to change a
whole group than a single individual.") This prop-
osition, we suggest, applies a fortiori , though
not exclusively, to changes in attitudes and. values
as contrasted, say, with the acquisition of in-
formation or dexterity.
2. The conditions that favor mutual stimulation and
support must be described in interpersonal terms.
They include, particularly, opportunity . for con-
tinued interaction among the same individuals,
allowing occasions for the discovery of. mutual
congeniality, preferably in varied settings not
2^9
just academic or just recreational or just resi-
dential, for example (Feldman and Newcomb, 1970,
P. 337).
The authors conclude that the most important single con-
dition for creating effective horizontal organization is
the degree to which local autonomy is present in any
single unit of a university.
When Feldman and Newcomb raise the question of
smallness they also bring up the question of "image” and
its impact on the college environment. They observe that
there are ". . . those colleges that have relatively
clear and salient images [and] those that are practically
imageless" (1970, p. 112). Those which have clear images,
they suggest, attract a homogeneous collectivity of
faculty and students, thus increasing the chances for
campus-wide impact, or as we say, a sense of community.
Typically, the colleges with "clear and salient images"
are those traditional private institutions that are high
on the prestige scale and high on selectivity, as well as
those that have historical denominational affiliations.
Pace (1968), for example, in discussing methods of meas-
uring college environments, noted that colleges which are
selective or have strong denominational ties tend to
have above average scores on the "Community" scales
of
C.U.E.S. (1968, p. 139). These observations, of course,
are consistent with our findings in our earlier
chapters
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regarding the conditions that enhance the sense of com-
muni ty op the "we— feeling.
"
In his book. The Distinctive College: Antioch.
Reed & Swarthmore (1970), Clark provides an exhaustive
account of how three successful small colleges had devel-
oped their "clear and salient images," their "distinct-
iveness." Of relevance here is the author’s concept of
college as saga :
The most important characteristic and consequence
of an organizational saga is the capturing of alle-
giance, the committing of staff to the institution.
Emotion is vested to the point where many participants
significantly define themselves by the central theme
of the organization. The organizational motif becomes
individual motive, much more than a statement of
purpose, a cogent theme, a doctrine of administra-
tion, or a logical set of ideas. Deep emotional
investment binds participants as comrades in a cause.
Indications of an organizational legend are pride
and exaggeration; the most telling symptom is an
intense sense of the unique
. Men behave as if they
knew a beautiful secret that no one outside the
lucky few could ever share
. An organizational saga
turns an organization into a community
,
even a cult
(Clark, 1970
,
p7 235, emphasis added)
.
How the college as saga turns into a community is later
explained
:
We may note particularly that distinctiveness
in a college involves and encourages those charac-
teristics of group life commonly referred to as
community. It offers an educationally relevant defi-
nition of the difference of the group from all others.
And salient elements in the distinctiveness become
foci of personal awareness and of a sense of things
held in common with others currently on the scene,
those who have been there before, and those yet to
arrive. Distinctiveness captures loyalty, inducing
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men to enlist and to stay against the lures of career-
ism. And it arrests the most transient members, the
students, extending their devotion for years to come
(Clark, 1970, p. 256).
The College as Non-Community :
Campus Alienation
The preceding discussion leads us to pause briefly
to consider the question of the college, large or small,
which has little impact (or negative impact) on its
resident populations and which presumably lacks the con-
ditions that promote community, that is, "image," "tra-
dition," "transcendent values," "selectivity," and the
variety of variables suggested by our survey of the com-
munity literature. One of the consequences may be alien-
ation, a term which Katz and Kahn (1978, p. 380) tell us
has become somewhat of a wastebasket concept, that is,
too conceptually "versatile" because it "is invoked to
explain a long list of troubles and their opposites." In
the mass societal context they view the concern about
alienation as "a belated recognition of Durkheim' s thesis
that modern society lacks the common collective conscience
provided by the internalized values of a traditional cul-
ture." In their discussion, Katz and Kahn call on See-
man's definition of alienation, which, as we read it (hav-
ing in mind a college environment), provides us with a
sharp sense of how a "low impact" campus experience
may lead
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to a localized form of that condition:
(1) A sense of powerlessness— the feeling that
events and outcomes of importance to oneself are
controlled and determined by external forces and not
one's own efforts. (2) A sense of meaninglessness
—
the feeling that the course of events is incompre-
hensible and that the future cannot be predicted.
(3) A sense of normlessness— the feeling that socially
unapproved means are necessary to attain socially
approved ends, and that therefore one is not bound
by standards of values and morality. (4) Social
isolation— feelings of loneliness, rejection, exclu-
sion from valued groups or relationships. (5) Value
isolation or estrangement— the rejection of commonly
held values. (6) Self-estrangement—the feeling
that one is engaged in activities that are not re-
warding in themselves and is therefore acting in ways
that are somehow not true to self and one's own
needs (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 382).
When one considers that college students to begin with,
from a mental health standpoint, are a "population-at-
risk," then the issue of campus alienation becomes sig-
nificant. A much discussed problem in the literature,
alienation is mentioned at this point only to show a
relationship with the question of the college as commun-
ity. For example, sociologists have found (Seeman, 1972;
Christenfeld and Black, 1977) that reducing alienation is
not simply a matter of attempting to "engage" people in
"activities," but more a matter of restructuring—in the
sense of horizontal reorganizing— some of the fundamental
aspects of campus life. "Involvement," observe Christen-
feld and Black, "when it occurs by default, through 'total
immersion' in an enforced community, cannot be expected
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appreciably to mitigate any predominant emotional rejec-
tion." The authors go on to report on a related study:
In one college community, in the 1970s, strongly
negative attitudes toward the college are not improved
by heightened membership and the extent that one’s
membership may not be entered into in a fully volun-
tary spirit, the boundaries of that environment can
be viewed as contributing over time to a pervasive
malaise which in some number of students approaches
a level of quiet desperation (Christenfeld and Black,
1977, p. 124).
Cottle (1974), a psychiatrist, in an essay entitled "The
Felt Sense of Studentry," explains that students arrive
on campus with a "need for communion" and a "need to be
watched over" (unadmitted, of course) having been "rewarded"
for doing good work in high school by "removal from home"
(1974, pp . 32-33). Waiting for them is the president "in
the role of impersonal father" who has substituted
"permissiveness" for " in loco parentis ," an administration
which is "product-oriented," and a "faculty which pro-
vides little or no contact." The picture Cottle paints
may seem overstated, but rings true to this writer:
At school, these students quickly learn not only
that there are few figures around to carry them
through their loneliness, but that the older people
on campus cannot give them sufficient time. They
learn too that university personnel differentiate
the task of caring for students into academic, psy-
chiatric, or legal compartments, leading students to
believe they will be dealt with only when they
exhibit a prefabricated problem, like flunking, steal-
ing, or "freaking out." While some students wake
.
each morning praising the new-found freedom of uni-
versities, others tremble at the thought that
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they might not be able to muster the strength to
carry them through today and tomorrow. Other
students find ways of avoiding the depression or
loneliness: they turn to drugs. Still others,
feeling guilt as well as loneliness and fright,
collapse
. . .
. . . It is not frivolous to say that merely
walking through the halls of a building may cause one
to feel that one is going crazy. Similarly, the cries
of' lack of closeness between faculty members and
students are not mindless repetitions of the noises
of prior generations. Class and dorm life, cafeteria
and meandering-in-the-halls life, walking about
campus or in the streets of a strange city, all may
have profound effects on the human psyche, particu-
larly when an individual has reached that point in
his life when severe social structure and personality
discontinuities have recently been experiences.
The effect of environmental features on students
is great indeed, especially because students, as they
undergo the transformations of style and value that
college demands, comprehend the fact that the world
is changing them. . . .
As long as there are families, systems of author-
ity, and age-graded capacities, there will be a need
for all degrees and varieties of human contact
(Cottle, 1974, pp. 35-36).
It should be kept in mind that Cottle '
s
observations may
be based solely or predominantly on his contacts with
troubled students. Feldman and Newcomb ( 1970 , pp . 330
-
331 ), for example, found that students do not
in general
demonstrate a strong desire for frequent contact with
faculty, "particularly those seeking independence from
parents and authority figures."
However, as was stated earlier, college
students
are a higher mental health risk than the
population at
large. In their Introduction to Community
Psychology.
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Za.x and Specter (197^) report of studies which demonstra-
ted this statistically: out of ten thousand college
students (in the late 1960s) 1650 required professional
assistance, 20 committed suicide, and 25 required con-
finement in mental hospitals. We report these data here
not because this study is focused on the problems of an
individual psychology, but for the same reasons they are
reported in our original source (a work on community
psychology) : to indicate that a community approach is
called for in a situation in which "too few students
with psychosocial difficulties are reached" with more tra-
ditional approaches ( Zax and Specter, 197^, p. 209). Not-
withstanding Nisbet's dislike for the campus as "thera-
peutic community," or Snyder's condemnation of "the
mystique of community" in academia, our findings suggest
that the concern for whether the campus is a community
or a non-community may be more than mere indulgence in
"the cult of individuality" or in "the Romantic ideal of
the primal family." And not only "mental health" concerns
are at issue. There is "hard data" (Heller and Monahan,
1977, pp. 127 - 130 ) to show that "global, friendly, help-
ing relations" as a chief "primary prevention tool" is
able to "reduce the number who [seek] individual counsel-
ing," and the number who seek to transfer. Thus "produc-
tion" goals as well as humanistic goals are affected by
the quality of the campus community.
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The 1972 NASPA Conference :
" The Communi ti zation Process in Academe "
It has been reported. (Bennett, 1965 ) that community
psychology was "born" at the now famous "Boston Conference
on the Education of Psychologists for Community Mental
Health." At another conference held in Denver in 1972,
this time under the auspices of the National Association
for Student Personnel Administrators, there might have
been the promise of the birth of a related movement, one
that would have cast the chief student affairs officer in
the role of a "campus community specialist." Billed as a
"program of utmost significance not only to student per-
sonnel administrators, but to the entire field of higher
education today" (NASPA, 1972, p. 266), the conference has
apparently failed to inspire the birth of a "community"
movement in these circles, that is, if we judge by the
literature and the practices which have followed that event
up to the present. The conferees were "to discuss among
themselves the process of building community on their
campuses," explore ways to "enhance interactions which
assist community development," and to
. . .
develop in their students and staffs those
skills and understandings which individuals can use in
building a sense of community in their own experiences
(NASPA, 1972, p. 266).
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Our* plan of presentation is to review the papers
of the Conference's four major speakers in the order in
which they were delivered, highlighting only those remarks
that would add to what has already been said about commun-
ity and the community process in our report thus far. We
shall do the same with the conference papers that were
presented by the various panelists.
Ardrey (1972) whom we met before in our discussion
(in Chapter V) of crisis and territory, addressed the 1st
General Session with a speech entitled "The Student: An
Evolutionary Perspective." Here he relates his triadic
need theory (identity, stimulation and security) to the
college community by stating that "the learning community
has to satisfy these innate needs" (Ardrey, 1972, p. 27).
The new message that we distill from this address is again
from the field of animal behavior. Ardrey calls it the
"Numbers Game." It comes down to this: that 500, "being
the minimum number that can successfully conduct inter-
breeding in terms of populations
—
genetics," is "the largest
group that can have reality," the "maximum number that can
know each other as individuals," "the maximum number that
you can talk to without using one of those things." It
is within that number that
. .
. the individual can still find his identity be-
cause he can still know everybody . The leader can
know everybody under him and everybody can know the
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leader
—
personally—not very well, but enough. So
you can achieve identity within 500 or 600. Beyond
that you must have a mosaic of tribes or groups.
So your identity is the identity of your group/and
that is where it extends on the whole corporation,
university, what not. But you cannot violate these
numbers (Ardrey, 1972, pp. 33-3*0.
The numbers 10 and 50 are also mentioned by Ardrey as
having significance in the biological Numbers Game, 10
being the optimal number for an intimate group, and 50
being the optimal number of individuals that can live
cooperatively in a communal-like setting.
The next speaker is Nisbet whose books we have
already discussed in regard to the issue of the loss of
the sense of community in society generally (1970), and
in the university, in particular (1971). His speech, "The
Future of Community” (1972), is essentially a reiteration
of the arguments expressed in his The Degradation of the
Academic Dogma (1971) which was discussed earlier in this
chapter. What is newly expressed here is the idea that
... it would be dangerous to try to make a single
community out of a given college or university.
The dangers would be . . . the monolithic kind of
authority and communal structure. Any university
should be thought of as a community of communities,
a communitas communitata (Nisbet, 1972, p. 31)*
This appears to be an extension of the principle ol scale
implied in Ardrey' s notion of the "Numbers Game.”
Buckminster Fuller's concept of the college com-
munity, expressed in his talk "Cosmic Science," is that it
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be "a community of spontaneous effort"—not "an aggregate
community of individuals"— "deeply committed" to "develop-
ing great documentary programs ... to get the right
information to their fellow man" (Fuller, 1972, p. 24).
Finally, the last "internationally known speaker"
is Arthur Chickering who addressed the Closing Dinner on
"Community, Human Development and Higher Education"
(Chickering, 1972).. He states that he likes Fuller's notion
of ad hoc "communities of spontaneous effort" primarily
because he, himself, opts for short term, not long term,
community, and suggests such devices as short-term living-
learning arrangements or "flexible short-term residential
periods" (p. 30). This is because Chickering is especially
concerned with the new sophisticated, worldly student
"who does not need to learn to fit in." "College should
provide ways, instead, to grow in diversity" (p. 22).
Asserts Chickering:
Community is no longer a given. Each person
[referring to the new internationally oriented student
as opposed to the student representing the "small town
middle America"] has to create his own community now,
and he has to carry it around inside himself . He has
to nurture it . He has to keep it alive if it i
s
going to be there at all (Chickering, 1972, p. 15 s
emphasis added).
And, concluding, he again addresses himself to the "new
student, after acknowledging that NASPA professionals with
their responsibility for residential life and the noncourse
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curriculum are in a good position to make a contribution
to creating developmental conditions:
If we are going to do that, I think we have to
think much more critically about how we manage these
residential contexts so that we create situations
.
which are congruent with the kind of multiple reference
groups and multiple social situations that our students
increasingly have to face as they leave our institu-
tions (Chickering, 1972, p. 3*1).
To sum up, what our four major speakers are telling
student personnel administrators about "the process of
building community on their campuses" is (1) keep your
communities down to scale, preferably no more than around
five hundred individuals, and preferably not the whole
place; (2) communities should not only be small, they should
be short lived and ad hoc and have as their function docu-
menting the conditions of the earth and its resources in
order to inform people through a total (ecological) ori-
entation rather than a narrow (specialist) one; and (3)
gear your communities so that they prepare students not
for a bygone era of the village community but for the
complexities of a mobile, rootless, multiple reference
society
.
We begin our review of the conference papers with
Hardee (1972) who presents four constructs for campus
community building: (1) identify the institution’s mission,
(2) identify and communicate with the campus sub-cultures
(she prefers the term "para-cultures"), (3) view coordina-
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tion as the key to community (this essentially relates
to governance designed to create manageably sized smaller
communities within the larger university), and (*1)
develop students through development of community (we add
the emphasis to underscore the unusualness of this state-
ment in student development circles) (Hardee, 1972, pp
.
8 -10 )
.
Meyers (1972) makes an interesting observation
that is somewhat reflective of Chickering’ s notion of
the "new" student: that students no longer need (and that
some even abhor) the small, intimate liberal arts college:
. . . They fear an ingrown, self-preoccupied
quality that a small college can have. ... If the
idea of community has enduring value ... we will
have to work hard and inventively to develop institu-
tional bases and structures very different from those
of traditional communities, and probably different
from those of communes (Meyers, 1972, p. 9).
At the same time the author offers a traditional view of
community
:
. . .
A community is a way of organizing human exper-
ience through time so that at least clusters of people
can come to know each other . . . They can develop a
common sense of direction and purpose as their
activities intersect in various ways and with varying
degrees of intimacy and distance. In principle, each
person can find at least some mode of common support
for a growing, coherent interpretation of himself and
his world. . . . (Meyers, 1972, pp . 9-10).
Meyers tells us that he is not sure that we can develop
communities while avoiding the "oppressive character of the
traditional community" or whether it is possible to create
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a university community with the problems of size, compart—
mentalization and the transiency of student populations.
Although he discusses possible changes in campus physical
design and other environmental manipulations that increase
the possibilities of personal contact, Meyers believes
that it is chiefly through the educational process that
community can be achieved, that is, "in the classroom."
He believes this can best come about if a technique known
as "creative bargaining" is employed. Originally a theory
of process formulated by Max Otto, creative bargaining
is described by Meyers as a set of four interrelated pro-
cesses which people embroiled in a controversy may use:
(1) try to understand one’s own ideas and goals more clearly
than before; (2) understand the perspective and claims of
others; (3) work to create a new goal or value that would
incorporate what the various parties were seeking; and
(4) formulate the new objective in a concrete fashion and
test it out. Says Meyers:
. .
Creative bargaining does not especially serve
to bring people together. In most cases they will
already have come together—as, for example, in con-
flict. It can stimulate or lure them to work through
their coming together so as to open their imaginations
to new loyalties in a common endeavor (Meyers, 1972
,
p"! 8, emphasis added).
Jones (1972) calls attention to "six significant
environmental factors" that can effect the communitization
process by insuring internal coherence: (1) physical
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factors which "should reflect the educational style sub-
scribed to"; (2) personal intimacy and social cohesion as
factors in promoting academic achievement ; (3) moral com-
mitment to standards of personal behavior
; (4) scholarship
and financial aid programs meaningfully administrated
(conceived of as a means of providing opportunities);
(5) student activities which reflect the goals of the
institution; (6) warm associations between students and
staff (Jones, 1972, pp . 2-7).
Cross talks about "The Impact of Egalitarianism on
the Academic Community" (1972) that is, the bringing in
of non-whites, women, and adult learners and their respec-
tive collective "reform movements." Cross’ approach is
an "extended classroom" or "extended campus" approach.
"There is no doubt in my mind," she writes, "that the
trend of the future is away from community—except for
those few institutions that wish to make a special feature
of it." What Cross does see in the future are more out-
reach programs such as external degree and university-
without-walls programs. She continues:
. .
. I take a dim view, I'm afraid, of student per-
sonnel administrators who entertain thoughts of the
profession serving as the experts in establishing,
the learning environment of the campus. That’s fine
for colleges that can afford to offer the expensive
luxury of residential and/or community experience..
But even assuming we knew how to create a stimulating
learning environment and were willing to be accounta e
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for it, it is too narrow a base upon which to build
a profession (Cross, 1972, pp
.
9-10).
Neither does Cross see counseling as the backbone of the
profession. Rather, she suggests that the major role of
the student affairs dean "is the matching of educational
experiences to student needs" and "the application of
research about students.".
A paper presented by Peig entitled "Oti Va-T’Elle
—
New Dimensions in Women’s Programming" (1972) is primarily
a statement on the recognition of the women's movement in
higher education. Similar to the hypothesis that was
suggested in Chapter III of this report to the effect that
the bondedness of same-sex groups may have a salutory
effect on the whole community, the author argues that
The hope comes from the groups now developing
small vibrant communities within institutions
.
If we understand the problems of women and mi-
nority groups, we can work in common toward their
solution. We can think—and think together
—
about how to transform knowledge and wisdom, and
a body politic into an organic unity of sympathy
and solidarity (Feig, 1972, p. 11, emphasis added).
In " Ubi Societas Ibi Jus- -The Role of a System of
Law in the Communitization Process in Academia" Hammond
(1972) deals with "necessary changes in the area of auth-
ority" that would impact the sense of community on college
campuses. Like Kanter (see Chapter IV) who emphasized
the importance of moral commitment and social control as
a factor in community endurance, Hammond argues that sys-
tem of authority in a community protects it from "the
265
unacceptable, that is, from that which shocks "the common
sense of community." In addition, he views a system of
law as helping to meet Ardrey’s triad of needs (identity,
stimulation, and security). The author concludes
. . . that a system of law within the academic com-
munity does not have much lasting effect on the vio-
lator but does tend to reaffirm the norm established
by the community and serve as a vehicle for reexam-
ination of the social order (Hammond, 1972, p. 10).
Sebok's "A State College Communitization Schema"
(Sebok, 1972) proposes better admissions testing and
advising, more careful selection of administrators in
terms of institutional goals, the tightening of standards,
promoting community commitment among faculty, and inte-
grating the liberal arts curricula. Student affairs lead-
ership would stress service, ombudsmanship and research,
while the student center would be conceived of as a
"contact center" with particular attention paid to the
needs of the commuter student.
The training of deans of students is the subject
of a paper by Blaesser (1972) who would make communitiza—
tion processes a central core of a graduate program de-
signed to produce student affairs officers. The training
would have a multi-disciplinary orientation and would be
staffed by sociologists, anthropologists and educationists.
It would incorporate the notion of the college as a col-
lection of "interlocking subcommunities" in which the def-
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inition of student would be understood to Include "...
not merely the tuition payer, but all who are actively
engaged in the common goal of learning" (Blaesser, 1972,
.p. 4). It would also incorporate a philosophy of com-
munity maintenance similar to the set of "principles for
creating and maintaining community" which the author bor-
rowed from the work of Walter Priesen and which he sum-
marizes as follows:
1. A sense of community requires that individuals
share a common purpose and common experiences.
2. The common purpose must be an authentic purpose.
3. For community to form, a personal commitment must
be made by the individual members.
4 . A personal investment suggests that community calls
for the risk of making oneself vulnerable.
5. In order to make risk and vulnerability possible,
the community must experience safety.
6. For a group to develop and grow in its sense of
community it must have significant responsibility
and the authority needed to execute its responsi-
bility .
7. While it is not necessary for a group to be com-
pletely autonomous for it to experience community,
the members must be able to clearly distinguish
the boundaries of their group.
8. For a community to develop, the authority figures
are commonly required to give up their assumed
roles and their status symbols.
9 . There must be the freest flow of communication
among members of the group.
10. There needs to be a sense of election [sic], a
personal calling.
11. For a group to experience and practice community,
the members also need solitude.
12 Individuals must enter with faith, recognizing
the
community as essential for human needs (Blaesser,
1972, pp. 4-5).
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In addressing the issue of community at the urban
university Shappell (1972) argues that
We can no ^ longer think of academic community as
a concept limited to the '’campus," especially in our
urban communities. We can no longer limit member-
ship in the academic community to the academicians
(Shappell, 1972, p. 10).
First, he would start with the development of a sense of
academic community within
,
and then through "effective
leadership" throughout the levels and components of the
university (including the faculty who he believes "must
share their talents and research the problems of urban
life"), he would see the extending of this "within" com-
munity into the urban community.
Describing the "community planning process model"
which was instituted at the University of Delaware in
1968 while he was Vice President for Student Affairs,
Worthen (1972) lists eight essential elements that are
derived from that model:
1. First, planning must focus initially on program
priorities with the constraints of finances,
facilities and personnel coming into play after
these fundamental decisions are made . . .
2. Second, the President must give the strongest
possible support to the enterprise.
3. Third, there must be a commitment on the part of
those in positions of responsibility, particularly
the budget-makers, to give careful consideration^
to the recommendations with the aim of implementing
as many as possible.
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4. Fourth, the process must be initiated with the
expectation that it will be continuous and the
plans always open to revision.
5. Fifth, each component part of the University should
initiate the development of its own plan involving
representatives of all members of the unit. The
plans must originate in the lowest level of the
organization
.
6. Sixth, a commission of internal committee, repre-
senting all segments of the institution, must be
established and staff assigned to support its
work
.
7. Seventh, the Commission should hold open hearings
where the plans can be discussed and defended
forthrightly and the pressures of community opin-
ion brought to bear.
8. Finally, in addition to producing the plan, the
process must be nurtured to reinforce the attitudes
of cooperation and understanding and positive
regard for others. Faculty, students and staff
should be able to sense that they share common
objectives and interests and that each has an
opportunity to participate in the development of
the institution (Worthen, 1972, pp . 8-9).
Worthen concludes that the planning process, itself,
aside from whatever eventuated in terms of programs, may
have been the chief factor in helping to facilitate a
sense of community.
The remaining conference papers (those relevant
to our subject) deal with: the cluster college strategy
designed to counter centralization and largeness (Collins,
1972), the living-learning strategy of resident
hall
arrangements utilizing Ardrey's triple need theory and
the principle of the transcending value (Shaw, 1972),
the principles of participative programming
and the pub-
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licizing of achievements (Cinclair, 1972), social work
type interventions in the campus community similar to the
community strategies described in Chapter IX of this study
(Riffel, 1972), the special needs of the transfer student
in regard to comparatively lower ratings of campus envir-
onments (Anstett, 1972), and an individual behavioral
approach to the problem of community (Smith, 1972).
Smith's paper deserved further description here, appear-
ing to us as the boldest and most provocative paper among
all the conference presentations.
His paper, "The Dean as a Stimulus for Communiti-
zation and/or Vice Versa" (1972), challenges most of the
views of community building expressed by the conferees,
taking a particularly dim view of theories of innate
communal responses (without mentioning Ardrey by name)
that would be the basis for dealing with human groups
"according to animal research." Without an individual
behavioral orientation "communitization" is in danger,
exclaims the author, of being just another "empty concept"
with all its attendant notions that
. . .
all is not well in higher education and/or in
student lives and that the student personnel adminis-
trator is a competent, concerned, and trustable person
who is ready and anxious to do something about this
. . .
(Smith, 1972, p. 2).
Regarding the idea of the transcendent value as a neces-
sary ingredient of communitization. Smith would see it as
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propitious rather than indispensable," but at the same
time agrees that its presences would make the process go
easier. For example, he observes that
• . . In some cases, the reputation or stature of aninstitution might announce or provide such a value
and assure its acceptance upon entry (which may be
what excellence is to some colleges and universities)
(Smith, 1972, p. 3 ).
Smith then goes on to depict his rendition of community:
. .
.
places where people live and work and seek
dignity and worth for very significant periods of
time
. . .
where
none of these lives can legitimately be perceived as
any more or less important or real than the life of
another individual in the situation
. .
.
(Smith,
1972, p. 4).
The author's description of the lack of sense of commun-
ity or malaise on the college campus strikes us as pain-
fully familiar and accurate and deserves a full quotation:
Tired faces, sloppily written or facetiously worded
proposals before governance bodies, statements of
worthlessness by older faculty members, contemptuous
remarks or looks between "straights" and "freaks"
(or whatever terminology is appropriate in April)
or between the humanities and the sciences, destruc-
tion and mistreatment of property, courses that never
meet, directed studies with no direction and no study,
endless requests for "Incomplete" grades, poor class
attendance, preoccupation with trivia, curriculum
reform influenced by or directed at financial dif-
ficulties, financial difficulties themselves, general
apathy with regard to racial issues, the arrogant
commission of felonies in situations in which the
same individuals wouldn't violate the institution's
drinking regulations, a student looking for a place to
study or sleep because his roommate is "using" their
room, the best students looking for ways to spend as
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few semesters or quarters as possible at the Institu-
tion—not to mention direct expressions of harassing
confusion and restlessness and tiredness and despair
unrelated to specific issues or Injustices (Smith
1972, p. l|).
For Smith, the communltization process is a matter of the
institution designating certain behaviors as community-
enhancing and others as community-defeating, and then
going about the business of maximizing and minimizing
respectively those specified behaviors. The process is
thus conceived of as "an increase in the likelihood or
occurrence of certain desired behaviors or experiences and
a decrease in the likelihood or occurrence of certain
undesired behaviors or experiences" (1972, p. 5). To the
author, the very process of arriving at "the consensual
validation of a specification " of these behaviors holds
"the most exciting possibility of all." He feels that the
dean of students, by background and training, should not
only be in a good position to contribute to this "crea-
tion and validation of a specification" process but also
to "really know" how to do some of the maximizing ("rein-
forcing") or minimizing ("extinguishing"), and how to
evaluate such efforts.
Above all, Smith insists that the following four
principles must be paid attention to if the communltization
process is to succeed: (1) standards which, essentially,
are the "criteria which represent the best interests
ot
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the total group," and which are used to evaluate behav-
iors, ( 2 ) accountability
,
or individual responsibility for
living up to the "specifications" of the community, ( 3 )
behavioral consequences
,
or accepting the responses of
the environment to one’s behavior, and (4) clear expecta-
tions by the total group of "standard" behavior (Smith,
1972, pp. 9-11).
Smith believes that the size of an institution
should not be a barrier to total communitization if his
behavioral scheme is put into practice "without self-
fulfilling pessimism." He outrightly rejects "employing
a conventional . . . concept of community, either as an
objective or a source of assumptions." Apparently, he is
obliquely referring to Nisbet’s concept of community based
upon the medieval model of the university or perhaps the
societal tradition of community, as suggested by his
statement that using such conceptual approaches
. . .
might well have introduced some very unattrac-
tive and difficult notions, notions such as attitudes
of superiority, conflict and competition within or
between institutions, requirements— for suffrage,
property rights, family patterns, hierarchies of
rights and privileges, and systems of authority
and law enforcement . . . (Smith, 1972, p. 17).
In his concluding remarks Smith makes particular
reference to the role of the dean of students:
.
To the dean, all that I have said is to view
communitization as an opportunity to become what
he's been saying all along—or perhaps to stop pre
dieting the future and start determining it. I
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suppose I have said something more to the dean whose
style consist s essentially of hoping or praying or
assuming or intending, or counting on vaguely concep-tualized processes.
.
. . And I guess I have implied
that, stimulated by communitization, some deans willfind themselves affecting the behavior of students
in ways that will help these students to become con—
tributive, happy members of the communities in which
they will spend the remainder of their lives (Smith
1972, p. 18).
With this Skinneresque view of the community pro-
cess we end our review of the papers delivered at the
Denver Conference of the National Association of Student
Personnel Administrators with its theme of building commun-
ity on the college campus. The experience of reviewing
this body of material has been humbling in the sense that
it has brought our attention to the fact that an able
assemblage of professional workers and thinkers attempted
to come to terms with this issue before the present writer
even conceived of it as an issue. At the same time we
recognize that, as far as we have been able to discern,
the general thrust of the student development movement has
been very little influenced by the communitization theme.
Perhaps, therefore, we may take a little satisfaction for
having reintroduced a subject that, after all, some nine
years ago was the cause for a whole profession and some
distinguished guests to assemble together for three days.
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Summary and Discussion
Conceptions of the college campus as community
were reviewed. Snow described it as an aspect of college
which commanded the affection and loyalty for a society
completely sure of its values. Klien questioned whether
a campus may properly be called a community since it lacks
some of the attributes of the traditional societal commun-
ity particularly a stable residency. He concluded that
since many of the features of community are present the
campus may be viewed as a community. Further, it was
observed that the literature about colleges invariably
referred to their settings as ’’community." The principal
differences between the campus community and the societal
(traditional) community were identified by Price: a limited
concentrated age range (truer in 1941 than now), and the lack
of continuity (except for the faculty)
. Distinctions be-
tween the faculty community and the student community were
drawn. The college was also seen as a formal organization,
which, having the attribute of isolation, led us to con-
sider the concept of the total organization (especially in
light of the segmentation of the staff and students [in-
mates]). Hillery’s conceptual requirement that the family
be the basic unit of community was seen to technically
rule out consideration of the total organization as com-
munity .
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Nisbet’s concept of the academic dogma (pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake) as the transcendent value around
which the true academic community may be maintained was
discussed. The crucial aspects of community were identi-
fied as function, dogma, authority, hierarchy, solidarity
and the sense of superiority
. The idea of community as an
end in itself (i.e., the therapeutic community, which Nis-
bet sees as an extension of the cult of individuality) was
seen as a trend in academia which the author deplored as
being part of the degradation of the academic dogma. This
view was contrasted with the Quaker position (Palmer) which
holds that education’s mission is the nurturing of commun-
ity which, in turn, perpetuates the educational process.
We reviewed an essay by Snyder which argued that
the quest for community as it relates to the college set-
ting is a romantic anachronism—especially as it concerns
the survival of the small, private liberal arts institution.
The author presented his case for revamping such colleges
so as to meet the training needs of particular student
populations, thereby constructing what he would consider an
appropriate sense of community through a restoration of
meaning.
Tollefson’s survey of university programs which
were addressed to creating or enhancing the sense of community
was reviewed. Transcendent values, frequency and intensity
276
of personal contacts, peer influence, and student terri-
toriality were named as the essential factors. We also
reported on the Evergreen College plan of community struc-
ture. A social contract taking the place of the traditional
disciplinary code, regular campus—wide meetings conducted
by the college president, the principle of the locatabil-
ity of decision-makers and the stress on voluntarism and
communication were important components of this structure.
Feldman’s and Newcomb's concept of campus-wide
impacts was discussed as it relates to the issue of com-
munity since it was observed that the conditions for maxi-
mizing impacts appear to be identical to conditions which
create a sense of community. Institutionalized arrange-
ments within the larger setting directed at interrelation-
ships were referred to as horizontal organization which,
when appropriate to the size of the setting, tend to play
a significant role in the nature of campus impacts. The
most important single factor was seen as the degree of local
autonomy in the horizontal unit. The authors also found
that a college’s clear and salient image tends to insure
favorable impacts. Another author (Pace) found that high
prestige combined with high selectivity as attributes of a
college tended to be related to higher levels of community
feeling. The importance of "a clear and salient image" was
also brought out in Clark's discussion of "college as saga.'
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The question of unfavorable impacts of college
environments was considered. it was suggested that, among
other factors, student alienation may tend to be more
prevalent in college settings which do not provide the
conditions for campus-wide impact or community. It was
reported that involvement in activities may not be enough
to pull students out of their sense of alienation (Chris-
tenfeld and Black). A psychiatrist's description of the
plight of the student who, when he arrives on the campus
with a need for communion, finds little or no contact was
presented (Cottle)
. Data were reported ( Zax and Specter)
which indicate that college students, from a mental health
standpoint, are a population-at-risk, and that too few
students have been reached through traditional one-on-one
approaches. This supported their notion that a community
psychological approach is a more viable direction for campus
workers
.
A section was devoted to a review of papers pre-
sented at a 1972 conference on the communitization process
in academe sponsored by NASPA. Ardrey asserted that a
successful learning community is only possible if the needs
of identity, stimulation and security are satisfied among
its population. This theory is derived from studies of
evolution and animal behavior, fields which also support
Ardrey' s view that the maximal size of a group that could
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develop into a viable community is approximately 500 indi-
viduals. Nisbet also alluded to community scale when he
suggested that a university had best aim for a community
of communities rather than a monolithic authority structure.
Communities of spontaneous effort formed to document and
communicate vital information was seen by Buckminster
Fuller as the appropriate form of college commutization
.
Chickering would opt for the short term community experi-
ence since in his view the modern student has no need to
learn to fit into a traditional community setting. Rather,
the author saw the college’s role as preparing the student
for life in a mobile society in which multiple reference
groups and multiple social situations are the rule. Simi-
larly, Meyers contended that many students are no longer
looking for the traditional community experience in their
education, which explains why many students would leave or
avoid a small, intimate college setting. Rather, Meyers
would see a sense of community emerging out of the educa-
tional process itself. Thus he described a procedure for
resolving conflicts, creative bargaining, as an example of
an educational process capable of promoting new loyalties
through common endeavor. Essential environmental factors,
significant in terms of communitization in that they pro-
mote internal coherence, were described in a
paper by
Jones. Small vibrant communities within
institutions of
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higher learning— for example, women's support groups and
minority coalitions—were seen by Cross as the only new
hope for community building. She asserted that the trend
in higher education toward such models as the external
degree program or the college-without-walls indicates that
colleges are moving away from the idea of a local college
community. Hammond emphasized the importance of a system
of laws in any communitization process. Reenforcing com-
munity norms—not punishing or changing the violator—was
viewed as the significant issue for community. Sebok
argued that a community process would be enhanced by inte-
grating the various liberal arts curricula, improving the
selection (admissions) process to conform more closely to
community objectives, tightening academic standards, and
promoting a commitment to community among the faculty. He
would also structure a new kind of student contact center
with particular attention paid to the usually estranged
commuter student. Blaesser proposed that a good place to
concentrate a communitization effort would be in the de-
signing of a training program for deans of students which
should deliberately incorporate the concept of communi-
tization built around the idea that a campus is a collection
of inter-locking sub-communities. Shappell insisted that
the communitization process in an urban university must go
hand in hand with extending the academic community—its
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faculty talent into urban life. Worthen reported on a
community planning process model which was actually imple-
mented at his university. He concluded that the planning
process itself began to build a sense of community. Fin-
^-Hy
»
3- behavioral modification design was proposed by
Smith who declared that the basic problem was to decide
which behaviors were desirable (in terms of community
objectives) and which were not. The dean of students’ role,
then, is to assist the community in reaching some consensus
in the identifying of these behaviors and then to develop
means by which community behaviors may be reinforced while
non- or anti-community behaviors are to be extinguished.
Jones’ paper set forth a number of principles by which such
a process would be guided.
As we indicated at the outset of this report, in
our inquiry into the meaning of the term sense of commun-
ity, we would not be concerned (as Hillery and others in
the sociological tradition obviously have to be) with the
careful and nice distinctions that may be drawn between what
is and what is not a community . Rather, what we set out
to explore is the meaning of community in so far as it may
throw light on the meaning of sense of community; that is,
to know what is meant by a "sense of something," we thought
we had better begin to see what that "something" is. While
in Chapter II we looked at conceptions of community in the
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abstract, in this chapter we have tried to understand how
the idea of community would be applied when restricted to
a locality called a college campus. We saw that, in
.the main, most writers who concern themselves with what
goes on in college or university settings instinctively
(that is, without pausing to consider the implications)
label the campus environment a community. The observations
regarding the college as community run the gamut from Snow's
conception of a feeling of affection, loyalty and certainty
of values—a view which places the locus of community in
those members who either do or do not experience these
things— to Nisbet's conception of an academic community
that is only possible when certain crucial aspects (derived
from a kind of medieval formula) are present, chief among
which is the "dogma" which holds that the college is first
and foremost a place where knowledge is pursued for its
own sake. In spite of the range of conceptions and the dif-
fering views, however, most writers reviewed included in
their notions of community the idea that some centering or
transcendent value was somehow at the core of the campus
community process. The exceptions were those (particularly
a number of writers whose views were presented at the 1972
NASPA conference) who rejected the idea that a traditional
conception of community was an appropriate one for today's
colleges. Snyder, who at first seemed also to be rejecting
a traditional conception, finally appeared to be embrac-
ing the predominant viewpoint.
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Unfortunately, Snyder’s conclusion did not bring
together all the elements of his argument that he intro-
duced throughout his discussion, and so we were left with
some unexplained gaps. While disparaging the traditional
idea of community which he himself defined as "an inte-
grated, exclusive, closed and static system of norms and
values that provides meaning for the individual who par-
ticipates in it," Snyder invoked precisely that very
definition when he concluded that community may be
restored by, in fact, calling upon colleges to narrow down
their populations and focus on a particular type or area
of training. Such a development would introduce a
"community of meaning," by which he presumably meant a
homogeneous collection of people pursuing the same ends,
thus again invoking one of the classic elements of com-
munity, the "consciousness of kind." While he accused
those unnamed idealists of using "the ritual invocation of
’community,’" Snyder, himself, in spite of such terms as
"rigorously instrumental and technically hard," appeared
to be using the very same ritual. He merely substituted
the "magic" of restructuring to provide a central value
upon which a community may build, to replace the
straw
man of "the ritual invocation of community,"
which he had
just set up.
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If there is a weakness in Snyder's argument it is
not that he has not discovered a useful element of com-
munity building, but rather that it is only one element
which unfortunately may not be sufficient in and of itself
to "engineer a restoration of meaning" or recreate a sense
of community. An example near at hand is the writer's
own work situation, which fulfills in almost every respect
Snyder's description of a unit of higher education (ex-
cept that it is not a liberal arts institution) set up
precisely to educate a particular college population. It
is a state technical college overseen by an external cen-
tral administration of "educational technocrats." Its
programs are "relevant" and "meaningful" in that all of
its graduates obtain employment for which they are trained.
The "magic" however, has not produced the results that
Snyder dreams of. A sense of community is also missing
here
.
That the college is a formal organization— that
is, deliberately organized around some stated goals (e.g.,
awarding academic degrees)—is fairly obvious. This may
be considered the instrumental or Gesellschaft aspect of
such a setting. The Gemeinschaft aspect, what we are
calling community, resides in the population (collectivity)
that inhabits the institution, not the institution itself;
that is, the informal, spontaneous, "non-deliberate social
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group." Morgan, late president of Antioch College, con-
ceived of this "gemeinschaft" as "the informal spirit of
community [which is] the social spirit that inhabits and
gives life to the formal organizations of society" (Mor-
gan, 1957, p. 4). Obviously, the family, one of Hillery,
Jr.'s focal components of community, is not to be found as
an integral part of the college as community. At the same
time, however, the staff-student relationship is not,
strictly speaking, a "staff-inmate" relationship. It seems
to us that when speaking about the campus either as a
community or a total institution (considered by Hillery
to be conceptually opposite) what we are really doing is
using the idea of a true local community or the true
custodial institution only in a metaphorical sense. There-
fore, what we might look for in the college community are
not families (or inmates) as such, but analogous forms of
primary-like groups or "intimate secondary groups" (see
our discussion in Chapter III) . In the negative or total
institutional sense we might look for the alienated or
nonaffiliated groups. In addition, the conception of
the family as a focal component of true community may be
extended (again, metaphorically) to the idea of the aca-
demic community or academe , not only as a community of
place, but as a community of kind gathered about a central
tradition whose attributes are not unlike those of a clan.
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or family. Such Is the perspective of Robert Nisbet.
Nisbet
' s earlier work. The Quest for Community
(1970, discussed in Chapter II), which spells out his con-
ception of community based upon the medieval model, can
throw some light here if we would search for the analogues
of the family in the college organization. Nisbet tells
us that the institution of the family was not in itself
enough to be the binding force of community. The reason
why the family (or any other functional group) could help
create and maintain a community was because the family in
medieval times held "institutional importance in the social
order" (Nisbet, 1970, pp . 61-62). And he adds:
. . . the derivation of group solidarity [arose]
from the core of indispensable functions each
group performed in the life of its members
. . . and
. . . the solidarity of each functional group was
possible only in an environment of authority where
central power was weak and fluctuating (Nisbet, 1970,
p. 84).
Comparing the society of the campus to the larger
society, we would conclude that campus groups which best
fit the family analogy may be those that are perceived to
have "institutional importance" in the "social order" of
the college as well as those whose functions are seen as
"indispensable" in the life of the college. Regarding the
issue of solidarity as it relates to local authority, a
major theme of Nisbet' s, the implications for the sense of
community in an organizational setting like the college may
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be that autonomy plays a key ijole in each constituent unit
achieving and laying claim tcU"institutional importance.”
This would be true throughouttithe vertical layers of a
hierarchical academic communjcty. Similar to the conse-
quences of "horizontal organisation" as discussed by Feld-
man and Newcomb in relating ft.o improving campus impacts,
Nisbet's principle of local aiuthority versus central
(external) power would allow/ecommunity to develop despite
his insistence that a successful academic community of
scholars would be essentiality aristocratic in nature and
hierarchical in structure. Further, under this principle,
the institution as a whole may have a better chance of
nurturing a sense of community among its inhabitants if that
institution had a degree of autonomy, let us say, in respect
to an organizational super-structure which reaches verti-
cally beyond the local community of the campus to a gover-
ning board represented by some central figure of authority
(power )
.
Of some relevance toicour present discussion is the
distinction which sociologists draw between the vertical
and horizontal aspects of the larger society. Warren
(1969 )> for example, explains that the f or in of community
has been changing to meet softie of the needs oi a fast-
paced industrial society such, that a shift has taken place
from a horizontal to a vertical community pattern. He be-
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lieves that the contemporary experience of the loss of
sense of community (discussed in Chapter II of this report)
is the result of a move away from horizontal patterns.
He sees it not as a deterioration but as a kind of "pro-
gressive reorganization" necessary "to solve the problems
that demand increased specialization and differentiation"
(Warren, 1969, pp . 45-46). Warren’s article is especially
interesting to us because it lays out a theory of "com-
munity leadership" that is based upon the tension between
"the horizontal and vertical axes." Briefly, he would
assign to the horizontal association a "permissive com-
munity organizer," "a non-specialist," "the process man
. . .
whose chief concern is what happens to the inter-
related parts of the community," while to the vertical
association he would assign a "problem area specialist,"
that is, task oriented and focused on particular tasks
to be accomplished. Granted, Nisbet presumably would not
accept this kind of social planning in an academic setting
because social planning suggests the idea of a therapeutic
community which he loudly deplores. No doubt, for Nisbet,
the problem area specialist is the academician, for his
"dogma" tells us that the only problem to be solved is
the problem of knowledge. In a sense, it seems that Buck-
minster Fuller would agree since, for him, community
appears to be a tool for assembling knowledge, dispensing
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it, and then dispensing with itself after the "spontane-
ous effort." Here, again, there seems to be no need for
the "process man."
Tollefson ’ s view, represented by his survey of
community-directed programs, appears to be that of a
process man, that is, judging by his list of essential
factors for creating a sense of community. What impresses
us most, however, is not so much the process or the program-
matic trends which he described but rather the kinds of
attitudinal commitment shown by some of the top leadership
of the institutions whose programs he described. This
was also apparent in the Evergreen model which resembles
in a number of ways the Black Mountain experiment discussed
in Chapter IV.
The issue of how the prestigious images of insti-
tutions and their related degree of selectivity (rejection
ratio) correspond to higher senses of community (as repor-
ted by Pace and as suggested by the findings of Feldman
and Newcomb relative to "campus-wide impacts") deserves
special note. The phenomenon is nothing new; secret socie-
ties, fraternities, country clubs, communes, etc., had all
learned long ago that exclusion (exclusiveness) has a way
of enhancing the value of belonging and fostering solidar-
ity. Minar and Greer ( 1969 ) recognize this when they de-
scribe the community process that takes place in Golding’s
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LQgA pf the Plies "among a randomly collected number of
children." Note the authors:
• • • The treatment of one boy indicates the poignantfact that c ommuni ty—bui lding often finds reinforce-
ment through excluding as well as including the
actors on the scene (Minar and Greer, 1969, p. 4 ).
However, image is not simply a matter of prestige or ex-
clusiveness. At its worst it may simply imply a "common
life-style" which, unfortunately, as McWilliams (1973)
observes, cannot provide "the basis for brotherhood"
(p. 621 ). At its best it may imply a "clear and salient"
set of values, traditions and norms to which a membership
subscribes. However, as we have seen, while the absence
of a clear set of common values and norms (normlessness)
may help to implant a sense of alienation, pride of mem-
bership, alone, cannot insure the absence of alienation.
After all, much of Cottle’s description of alienated
campus life is derived from his work with students on a
very prestigious campus. And so we come to the question
of the relationship between a sense of community and a
sense of alienation with all its implications regarding the
mental health of students and other campus members.
At the NASPA Conference Nisbet delivered an address
to a profession (student affairs officers) which was
accused in his book The Degradation of the Academic Dogma
of consisting of "empires of deans of students as psycho-
logical welfare agencies." This, of course, was part of
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his attack on the idea of the university as a thera-
peutic community. We must not misunderstand Nisbet*
s
message. He is a person passionately attracted to the
idea of community, a sense one gets only in reading his
works in full. Nisbet is not trained as a psychologist
or as a student personnel worker; neither do his sensi-
bilities run in that direction. However, even while de-
crying the "deluge of humanitarianism" in academe, he
betrays through his passion for community his own human-
ism. Despite his protestations about the academic dogma,
he would still, like Cardinal Newman whom he quotes in
his address, choose a university "with a second grade order
of faculty distinction" over one with "the most distin-
guished learned faculty in the world" if the latter had
"a student body that never saw each other" and the former,
a student body which "... rubbed shoulders with one
another constantly and lived the normal, human social life
in terms of the groups and communities and subcommunities
..." (Nisbet, 1972, p. 32). What we would like to sug-
gest is that the community built around an academic dogma,
with all the elements of function, authority, hierarchy,
solidarity and sense of superiority in place, may, in fact,
function as a "therapeutic community." We are saying that
community, itself, may be therapeutic, and that it does
not necessarily have to conjure up images of encounter
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groups, love-ins, or human relation courses. Palmer and
Nisbet are truly not far apart in this respect. Neither
believes that community is something that can be construc-
ted directly out of something called "togetherness"; both
believe that it is the by-product of commitment and of a
centering transcendent value. The chief difference is
that Palmer, an educator in the Quaker tradition, makes
explicit his belief that community is therapeutic:
The ultimate therapy is to translate our private
problems into corporate issues. . . . Therapy in-
volves identifying and building communities of
concern (Palmer, 1977, p. 12).
The issue of the size of a collectivity as it
relates to the prospects for creating a sense of community
was raised by a number of authors, the predominant view
being that smallness is favorable to the engendering of a
sense of community. We agree with Feldman and Newcomb
when they say that at any given horizontal level size does
matter. However, we would caution on relying on smallness
in any absolute sense as a guarantor of warmth, intimacy
and community. Aside from the fact, as some of our
authors
have pointed out, that some small settings leave too
little
room for anonymity and privacy and that some individuals
seek to escape from such a community constriction,
there is
also the possibility that some small settings can
be sur-
prisingly cold and impersonal and lacking in
community feel
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ing. This kind of situation can be further aggravated by
the high level of expectation that many persons would
presumably have as they enter such a setting. The oppo-
site would seem to be true of persons entering an enor-
mous university. And yet the writer has seen the example
of a keen sense of community existing in the upper floors
of a high-rise dormitory in a large eastern university.
We shall make just a few general comments regard-
ing the papers presented at the NASPA Denver Conference.
It is our observation that what usually happens at pro-
fessional meetings of this sort is that a "theme" is
chosen by the conference planning committee and that the
invited speakers simply use that theme as a vehicle for
delivering their own special agendas which would be deliv-
ered no matter what the theme. Thus the college student
personnel workers who made up the bulk of the panel pre-
senters, used the occasion to talk about "student develop-
ment" while the guest speakers rehashed their usual themes:
Robert Ardrey talked about the issues already developed
in his published works relating what is known about animal
behavior to human groups; Robert Nisbet reviewed the basic
themes of his books, particularly the idea of "academic
dogma" and the basic elements of community that to him are
being given short shrift by modern society and institutions;
Buckminster Puller talked about "cosmic science," and his
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usual themes of reforming the environment and "being a com-
prehensivist " versus a specialist; and Arthur Chickering
raised the issue, well-developed in his book Education and
Identity (1971), of the importance of creating conditions
"for the achievement of the major dimensions of human devel-
opment." The point we are making is that, while these are
all extremely worthy issues that should be heard again and
again by professional educators, "communitization" of
colleges as a theme received only a small volume of atten-
tion. It is only because of this that our report will have
appeared to have skimmed too rapidly over voluminous pre-
sentations
.
In Chapter V we had already explored the implica-
tions of Ardrey's triad of needs in regard to enhancing
the psychological sense of community on a college campus.
Discovering this notion in Ardrey's paper served to con-
firm that the author would agree with our applicative
interpretation. His suggestion that community planners
take some heed of the Numbers Game as applied to human
groups is well taken. The concept of the "magic" numbers
of 10, 50 and 500 holds some fascination for us and would
even seem to hold up in our experience; it would seem that
the best one can do with such a theory is to test it out
experimentally, while we do our best to take care of what-
ever numbers of people we do have.
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A number of the Denver Conference speakers chal-
lenged the idea that the traditional community model is
the proper one for the contemporary college scene. In
their arguments they point out the need for the conceiv-
ing of new models based on the reality of a rootless,
mobile population, or based on the reality of styles of
education which do not require that persons live together
or collaborate in any way for any significant length of
time. While it is extremely important for us to be aware
of these trends, we do not see that it follows that we
must put aside a model that is obviously valued by our
culture, if not innately ingrained as an objective. We
believe it is a fallacious argument to propose that a dif-
ferent concept of community is needed for the new breed
of student whose likely life plans do not hold the promise
of the traditional community. First of all, we do not
necessarily agree that such is the case with the "new
breed of student," and secondly, even if it were the case,
there is no need to avoid implanting a sense of community
simply because of a fear that a person would not know how
to make use of such an experience in a community-less
world. Like the good family experience, the good commun-
ity experience may better prepare one for leaving the
experience and entering "the world out there." Further,
presumably we are educating people for living in not just
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any society but in a very particular kind of society:
the democratic community. With this in mind, we shall
quote a statement by Joseph K. Hart regarding "the demo-
cratic problem in education." Although referring to
"children" in an elementary school context. Hart's expres-
sion would appear to have application to higher education
as well:
. . .
[It] is not primarily a problem of training
[students]; it is the problem of making a community
within which [students] cannot help growing up to be
democratic, disciplined to freedom, reverent to the
goods of life, and eager to share in the tasks of
the age. A school cannot produce this result;
nothing but a community can do so (Hart, 1975, p.
7).
Buckminster Puller's depiction of the campus community as
made up of "communities of spontaneous effort" brought
together for establishing and communicating knowledge of
the earth comes to mind when we consider Hart's phrase
about sharing "the tasks- of the age." Although his term
"spontaneous" invokes an image of small subgroups that are
born and then fade, it may be interpreted as yet another
form of a transcendent value around which a community of
the whole may be formed. "Spontaneous" may also be another
way of expressing the idea that a true sense of community
emerges as a byproduct of deep involvement rather than
as a direct product of an effort to create community.
A distinctly different point of view, on the sur-
i
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face at least, was expressed in Smith’s conception of
communitization as a carefully planned process of reward-
ing certain behaviors that have been identified as comm-
unity-enhancing, while discouraging behaviors identified
as having ;bhe opposite effect. Although laid out in be-
h^-vioral terms, we believe that Smith's scheme is a uni-
fying conception that puts in bare, abstract terms the
essentials of any effort to arrive at any stated objective,
communitization or otherwise. In that sense his scheme
seems to have little to contribute. On the other hand,
we feel that it is a good thing that even community-
minded humanists be made aware that, in the end, it is
ultimately behavior that is at the bottom of a community
process, and that behaviorism is a way of making explicit
our values, attitudes and intentions. When Sarason asserts,
for example, that the policies and actions of the community
psychologist should be informed by the value of the psycho-
logical sense of community, he is, in a sense, announcing
a scheme for identifying the behaviors that require rein-
forcing and those that do not.
One final word on the Denver Conference . We have
found only one article (Crookston, 1975) in the NASPA Jour-
nal published since this conference whose subject matter
was related to the ’’communitization process in academe."
Articles on "ecology," on the college "environment," on
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the "ecosystem" of the university, etc., have appeared in
great number, all contributing to the student development
model of student affairs. However, none have dealt with
communitization directly, and none have dealt with the
idea of the sense of community. The purpose of this section
was to bring to the light of day some of the thoughts
(obviously relevant to this study) which were expressed
at the 1972 Conference, and which presumably have been
virtually ignored by the profession.
All in all, our findings in this chapter led us
to be convinced that the most important factor in the
creation, maintenance or enhancement of the psychological
sense of community is one of attitude and not one of pro-
gram. Furthermore, this attitude must take the form of a
commitment to be found at all levels of an institution,
but most importantly,, at the top. Typically, it is the
dean of students at a collegiate institution who is
charged with looking after the "quality of life" on its
campus. Although not standing at the very "top" of the
hierarchy, it appears that the dean is in a good position to
both exemplify the "attitude" and to devise ways to promote
commitment, upwards, downwards, and horizontally throughout
the institutional structures. Our next chapter will explore
how the role of the dean of students as conceived of in
the literature relates to the issue of community.
CHAPTER X I
THE STUDENT AFFAIRS DEANSHIP:
IN LOCO CQMMUNITATIS ?
The Role of the Dean of Students
Having explored some answers to the first question
we posed for ourselves, in what sense may the college be
construed as a community, and having examined some notions
on the problem of promoting or maintaining a sense of
community on the college campus, we are now ready to
pursue a second question: how is the role of the student
affairs administrator related to the above, in light of
the fact that that person, as we have said, is typically
charged with looking after the "quality of life" in such a
setting? For the purposes of this discussion, we shall
refer to this person as the dean of students and begin by
examining how the dean’s role is viewed by representative
literature. What we shall be looking for, particularly,
are discussions relating to the dean as one who looks
after the quality of community and the sense of community,
as part of the more inclusive responsibility of managing
the campus environment so as to enhance the learning pro-
cess and to promote the health and development of the
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members of that community.
Judging by the spate of soul-searching articles
that have appeared in the journals during the last decade
and earlier relating to the "role of the dean of students"
it would seem that that profession has been experiencing
an unrelenting crisis of identity. Our chronological pic-
ture of this process begins with one of the early discus-
sions of "student development" (Koile, 1966) in which the
question is asked:
. . .
Are student personnel activities a part of
a complex of "student services"— the prevalent per-
ception— or can they be conceptualized and developed
as programs with a focus on student learning and
development (Koile, 1966
,
p. 67)?
The author expresses his concern that in addition to con-
tinuing to maintain and cherish the "student personnel
point-of-view, the deep valuing of the student as a per-
son" and the offering of "discrete student services,"
student affairs should be also dealing with "the campus
as a social system." By this he means helping students
to make better use of the campus environment to enhance
their learning. The main thrust of Koile’ s article, how-
ever, is to suggest ways to insure that the dean is in
"equal partnership" with the instructional aspects oi the
college organization, principally by advocating "the small
college idea of keeping student affairs as a part of the
academic unit ...”
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Much of the rhetoric of these self-examinations
brings into focus the so-called demise of in loco parentis
and the heralding of a new age of student development.
Interestingly, the following fragment, taken from a 1970
position paper, announces the replacement of the parental
model by the community model:
The myth of in loco parentis may be exposed by
recognizing that students no longer view university
authority in terms of a parental substitute, and
university officials are increasingly declining to
stand in loco parentis. Students have replaced theparental substitute model for a community substitute
model
.
The university does not stand in loco parentis.
It does stand in loco communitatis (NASPA. 1970.
p. 4, emphasis added)
.
However, the identity crisis goes unalleviated and role
explorations continue. Rickard (1972) asserts that the
principal reason for the crisis is the tradition of the
dean as both student advocate/counselor and disciplinarian.
"Separating responsibility for counseling and discipline
and helping functions from crisis management responsibil-
ities," writes Rickard (1972, p. 225), "are . . . prerequi-
sites to considering new directions for student affairs."
He sees getting rid of the disciplinary role as not only
freeing the dean to pay more attention to student rights
and due process but also as a way of approaching the inte-
gration of student affairs with academic affairs. Again,
the thrust here appears to be the "equal status" objective
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and the throwing off of the in loco parentis mode. Taking
the same theme from a different perspective, Hecklinger
(1972) argues that the dean’s custodial and disciplinary
function "must be cut out" because "it implies that stu-
dents are separated from the campus community" because
"there has to be someone special to deal with them."
The dean could then be left to deal with "non-instructional
services" and no longer would be seen as "one of the chief
barriers to student freedoms." Another writer (Lavender,
1972) proposes "a radical reorganization of the existing
student personnel services" in order to complete the
eradication of the in loco parentis point-of-view and to
install in its place a system that would emphasize "a
high quality of student life." He goes on to define the
latter, using a phrase from Harold Taylor's book Students
Without Teachers
,
as "a sense of joy and the exhilaration
of being caught up." To accomplish this, his "radical"
reorganization would consist of a Counseling Center to
deal with aspects of student life, a Training-Supervising
Center concerned with student housing, a Student Center
for Intellectual Concerns to help create an intellectual
community, and finally, a Student Action Center concerned
with "radical change." Lindahl ( 1972 ) writes in the same
vein, with the stress put on broadening the dean's role
as
rather than a social controller.an informal educator
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A well-respected writer in the field, the late
Burns B. Crookston (1972), takes a broader view and pro-
poses a new organizational model for student affairs
that would accommodate the student development philosophy
based on the premise that student development "is not
merely complementary or supplementary to the instructional
program, it is a central teaching function of the college ."
In contrast to the "old student personnel model" which
Crookston describes as "reactive," "remedial," "correc-
tive," and "cooperative," student development is seen as
"proactive, developmental, preventive and collaborative"
(Crookston, 1972, pp . 4-5). Therefore, argues Crookston,
the accompanying organizational style, rather than being
bureaucratic, should encompass "shared power and decision
making," "flexibility," "open communications," "term lead-
ership [he would abolish 'career leadership’]," and
"individual and organizational symbiosis." The last men-
tioned component is named "the developmental contract"
—
an idea ascribed to Allen E. Ivey—in which
. . .
each individual within the organization
shares in the development of a plan that will allow
him to grow and develop as a person and professional
while at the same time maximizing the use of his
talents and energy in furthering the goals of the
organization (Crookston, 1972, pp . 7-10).
With the pressure mounting in the early 1970s
because of pervasive budget constraints in higher educa-
tion, the student development rhetoric takes on a defen-
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sive tone and begins to borrow the language of industrial
organization. Witness this statement by Shaffer as he
attempts to explain the "failure” of "self—perception” by
the student personnel profession:
. . . Much of this failure must be attributed to the
lack of awareness
. . . of advances in understanding
and conceptualizing the nature of organizational
development, in applying current knowledge of complex
organizations to operational behavior, and in adapt-
ing the systems approach to student personnel work
(Shaffer, 1973, p. 391).
To make the worth of deans of students’ functions more
visible, Shaffer concludes that deans must begin "by
perceiving the entire organization as a client. . . ."
Echoing this notion, Lipsetz (1973) advocates the training
of the student personnel worker as a "systems consultant"
or an "OD specialist" but at the same time recognizes
that the social structures of higher education "require
different theoretical frameworks for their understanding."
The pressure for accountability apparently also
leads to the adapting of a scientific tone, and so, the
fashionable words ecology and environment enter the vocab-
ulary of the student development movement. A case in
point is an article by Peterson and Spooner (1973) which
proposes that a dean (or other personnel worker) should
operate as a "psychoecological observer-participant" in
order "to insure a truly human, developmental environment."
And, of course, "the ecosystem perspective" (discussed in
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Chapter IX), a model developed and promoted by WICHE during
the same period is the more prominent case. (We shall be
reporting on a recent application of this model below as
we continue our chronology.)
The following year, Lilley (1974), reporting on a
survey of the functions of deans, complains that the
profession as a whole was still clinging to the modus
operandi of "providing services" under the old personnel
model, and admonishes the profession to "cast aside those
functions or operational procedures
. . . that do not
fulfill the principles of the proposed 'developmental'
model." Heath (1974), in an article entitled "The Reality
of Student Development Programs in the Private Liberal
Arts College," confirms Lilley 's findings. In spite of
the rhetoric of student development. Heath found very
few changes in programs he surveyed.
By 1975 "accountability" and "management technol-
ogy" achieved "prime time" status in much of the human
services literature. The Winter issue of the NASPA Journal
is fully devoted to "management effectiveness" with arti-
cles divulging the "New Management" tools for deans.
Saurman and Nash (1975), concerned with the threat that
M.B.O. (management by objective) and the like post to the
humanistic aspects of the student development orientation,
suggest that the dean must become a "philosopher-activist
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to counter the trend toward the uncritical acceptance of
such. Repudiating the idea that the dean's role be
reduced "solely to service, housekeeping and/or managerial
responsibilities," Saurman and Nash proclaim the need for
a radical change in the training of student development
professionals. In and among their laundry list of areas
to be mastered by these specialists is "the ecology of
the university."
Indeed, the conference theme of that year and the
Summer issue of the NASPA Journal were devoted to "the
ecology of the learning environment." Crookston, whose
article on the organizational aspects of student develop-
ment was mentioned earlier, now presents his case in terms
of "milieu management" (Crookston, 1975 ), a concept which
we discussed in Chapter IX as one of the three basic
strategies of student development. What is new this time
around is that he invokes the idea of community in the
context of democracy :
What is milieu management ? It is the systematic
coordination and integration of the total campus
environment— the organizations, the structures, the
space, the functions, the people and the relation-
ships of each to all the others and to the whole
—
toward growth and development as a democratic commun-
ity. . . . Thus as the individual and the group con-
tribute to the total community they give the commun-
ity the capacity to create conditions that contribute
to the enhancement of the individual and the group
.
. .
This symbiotic relationship of the individual
to the community is the classical definition of democ-
racy (Crookston, 1975
, P* ^6)*
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Crookston notes that to develop a community "there must
be a transcendent value upon which commitment can be
based," but at the same time observes that at a large
complex institution such a value is not likely to be
found
:
The MM [milieu manager] should focus instead on
the smaller, discrete communities that do exist
within the institution, concentrate community build-ing efforts on them, and then try to build a system
of interrelated communities as a means to move toward
a community of the larger whole (Crookston, 1975
P. 54-).
And, finally, we find in Crookston’ s scheme for milieu
management a rarely stated position in student affairs
that is surprisingly congruent with Sarason's dictum that
a psychological sense of community cannot be sustained
unless all members of a setting are considered in respect
to their own development. (We also note another instance
in an article by Stanfield [1972], "Alienation of the
University Employee," a rare statement of concern for
the whole community.) Here we quote Crookston in full:
Who is involved ? Everyone in the campus community
should be involved in the creation and development of
a symbiotic community— faculty, students, staff,
administrators, librarians, maintenance workers, cooks,
janitors, craftsmen. It is time to think of the
community as a whole, not merely a place that is for
students to develop and faculty to teach and do
research. This means thinking of a health service
for all, not just for students, a library for all,
counseling for all, life planning programs for all,
organizational development, and human development
training for all. The MM must have the authority
to impact all components of the campus, to have a
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significant role in the staff and human development
of all employees (Crookston, 1975, p. 54).
The remainder of the "ecology" issue is devoted
to the "ecosystem perspective," principally in two arti-
cles: "Designing Campus Environments" (Kaiser, 1975)
and "Designing Campus Ecosystems" (Delworth et al., 1975).
(This model, as noted above, was earlier discussed in
Chapter IX.) Suffice it to observe here that, in contrast
to Crookston* s community orientation, the model appears to
be focused on the student's personal development. Util-
izing the new "eco-language , " Kaiser’s "intentional campus
design" is built upon eight basic assumptions:
1 . Students are primarily motivated by a desire
for experience. . . .
2 . All experience is gained in spaces. . . .
3 . All spaces have opportunity structures. . . .
4 . Expansions of consciousness occur as a result
of the developmental movement of consciousness
through progressively more sophisticated spaces.
5 . A transactional relationship exists between
college students and their campus .environments . ~T~. .
6 . Students attempt to cope with any spaces in
which they find themselves. . . 7
7 . Every campus environment has a design, even if
the administration, faculty and students have not
planned it or are not consciously aware of it. . . .
8 . Successful campus design is dependent upon
participation of all campus members including stu-
dents, faculty, staff, administration, and regents—.—•—
•
(Kaiser, 1975, PP- 34-3bV“
Notice that the last mentioned assumption parallels Crook-
ston*s call for total involvement in respect to design
but
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falls short in respect to broadening the scope of who
benefits from development.
The most recent collection of statements on the
ecosystem perspective we find in a volume edited by
Huebner (1979b) in the New Directions for Student Services
series entitled Redesigning Campus Environments
. Of par-
ticular relevance to the present discussion is the chapter
"Application of the Ecosystem Perspective to a Dean of
Students Office" (Hurst and Ragle, 1979). Keeping in
mind that their discussion applies specifically to the
large university campus (based upon an actual working
model at the University of Texas), we are nonetheless
interested in seeing if this new conceptual model contains
a community oriented role for the dean of students.
Hurst and Ragle begin by discussing the tradi-
tional functions of the dean of students office which are
identified as (1) student discipline, (2) student activi-
ties, (3) the administration of student service programs
designed to serve specific student subpopulations, and
(ij) the representing or interpretation of the student
point of view in the formulation of university policies.
The authors claim that an ecosystem design would enhance
these functions, particularly in overcoming the dilution
of influence usually experienced by the dean of students’
office by (1) providing "an overall perspective regarding
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the impact of the university environments," and (2) "pro-
viding hard data to justify their proposals." The ecosys-
tem model proposed by Hurst and Ragle, which they name
"The Environmental Assessment and Intervention Team Model,"
divides the dean of students’ office into units for the
most part representing the typical functions mentioned
above. What this perspective adds is the "research and
evaluation unit, which collects data relating to the needs,
interests, abilities, and goals of students and assists
with the evaluation of student services programs." Rep-
resentatives of each of the units thus formed are then to
come together to form the Environmental Assessment and
Intervention Team which serves as a "think tank" and an
"information processing center."
However, the adding of an assessment team is not
in itself an ecological innovation. The structure, insist
the authors, must be accompanied by "an attitudinal and
behavioral shift" incorporating the ecosystem perspective.
Thus the emphasis is not only on data-gathering but on
the kind of data that are sought, and this primarily has
to do with "the congruence or incongruence between various
student populations and the characteristics of the environ-
ment," or in ecolanguage parlance, the "matches and mis-
matches of the university environment." Judging from the
conclusion of the authors, the main contribution of this
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approach and its "attitudinal shift" is that "speculation
and intuition" are put to rest (alongside of in loco paren
tis) in the arena of student affairs, and a new age of
ecosystem technology is proclaimed to be upon us:
Program development and intervention by specula-ion and intuition is obsolete for modern student
aiiairs work. Intuition may have been sufficient inthe era of in loco parentis
,
and speculation sufficed
when expectations of student affairs professionals
were less demanding. The ecosystem perspective pro-
vides a conceptualization that holds great promise
as a cornerstone in the foundation of student affairs
work in the eighties and nineties (Hurst and Ragle
1979, pp. 82-83) . 5
Bloland (1979) points out that "the response of the
academic community has been decidedly strained” when it
comes to the student development "reformation” in its
attempt to encroach on the academic territory of the fac-
ulty. In fact, Bloland, who addresses himself primarily
to the question of how deans should be formally trained
for their roles, feels that in their effort to broaden
their role they may have "painted themselves into a corner."
As a result, says Bloland, student development specialists
find themselves in the position of being trained for roles
that are not seen as essential by the academic community
and hence not in very high demand. His chief conclusion
is that doctoral level training for deans should concen-
trate in the general administration and management of
higher education, and that* areas such as counseling, stu-
311
dent development education, etc., should be reserved for
the master’s level and below. (This is in contrast to
the view expressed by Saurman and Nash [1975], mentioned
earlier in this chapter, to the effect that a dean’s edu-
cation should counter the managerial trend and focus on
student development and campus ecology. In the last chap-
ter another contrary view was mentioned. Blaesser [1972]
saw the communiti zation process as the center piece of a
doctoral program for deans.)
We end our chronological survey of perceptions of
the dean of students’ role with an observation by Pitts
(1980) who, commenting on the literature of student devel-
opment, ecosystem design, and milieu management, notes an
historical irony in the so-called demise of in loco parentis
and the new direction of student affairs:
A number of recent writings in the field suggest
that "student personnel work" is an outmoded term
which refers to practices which are not in keeping
with the current emphasis on facilitating student
development. The doctrine of in loco parentis (now
legally dead), is often cited as evidence that student
personnel work has traditionally been interested in
student control but not student development. In loco
parentis
,
however, is better understood historically
as a vehicle by which colleges sought to facilitate
the development of the whole student as students’
developmental needs were understood at the time. The
current emphasis on student development reflects
current views concerning students’ needs, and is more
similar in basic purpose to the older approach than
"developmentalists" suggest. Concern for the total
development of the student is, by its very nature, a
parenting function, whether the college acts through
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the relatively strict and old fashioned doctrine ofin loco parentis or through the more permissive quasi-parental role in evidence today. It is too soon totell whether or not milieu management will turn outto be another example of the college as parent (Pitts
1980, p. 24).
Summary and Discussion
We have examined some representative articles
dealing with the role of the chief student affairs offi-
cer in the period 1966 to present. We found the profession
in the midst of an identity crisis consisting of a
redefinition of role, a justification of role, and a search
for equal status with academic colleagues. As a result,
a number of the writers stressed the educator aspect of
the deans’ responsibilities while they sought to de-
emphasize parental-like custodial functions. Much concern
was expressed over the role-confusion caused by the dual
assignment of the dean of students to the disciplinary and
counseling functions. Thus, in this period we see a
move away from in loco parentis to student development
concerns and concerns with managing a system which would
maximize the match between learner and environment. Such
systems have been variously called milieu management,
organizational development, ecosystem technology, etc.
Also during this period, due to increasing fiscal con-
straints and the demands for cost-effectiveness, a mana-
gerial trend erupted calling for accountability and the
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adoption of industrial approaches, as well as scientific
approaches calling for mechanisms for the collection of
data. Some writers, in spite of the new rhetoric, found
the profession still clinging to old habits, that is,
providing services, overseeing disciplinary and housekeep-
ing functions. Presently, the dominant mode for student
affairs management, at least as suggested by the litera-
ture, and especially in the larger university systems, is
the ecosystem design, stressing the ecology of the univer-
sity environment as it relates to student development.
Whatever the system, the prime focus appears to be on the
"personal growth" of the student, not as a consequence of
the development of community or any consciousness of com-
munity but rather of the application of environmental
assessment data to the problem of matching student needs and
campus programs. Some disagreement was expressed regarding
how deans of students should best be educated, some arguing
for a focus on student development education with its
humanistic implications, and others for a focus on admin-
istrative and managerial competency. (It was noted that
an author discussed in the previous chapter vied for an
emphasis on communitization
. ) Finally, we quoted one
writer who observed that the concern for the "total devel-
opment of the student," prominent in today’s models of
student affairs, is by its very nature a parenting function.
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and thus dn loco Parentis , though legally dead, may, in
this new sense, be alive and well.
Our review has not convinced us that the dean’s
identity crisis has been resolved or that the dean's
role has stabilized. More importantly, for the purposes
of this study, we have not found what we set out to look
for and what was so eloquently promised in Crookston's
conception of milieu management, that is, any attention,
by design, to the development of a psychological sense of
community. We have already discussed in Chapter IX the
limitations of the student development philosophy in
this regard; examining the expected or prescribed roles of
the dean of students has not changed this conclusion.
For example, the tired old argument that a dean cannot be
both a counselor/student advocate and a disciplinarian is
a certain sign that a community perspective is not being
taken seriously. Again, looking at the family-community
analogy, it may be understood that, as difficult as it is,
the authority or the parent must always assume both roles,
otherwise this and other fragmentations and role special-
ties have a way of diluting a sense of community respon-
sibility. This may also be true of the mind/soul dichot-
omy which the student development model is meant to break
down. It seems to us that, in a futile attempt to arrive
at equal partnership with the academic function, the model
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has not only failed to obliterate the dichotomy but has
driven the wedge deeper by insisting on a distinction
between "developmental education" and traditional
education
.
Also noted, was another promising element in
Crookston’s description of milieu management, and that is
the idea that everyone—not only students—is involved
in the creation and development of a symbiotic community."
However, we found very little recognition of this prin-
ciple (one of Sarason's primary conditions for achieving
a psychological sense of community) in the bulk of the
literature. Also missing is another condition prescribed
by Sarason: the involvement of the institution in the
larger community in which it is embedded.
This chapter did not explore the issue of leader-
ship style and other areas of organizational behavior which
undoubtedly have a bearing on our topic. We make mention
of this omission only to suggest another avenue of approach
to some of the areas we have attempted to explore. A
work like Appleton, Briggs and Rhatigan's Pieces of Eight :
The Rites, Roles, and Styles of the Dean (1978) is very
informative in terms of the personal perspectives such
accounts afford. However, even in this instance, there
is very little attention paid to the problem of community
or the sense of community. Similarly, Lewis and Lewis
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(.1977), who offer a model of "community counseling" that
could certainly be applied to the operation of a dean of
students' office, have much to say about a community ap-
proach in terms of assessment of needs, resources, skill-
building and student advocacy, but little is said about the
psychological sense of community.
In our next and final chapter we shall examine in
full where our findings have taken us, and explore the
implications of those findings in respect to our concern
for the relationship between the dean of students' role
and the nature of the campus community and the sense of
community
.
CHAPTER XII
CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS, REFLECTIONS
AND IMPLICATIONS
Overview
In this study we have explored the meaning of
the concept sense of community, first through an examin-
ation of the idea of community itself (Chapter II), then
through a review of some basic notions regarding factors
which induce people to cohere in groups, and the mechan-
isms that promote bonding, cohesiveness and group spirit
once groups have organized themselves (Chapter III). We
have examined the means by which the so-called intentional
community manages to build into its system (looking par-
ticularly at the commune as a social system) an enduring
sense of community and commitment, and in the process
considered the example of a college whose educational
intent was explicitly interwoven with a communal intent
(Chapter IV). The notion that crisis seemingly has the
power to create a sense of community—or something resem-
bling a communal response— led us to examine the idea of
territory as an analogue to the idea of community, to see
if there may not be some biological correlates to such a
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communal response (Chapter V). Leaving the biological,
we then examined the communal mechanism from a socio-
theological perspective, namely Buber's concept of The
Centre as a community-building force (Chapter VI). A
review of Sarason's concept of the psychological sense of
community, particularly as it contributes to an enrichment
of human services endeavors (Chapter VII), and a review
of a study designed to develop PSC into a measurable
construct (Chapter VIII), brought us to an exploration of
community psychology or, more generally, of how the issue
of promoting, growth, change and mental health is viewed
through a community perspective (Chapter V). We reviewed
the literature pertaining to the idea of the college campus
as community, and the problem of promoting a sense of
community in such a setting (Chapter X). Finally, our
attention was turned to the question of how the dean of
students' role was viewed by the literature, especially
as it relates to the community perspective (Chapter XI).
Suggestions for Future Study
The study has evoked a number of questions still
to be answered that would have taken us beyond its scope
if we had stopped to explore them. Some of the unanswered
questions we have mentioned in the body of this report.
These are the principal remaining questions:
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What is the relationship between the sense of
community and the physical surrounding s and architecture?
The answer, in part, lies somewhere in the domain of
environmental psychology where such variables as propin-
quity, privacy, personal space, noise, corridor design,
crowding, and perceptual monotony are manipulated. In
their book. Environmental Psychology: Man and His Physi -
cal Setting
,
Proshansky, Ittleson and Rivlin (1970)
report on hundreds of studies in which these and other
variables play key roles. However, the reader will find
there no mention of the sense of community in relation to
design but instead will have to extract some related mean-
ing out of such discussions as sociopedal design (i.e.,
serving to facilitate social interaction) versus sociofugal
design. To make the point we shall cite two more exam-
ples of related sources. Holahan and Wilcox (1977),
reporting on "Ecological Strategies in Community Psychol-
ogy," investigate the negative behavioral consequences of
"double-loaded corridors" in residence halls emphasizing
the issues of small group contact and increased interac-
tion. Kaplan and Greenberg (1976) who, among other issues,
discuss suite-designed dormitories versus corridor-design
in their article entitled "Regulation of Interaction
through Architecture, Travel and Telecommunications."
We have questions about the relationship of lead-
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ership styles and community
,
and about the charismatic
leader (Schiffer, 1973) and the sense of community; about
the human need for consensus" (as identified by Berelson
and Steiner [1964]); about the cultural differences in
regard to the importance placed on community (as exempli-
fied in Bronfenbrenner’ s work. The Two Worlds of Child-
hood: U.S. and U.S.S.R
. [1970], in which community is
examined in relation to upbringing and parental authority);
about the relationship between sense of community and
alienation (e.g.. Wagoner [1976] reports on a study which
examined normlessness in a police department); and about
the relationship between communication or rhetoric and the
sense of community (e.g.. Hart [1978] reports on the power
of rhetoric to "generate" a sense of community "even given
the lack of a cohesive and integrated belief system";
and Kerbo and Marshall [1977] report on the connection
between a sense of community and the CB Radio fad).
Finally, these are additional questions which demand
studies of an experimental nature:
What are the practical implications for community
building in an institutional setting of Wireman's theory of
intimate secondary relationships? (See Chapter III, pp
.
67-70.)
Do Ranter’s commitment mechanisms appear in insti-
tutional life other than in communes and would these
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relate to an endurance factor? (See Chapter IV, pp . 87-
99.)
Can Ardrey’s need theory (identity, stimulation
and security) be quantified for the purposes of measure-
ment and comparison in an institutional community such as
a college campus? Are these needs related to PSC? (See
Chapter V, pp . 115-127.)
Would the implementation of Snyder’s suggestion
that liberal arts colleges become focused on special
student populations (regarding career training) result in
an increased sense of community in such settings? (See
Chapter X, pp . 234-240.)
Is there better mental health, etc. and better
"student development" in settings which have higher levels
of PSC?
And finally, what is the relationship between the
manner of carrying out the various, traditional college
functions (e.g., admissions policies, sports, activities,
discipline, clubs and fraternities) and PSC?
Personal Recollections: "A Small ,
Intimate Liberal Arts College "
As stated in the Introduction, the writer was pri-
marily attracted to this topic because of his personal
experience as a dean of students at a small, non presti
gious, residential liberal arts institution which,
in the
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view of many, suffered from a lack of a sense of community
for a number of years before it closed in a state of fiscal
ruin. The study was undertaken for the purpose of seeing
if anything could be learned about the psychological sense
of community that would be applicable in the carrying out
of the responsibility of creating, maintaining or enhanc-
ing a sense of community on a college campus. This is
not the only responsibility of the dean of students nor
is the dean the only person on campus who is charged with
that responsibility or who has that concern, but it is
from the dean of students’ perspective from which this
subject was approached.
The setting which frames the writer’s perspective,
the place where he had been employed as a dean in the
1970s, is presently a ghost town of empty buildings spread
out over several acres of Vermont countryside, a campus of
white-painted brick buildings ’’designed," says an old
catalog "by the prominent architect, Edward Durell Stone."
Recently the writer ran into a former Windham student who
showed him a draft of an article that was being prepared
for a news publication describing the auction that took
place following bankruptcy proceedings. Here are some
excerpts
:
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X had watched Windham bleed since the spring of
1976 when it was announced that the institution could
not meet its payroll; the faculty stayed on without
pay to finish the semester. Its president for two
years, a former State Department official
. . hadbrought Windham down with a crash. I was not alone
in my feeling that [the president] looked on the stu-dents with contempt; and he established an inner
circle of administrators to insulate himself from
[them]. He also did what he could to give the school
a "straight" image.
. . .
... I graduated the year before the first major cri-
sis, and four years before the final indignity which
took place last weekend, the auction of its furnish-
ings and equipment. But I, like many students, always
suffered from Windham’s lack of identity, represented
by those ugly white square buildings clashing so
unceremoniously with the soft hills. . . .
. . . A few former students showed up to pay their
respects, but no one seemed especially solemn. As one
graduate put it: "the soul of the place had been
ripped out long ago" (Seigel, 1979, pp. 2-4).
The writer first assumed his position as Dean
in the fall of 1970; the campus was alive and vital but
shaking in the aftermath of the strikes that had accom-
panied the Cambodia and Kent State tragedies. The Presi-
dent had chosen him for that position almost against his
wishes (the writer wished to pursue his counseling psy-
chology career and had no ambitions to be an administrator).
However, the President saw him as a person capable of
dealing with the drug problem from which the College was
apparently suffering; in addition, he was an alumnus of
the College. And he needed a job.
He found himself alone (the other administrators
were "away for the weekend") on the first day of his job
facing not only 500 new freshmen and their parents, but
a- protesting assemblage of a hundred "Free Farmers" who
had interrupted the orientation program by marching onto
the campus followed by an assortment of State and local
police and deputy sheriffs. The "Farmers" had borrowed
a two-acre piece of land with the consent of the President
for the purpose of growing a summer garden. The problem
arose from the fact that summer gardens in Vermont require
an autumn harvest whose season coincides with the Fall
Semester. The President could not abide this conflict
and so he requested the police to make a trespassing raid
on the very day that the new students would arrive. Hence
the Farmers left their garden and headed for the campus
just as the orientation barbecue was getting under way.
The sheriff asked the Dean to warn the protesters that they
would be arrested if they did not immediately leave the
campus. Meanwhile, parents of the new students were shocked
in disbelief, and the freshmen were amused, scared or be-
wildered; sixty helmeted
,
deputized individuals held their
clubs tightly as they waited for the word. The Dean duti-
fully made his announcement; no one moved, but the word
was not given. The silence was broken by a sudden anima-
ted eruption of dialogue. The Farmers were explaining
their case and the sheriff was nervously prompting us to
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deliver more warnings. The Dean did a reconnaissance of
the mob: it was a potpourri of long hair and short hair,
of beards and wide-brimmed hats, suits and ties, kerchiefs
and skirts, dogs and children, students, professors, pho-
tographers and cinematographers. The Dean first conferred
by phone with the Treasurer (the President could not be
reached) who suggested that the order for an arrest be
given. Rejecting the suggestion, the Dean returned to the
scene of the protest, invited the Farmers to the barbecue,
and told the sheriff that the raid was over.
The incident provoked a series of events, one
of which was a midnight raid of destruction on the two-
acre garden by some infuriated townspeople who hated both
the "hippies" and the College. However, the particular
event that stands out in the writer's mind is the impromptu
open meeting that was called the next evening at the gym-
nasium to discuss "the whole situation." It was the first
time the writer remembers hearing the term "sense of
community" expressed in the context of the place where he
worked. " Your institution has no sense o f community!"
bellowed out a young lady (who, the writer was told, was
a Windham drop-out who joined the Free Farmers), it
doesn't care what happens to anybody; it sits
alone on the
hill and doesn't care!"
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It is not the intention of this section to present
a detailed documentation of "the case against Windham
College" in the area of a lack of sense of community.
(Nor is there any implication that Windham's demise is a
consequence of this lack.) What we wish to do is to picture
for the reader the setting in which the writer's interest
in the problem of community emerged. A few other instances
should suffice, but let us first complete the backdrop of
these scenes.
Windham had a faculty composed of brilliant, young,
ivy-league-credentialed instructors who were lured to the
College in the sixties by attractive benefit packages and
the rural Vermont life-style. Its students, who for the
most part came from the urban and suburban areas of metro-
politan New York, were largely a creative, bright-but-
underachieving lot (many of their brothers and sisters
were attending colleges like Dartmouth and Smith) who were
attracted to the promise of "a fine faculty and a small,
intimate, liberal arts college nestled in the Connecticut
River Valley, and in the heart of the best ski country in
the East." Apparently, many were also attracted to an image
which the Admissions Office did not wish to advertise: a
permissive atmosphere. On the other hand, the school did
not seem to possess "a clear and salient image" of the kind
which Feldman and Newcomb observed to promote a homogeneity
between faculty and students which tends to increase the
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chances for "campus-wide impact." The President's private
dream was that one day Windham would be a second Middle-
bnry (his alma mata); many of the faculty had their own
similar dreams of "one day." And Admissions was continu-
ally gearing up for that new and future population of
students even as they drew in their present paying cus-
tomers, "the kind of students we don't want." The students
appeared to take little or no pride in being a part of
the institution; many of its alumni seem to have forgotten
its existence. The dormitories were maltreated as if their
inhabitants felt that the dorms were not theirs to care for
and protect, that they were "the property of the Corpor-
ation of Windham College." (The architect originally pre-
sented a quadrangle design which, because of financial
considerations, was rejected in favor of a barracks-type
arrangement.) The maintenance men always seemed disgusted
with the administration, particularly the Dean of Students
whom they saw as a "soft-headed liberal" who allowed stu-
dents to run rampant over their physical plant. Against
their expectations of small college intimacy many new
students complained of coldness and unfriendliness until
they found their small group with which they could share
common interests and/or their bag of grass. Regarding
campus events, it would seem as if the same group of peo-
ple would appear and the same group (the larger one) would
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stay away at event after event. Many students would be
down at the local tavern, many back at their rooms, small
cubicles often housing two occupants, two expensive stereo
systems and two record collections. The instructors were
living their private lives "out in the country” far away
from the campus as were many of the upper classmen who had
escaped from campus at the first opportunity. So too were
the administrators living at a distance, most notably the
President, who lived in a private mansion (provided by
the Board of Trustees) located ten miles south.
Not all was gloomy. The College had exciting aca-
demic and cultural programs and offerings. It excelled
in the sciences and the fine arts, particularly drama; the
English department boasted first-rate novelists. And it
was in these areas that one found pockets of good morale
and a sense of community. But an economic crunch was begin-
ning to be felt because of lowering enrollments and a high
attrition rate (some thought that the end of the draft
might have had an impact on enrollment) . Departments began
competing for dollars and the president of ten years got
himself in trouble with the faculty by insisting on voca-
tional innovations in the curriculum. In its twenty-
second year a third president was brought in. A Southern
gentleman and former ambassador, presumably the Trustees
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hoped that their new man would change the image of the
school by "cleaning up the place." Two years later the
place was in shambles and unable to meet its payroll.
A fourth and final president attempted to run a "Windham
II," as its redesigners called it, at a drastically re-
duced budget and scale. The rest of the story was told
in our quote from a former student (above).
It was in this context that the writer first came
up against the problems of a lack of a sense of commun-
ity, although only in retrospect did he become fully
aware that this was the case. To be sure the phrase "this
place has no sense of community" was often heard, but all
the instances that made this true were not discerned at
the time as being part of a total pattern. The instances
that we are referring to were, in retrospect, signals that
the setting was not nurturing the psychological sense of
community (about which Sarason writes) among its staff
and students, and signs that the "mechanisms of commitment"
(about which Kanter writes) had little place of importance
in campus life. We shall mention a few of these instan-
ces for illustration.
In the late sixties the administration made the
decision to move the "campus" out of the wood-framed houses
scattered throughout the village of Putney and on to a new
site with new modern buildings. Many associated with the
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school in those days expressed the mixed feeling that they
were both excited at the prospect and that they were in
fear of losing some "sense" that would never be regained.
Sarason would call this the "buildings as distractions"
syndrome, arguing that new buildings often obscure the
original objectives and tend to dampen the sense of com-
munity
.
The College ordered its fire extinguishers for the
new buildings from a Boston firm, slighting the local fire
department whose bid came in a few dollars higher, a
violation of the principle that to have a sense of commun-
ity of its own, a setting must be aware of and involved in
the community in which it is embedded (Sarason).
The College had no faculty lounge for many years
until someone proposed that a classroom be converted for
this purpose. After much resistance, money was appropri-
ated for the conversion. Two principles are involved here:
A sense of community is often aided by a common area or
territoriality and the idea (again Sarason* s notion) that
"schools are not just for the kids .
"
A proposal by a physics professor that the instruc-
tors use part of their vacation time (during the January
break when the students were gone) to "retreat" together in
the dormitories was turned down by the Faculty Senate on
the grounds that it would be too much of a sacrifice.
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Recall that Kanter found that sacrifice and Investment are
important mechanisms of commitment
.
The students planned to have a Spring Festival on
campus near the end of the term. The plan was criticized
because the librarian claimed it would interfere with
students still using the library. Here was a conflict in
community values, a lack of common ties, and an insensi-
billt y regarding the importance of ritual
. In a similar
instance of "Spring rites" the new president failed to
appear at a pre-dawn Maypole event organized by the Student
Activity Committee.
There was a time when the most cohesive group on
campus was made up of a dozen students who had come to
Windham after their college had folded, a good instance
of the communal response to crisis and the persecution
experience described by Kanter and Ardrey and others.
The campus psychologist had ordered that a student
be sent home because she was "schizophrenic" and a "sui-
cide risk." The Dean of Students refused and instead
organized a support group on the wing of the dormitory in
which she lived which agreed to have her stay "in the com-
munity" rather than have her hospitalized. The psycholo-
gist had no consciousness of community resources or of the
power of networks or of the sense of competence that such
situations involve. When the writer mentioned this example
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during his interview with Sarason this was Sarason 's
response
:
That's a very, very good instance, you know, of
several things. One thing is that that student was
embedded in a network of relationships. And yourjob was to find out whether it was working for her
or against her. Was it supportive? Was it isolating,
or what-the-hell was it? And the decision what to
do with her was going to depend upon that network of
relationships and whether it had aspects for her as
well as for others of some sense of community. And
that's a very good example of that. That's the
difference in thinking in terms of an individual
psychology as against thinking in terms of a commun-
ity psychology (Sarason, 1980)
The College suffered from a debilitating attri-
tion rate. Our findings would suggest that attrition may
have been both cause and effect of campus malaise
. We have
learned from our review that low selectivity is often
associated with high attrition and a lowered sense of com-
munity, and that, conversely, "exclusivity "— that is, "a
place that’s hard to get in"
—
may be an element of commun-
ity . We also learned from Glynn (1977) that the number o f
years one expects to live in a community is the strongest
predictor of the psychological sense of community . Morgan
(1957) saw "nomadism" as being antithetical to community ;
and Keyes (1975) wrote of " a mobility neurosis" that is
endemic in our society and "one of the major sources of
our lack of community." "A community," complained Keyes,
"simply cannot be built from people crouched and ready to
take off at the crack of the gun" (1975, P* 17)*
333
Like many similar institutions Windham was known as
a suitcase college"; for many, home or some other compet-
ing setting in the outside world pulled students away from
many of the weekend events planned to take place on campus.
On the whole, the events themselves were limited and not
of sufficient variety to attract the full spectrum of
student and faculty interest. The most popular weekend
events were the "boogies" that took place in the Student
Union; the most spectacular and the most massively attended
were the superstar rock and folk concerts given at the gym-
nasium. However the bulk of the patrons of these events
were outsiders who commuted from nearby states. Meanwhile
the faculty and staff were leading the "good life" in
the Vermont hills far away and independent of the campus
culture. It was Knop (1976), writing on community forma-
tion and decline, who told us that a community breaks down
when the internal milieu of a setting does not provide
"closure," that is, when it ceases to be "self-sufficient"
and consistently develops a pattern of "linkages in the
contingent milieu .
"
Unque stionably the College had a value for many
but the many had never settled on one transcendent value
on which all could agree. Buber would not have found
there a "Centre" or "eternal thou," and neither would have
Nisbet found any clear sense of "function, dogma, authority.
33*J
hierarchy, solidarity or sense of superiority."
To complete the picture we shall describe one more
component. Here is an excerpt from the "Position Descrip-
tion and Analysis Form" setting forth the purpose of the
dean of students' position at Windham College:
To oversee the administration of the various student
services departments; to initiate, facilitate, encou-
rage and engage directly in certain tasks and inter-
ventions which are designed to maximize student de-
velopment, providing for the welfare and health of
students, reducing stress in the environment (while
assisting students to cope with unavoidable stress),
establishing a milieu which encourages the integra-
tion of academic and non-academic life, providing
for a social and interpersonal education for indi-
vidual and community responsibility; and in general
to assist the President in uniting the community,
maintaining harmony and improving the quality of
life on campus.
In reporting on the background of his interest in
the problem of community in the context of the place where
he was employed for a period of six years, the writer
wishes not to appear as self-righteous or as self-
denegrating; in this respect he was neither blameless nor
sinful. In any case, we are not presenting his adminis-
tration of the duties described above as a model. In the
carrying out of those duties he introduced a number of
community-oriented innovations but for the most part con-
sidered his position description (which he helped compose)
as just another collection of "student development" jargon.
If there were any complicity on his part in respect to the
lack of a sense of community it may have been a failure in
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the area which Kanter refers to as moral commitment
, and
which other authors variously call order
,
constraint, moral
unity
,
and so forth. As long as permissiveness is an
agreed upon value in a community, as it was, for example,
in Summer Hill, then "moral unity" and sense of community
may prevail. While "unconditional positive regard" was
instilled in the writer as part of his Rogerian counselor
training, the object of that regard was the individual
,
not the community. While the writer did carry out his
disciplinary function at the College—drug pushers were
expelled and thieves were brought to justice—his leader-
ship apparently failed to help the President bring together
the conflicting segments of the setting— the trustees,
the students, the maintenance staff, the faculty, the
parents, the administration, the larger community—into
a consensus or order or "moral unity." Nisbet describes
such a unity in his book. The Quest for Community , as he
writes about the rewards of the regimentation of military
life and the
. . .
contentment of being in the presence of moral
regulations whose clarity and preciseness of cover-
age makes more pleasant the "free" areas not covered
by the regulations. . . . [Such an order] had the
capacity to inspire in the individual soldier a feel-
ing for the warmth of comradeship . . . , an orderly
predictable world of values— a sense of belongingness,
of close identification with other human beings (Nis-
bet, 1970
,
pp. 42 - 43 ).
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And recall that McWilliams in his work on fraternity also
lauded the nold tradition" and the "virtues of constraint
and. discipline . " We repeat our previous quote from our
discussion in Chapter III:
[The old tradition is not the social science tradi-
tion which] continues to identify eros and commun-
ity, and to define community in terms of "warmth,"
physical gratification, and the "original," "natural"
desires of pre-cultural
,
pre-political man, [nor is
it, as others have suggested] a desire to recapture
the "sweetness" of childhood (McWilliams, 1973, p.
36).
McWilliams would have us revive the old virtues of
. . . honor, obligation [and] authority [which]
involve more than constraints; as they imply, con-
straints are involved whenever affection matters,
whenever one is deeply bound to other human beings
(McWilliams, 1973 s p. 623).
Let us end this discussion of Windham College with
some observations offered by Sarason during our interview
with him:
Look, the more you talk about the place the more
I see that the sense of community simply wasn’t in
the heads of the leaders of the joint. . . .
. . .
The sense of community enters in the sense
that it never really was high on the priorities; I
mean other things took precedence over it. You know,
legitimation; they were going to become another
Middlebury. They put themselves on the treadmill of
building and image. Their orientation was "How was
the outside going to look at us?" not "How do we
want to live" (Sarason, 1980)?
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The Dean as Community Psychologist
Soon after the writer left Windham College he
began planning to set up a private practice in psycho-
logical counseling and consulting while he was seeking
new employment as a dean. During this period a critical
situation developed as he sought licensure as a practicing
psychologist, which turned out to be of pivotal signifi-
cance in regard to his career and in regard to the topic
under study. Having been supplied all the necessary cre-
dentials, the Board of Psychological Examiners sent the
writer a notice of ’’deferred application," which effec-
tively meant that the application for a license was denied
with the right of appeal. The Board’s explanation was
that although he met all the necessary training and super-
vised practice requirements in terms of clinical counsel-
ing and testing, the fact that "his chief employment for
the last six years while in the State of Vermont was in
administration and not in psychology" disqualified him for
licensure as a psychologist . To recount it briefly, the
writer won his appeal and received his license on the
basis of the argument (spelled out in what amounted to a
lengthy psychological brief) that it is possible for a
person to be both a dean and a psychologist at the same
time and that is called community psychology and that is
what he had been doing for the last six years.
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When this study was undertaken, the initial
objective was to learn what the literature has to say
about the concept of the sense of community and then to
see if that knowledge can make some sense out of the
writer’s experience. It was not until he read Sarason's
The Psychological Sense of Community that he realized that
there was a connection between the idea of the sense of
community and the discipline of community psychology.
At that moment the pieces of the puzzle suddenly produced
a recognizable picture of the writer’s experience. Fur-
ther, in reviewing the field of community psychology it
was noted that most of the authors expressed the view
that the community psychological model demands an acti-
vist stance of its workers. "Some would go so far," wrote
Zax and Specter, "as to inject themselves into the power
structure where they could, themselves, hold the adminis-
trative reins." These ideas we see as the theoretical
underpinning for the proposition that a dean of students
(or a person who would be a dean) who sees him or herself
as a "social regulator" or a "prosocial encourager," who
sees the efficacy of intervention at the community level,
and who has the psychological sense of community high on
the priority list, might serve that role well if his or_
her training—or at least his or her professional iden-
tity were in the field of community psychology . Despite
the "identity crisis" which was evident as we reviewed the
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literature on the role of the dean of students, many of
the functions of that position remain universally stable:
overseeing the "quality of life," managing the "milieu,"
the "system" or the "environment," being responsible for
"mental health services," and "student development" all
are functions that represent the stuff that community
psychology is made of. Add to these Sarason’s conviction
regarding the central place of the psychological sense of
community in the field of community psychology and we
arrive at what to us is the inescapable conclusion that
this field is one (we are not saying the only one) with
which a dean might be comfortable in identifying.
In the writer’s case, this conclusion was arrived
at somewhat after the fact, that is, after most of his
formal training as a counselor and psychologist had gone
by. However, formal training or for that matter specific
methodologies are not at issue here
.
The purpose of this
report was not to offer a model of intervention or to
compare one set of strategies or one model with another
set or model. Rather, its goal was to examine the concept
of the sense of community as it relates to student affairs
leadership on a small college campus. In light of this
goal, the conclusion arrived at in the end of our discus-
sion of the chapter on community psychology (Chapter IX)
cannot be emphasized too strongly, and we repeat: commun-
3^0
ity psychology is not a set of techniques or a discrete
collection of intervention strategies, but rather a pro-
fessional attitude associated with a community orienta-
tion and informed by a central value. And, of course, we
agree with Sarason when -he says that value is the psycho-
logical sense of community. When, in our Interview, the
writer explained to Dr
. Sarason that he was Interested in
exploring the idea of the dean as community psychologist
this was his response:
You know, that makes sense. You see, if you go
back to the Creation of Settings
, one of the most
important chapters, from my standpoint, in the book
is "The Socialization of the Leader." You know, the
dean of students is a leader, or at least is per-
ceived as that by different segments of the community.
And so one has to ask how does the leader conceive of
himself in relation to the goals of the institution?
And does he see it as one in which he or she, so to
speak, acquires status, prestige, power or what have
you, or is it to help others do what they want to do
and is it one where you want to give a group of indi-
viduals some sense of interdependence and interneed,
you see. And if it isn’t in your head then you don’t
see these tilings (Sarason, 1980).
What we mean by "professional attitude " and the sense
that a dean of students may be guided by a "community psy-
chology" is what we believe Sarason meant by suggesting
that the elements of community should be "in the head."
Elsewhere in the interview Sarason states it this way:
The leader is the model for what he wants other
people to do. OK? And if the sense of community is
something that he not only believes in but somehow
in diverse ways shows up in what you do and what you
say, that becomes influential.
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. . . The leadership thing is really, in my opin-
ion, you know, crucial. If there’s anything that the
people who surround you get very, very quickly is
,
whether you are truly interested in helping them fur-
ther their goals. Or do they exist for you? Are
you approachable, you know, or are you self-serving
(Sarason, 1980).
To say that we are viewing a dean’s community psy-
chological role in terms of an attitude rather than in
terms of a model of campus intervention is not to minimize
the importance of the latter but to underscore the impor-
tance of the question: now that we know the leader’s
model of intervention can he or she tell us what is "in
[his or her] head"; does he or she know? When the answer
to the question is "Yes, I know; it is the psychological
sense of community," then the findings in this report may
be of significance. Sarason 's book. The Psychological
Sense of Community (1974) was a book about community psy-
chology, not about its methods or programs but about a
quality which one of the "fathers" of that school of
approach felt was missing in the heads of its practitioners,
the primacy of the sense of community for anyone who would
"treat" communities.
Student Development and
Personal Growth (A Caution)
3^2
Similarly, our findings lead us to believe that
something has been missing in the student development move-
ment which in a sense is the campus-based version of a
community psychology model. So too do we see this lack in
the written pronouncements of the most "newly packaged"
form of this model, a sophisticated and operationally
well-conceived technology of "person—environment interven-
tion which Huebner (1979b) and others call the "ecosystem
perspective." While we laud the explicit and practical
design techniques of this new discipline, particularly its
contribution of the principle that interventions are predi-
cated on "a data-theory base," we see very little of a
consciousness of community in the writings of its propon-
ents. The criteria for success of its interventions,
like other student development models, are "personal
growth" and the reduction of "student-environment mismatches"
and "stress and strain." As we concluded in our discussion
of these and other community intervention models in Chap-
ter IX, we believe such efforts, though highly commendable
in terms of their objectives and in terms of technique and
theoretical rationale, have fallen short of their promise
to promote student development precisely and ironically
because they have emphasized personal growth to the detri-
3^3
ment of a psychological sense of community.
A description of a recent experience at an annual
Student Development Conference of a large public univer-
sity in which the writer participated will illustrate our
concern. The Conference offered a smorgasbord of the
typical "personal growth" menu, including workshop intro-
ductions to gestalt therapy, bioenergetics, guided imagery,
human sexuality and the like as well as to some "campus
intervention techniques"; additionally, a dash of "social
consciousness" (e.g., racism, sexism, dealing with the
handicapped, etc.) was made available. One workshop, in
particular, stands out in the writer’s memory; it was
entitled "Personal Growth in an Institutional Setting."
Billed as an "experiential workshop," the hour and
one half event became a commiserating session in which
many of the participants, and most particularly, the
trainers, found the opportunity to share their grief over
what the majority agreed was a common loss: the fact that
their institutions' austerity-minded decision makers were
beginning to cut the funding of their personal growth pro-
grams. The consensus seemed to be that the student devel-
opment movement was being seriously threatened by these
circumstances. We were told, for example, that the uni-
versity which was hosting the conference was in danger of
losing its Center for Personal Growth, which, incidentally.
coexisted with a mental health facility, a counseling and
student development center, a residential life center a
women’s center and various other campus agencies that
focused on "student development" issues. The writer
noticed that at no time during the workshop had anyone
raised the question of the campus as a community and how
the issue of a sense of community could impinge on the
problems of the potential loss of "essential delivery
systems" which the workshop was attempting to address.
When the writer brought his own agenda to the floor he
met only blank stares and looks of courteous bewilderment.
"Sense of community" was simply not in the heads of the
participants and apparently not part of the personal growth
vocabulary. "How about the growth and development of other
members of the community, the faculty, for instance?" was
the follow-up question; that too induced blank responses.
A third and final question met the same fate: "Why is it,"
the writer asked the group, "that 'personal growth' is
conceived of something that must be housed and confined at
one particular agency that would dispense it piecemeal?"
The group politely acknowledged the writer's concerns and
then returned to its own agenda. It quickly moved on to
a heated discussion of how to convince the administration
to continue to fund a series of assertiveness training
workshops in the residence halls.
3^5
Our point in relating this anecdote is to suggest
that the psychological sense of community might well be
added to the agendas of future discussions or investiga-
tions by student development specialists, or for that
matter by any of the helping, teaching, or administrative
professions who practice and/or make policy or decisions
in college settings.
Some Fundamentals of Community
We insisted above, in so many words, that the
concept of dean-as-community-psychologist not only implies
the possession of a full professional bag of tricks (the
supplying of which is not within the purpose or scope of
this report) but the possession of an attitude which
judges any plans, policies, schemes, decisions, implemen-
tations, interventions and other actions on the basis of
the impact of any of these on the psychological sense of
community. We also asserted that such an attitude must
be an informed one, implying the possession of knowledge
and understanding (the supplying of which is decidedly
within the purpose and scope of this study) of the
con-
cepts of community and the sense of community.
In the
body of this study we have reported our findings
from an
examination of relevant literature and have
discussed each
set of findings respectively as we went
along. Without
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attempting to review all of these findings once again,
let us recapitulate by discussing what we have learned
to be the fundamentals of community, and highlighting
these by framing them in the most fundamental of settings,
the dyad. (It was brought out in our discussion of the
social psychology of groups that many investigators of
group life often begin to develop their theories by first
examining the interactions of two persons who have become
a "group.”)
Two people, in a setting like a successful mar-
riage, illustrate the perfect embodiment of the idea of
a psychological sense of community. Let us take just a
few of the more basic elements of community and apply them
to the dyadic setting of a marriage. Taking first the
element of social interaction we may apply the following
adjectives derived from the literature on community:
frequent, day-to-day, face-to-face, regularized, interde-
pendent, reciprocal, help-giving, cooperative, committed,
communicative, exclusive, sufficient, complete, stable,
satisfying. Next, taking the element of common area , we
may apply these terms: limited social space, territory,
smallness, knowledge of the physical layout, safety and
sense of security. Following that we take the element of
common ties and apply: norms, aspirations, problem-
solving methods, values, desires, traditions, belief.
3^7
shared, work and responsibility, mutual honoring of estab-
lished-instrumental behaviors, institutionalized awe,
investment, sacrifice, homogeneity, economic sharing.
Add to these the elements of social control (moral commit-
ment, constraints, order), the central importance of
family (honor), neighborhood (obligation), church (author-
ity), social emotional comfort, physical sustenance,
sense of competence, and finally, the satisfaction of
innate needs for identity, stimulation and security.
By considering the elements of community as they
apply to the marriage setting a number of conclusions
about the problem of community become strikingly evident.
For example, it can be immediately seen that size (small-
ness) alone cann not ensure the sustenance of a sense of
community; it is obvious from the standpoint of the sta-
tistics of divorce that the loss of "the sense of mar-
riage" is as common to our society as the loss of the
sense of community. In considering the analogy of marriage
it becomes apparent that the problems of a setting may
never be completely understood if focus is limited to the
internal structure of the setting; it must also be asked
How is that internal structure shaped or reinforced by
the larger society in which it is embedded? For example,
as Robert Nisbet has shown us, if the function of family
life no longer has central importance in society then the
3^8
sense of family is likely to suffer; similarly, we may
hypothesize that the devaluation of the community ideal
in the larger society would tend to diminish the sense
of community in its various settings. Taking this into
consideration but returning to our focus on the inner
structure of a setting, a more general conclusion is
that the absence or interruption of any one or more of
the elements of community we have been discussing places
a setting in danger of losing its sense of community.
Some of the interactional elements of community
come almost automatically to a setting like marriage
simply by virtue of smallness and therefore are for the
most part taken for granted. Let us take the most funda-
mental of these, the knowing of the other. We learned
from Glynn, for example, that in larger settings like
villages or settlements there is a relationship between
a psychological sense of community and the extent to which
the first names of others in the community are known by
its members. It is obvious that in the dyad the knowing
of first names is not an issue and that it becomes an
issue only as "the community" reaches a certain critical
scale. In small groups, however, the issue of mutual
knowingness still remains but revolves around a much
subtler set of interpersonal variables. Likewise, we
may look upon a second fundamental element that automati-
3^9
cally occurs in the small setting, the idea of mutual
personal recognition: my presence or my absence is
recognized by the other and the other’s is noted by me.
Related elements may be expressed as follows: I care and
am cared about, I can depend on the other and the other
can depend upon me, my impact on the other is easily
evident and the other’s on me is also evident; we belong
here, etc. In looking for signs of a sense of community
in a setting of, let us say, 500 persons, we would not
expect to find the perfect replication of these elements
which, in their dyadic form may be referred to as friend-
ship and/or love. On the other hand, the state of "being
in community" would be signified by the existence of
similar kinds of perceptions regarding "others" among a
large proportion of the 500. In that sense the problem
of defining psychological sense of community is not dis-
similar to the problem of defining "happiness" or other
such state of being; it is a matter of proportion rather
than of completeness. To suggest that in a community of
500 people there is or is not a sense of community is not
to suggest that all of the five hundred do or do not ex-
perience the fundamental elements of community we have
been describing.
Having become acquainted in this report with some
sociological definitions of community we may conclude that
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simply being a member of a social system which fits one of
those definitions does not necessarily imbue that member
with a sense of community; or conversely, when a member
of a setting possesses that sense it does not necessarily
follow that the setting is a true community. Recognizing
this conundrum it may be said that to the extent that a
member of a setting perceives that certain elements
contained in the sociologist's conception of community
are present in that setting, then, to the same extent may
we say that the member has a consciousness of community
which we are calling the psychological sense of community
(this principle is one of the cornerstones of Glynn's
dissertation design). May we not also conclude, there-
fore, that one way to build a sense of community is to
see to it that a given setting contains the elements of
community and that thorough participation in this process
the members of that setting should tend to experience the
psychological sense of community? At the same time we
recognize that there is not a simple one-to-one corres-
pondence between a finite set of elements and a certain
degree of the sense of community. While nothing we
found
in the literature treated this issue, our
observation
would lead us to believe that a sense of community
has
principally to do with the way a person feels
about the
collectivity of persons among whom he lives,
works or
351
studies, and that this subjectivity sometimes may, by
association, be directed to the physical setting, geograph-
ical place, organization or institution. As suggested
earlier, this process may be independent of whether any
of the latter constitutes a "community." (This is one
reason why we believe that Sarason’s modification of the
term "sense of community" with the word "psychological"
should not be construed as a redundant embellishment.)
In addition to highlighting the fundamental ele-
ments of community, we wish to make mention of what we
consider to be those key authors who have added valuable
and insightful dimensions to our knowledge gained about
the properties of community thus giving a breadth to our
understanding of the meaning of sense of community.
Robert Nisbet (Chapters II and X) brought his historical
and traditional perspective to our understanding of
community and of its place in academe. So too did Wilson
McWilliams (Chapter III) as he provided us with observa-
tions about the meaning of fraternity and its place in
human affairs. Martin Buber (Chapter VI) gave us a defin-
itive statement regarding the profound connection between
a transcendent value and the existence of an enduring
community; and he cautioned us that community does not
result from man’s deliberate attempts to gain it through
the restructuring of his institutions, that it is not only
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the consequence of a "fundamental transformation of
interpersonal relationships (that is only the first
difficult step) but of people standing "in a living
reciprocal relation to one another facing a center
a living center."
A major contribution to this study was Kanter's
analysis (Chapter IV) of the commitment mechanisms which
she found to be essential to the survival of the 19 th
century communes. Much of what we have reviewed is so
rhetorical in nature that, without the addition of Kanter’s
evidence of what it is that links the self to "social
requirements" and what it is that ensures the stability of
group life and a sense of community, much of our findings
would have been like seeds in the wind searching for
earth. Kanter's findings appear to confirm the rhetoric.
Ardrey ' s formulation (Chapter V), which links the inter-
active variables of enmity, amity and hazard, and the
innate striving for identity, stimulation and security
with the success of territory, represents another notable
contribution and is a good example of congruency with
Kanter's findings.
Finally, if Kanter's was a major contribution then
Sarason's contribution in this report (Chapter VII) was
of supreme and inestimable significance. While many of
his pronouncements remain to be tested by others, they are
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solidly grounded in his own experiences in a variety of
settings, many of which were created by him for the pur-
pose of rendering service. Looking back over the process
of creating a setting, not from the organizational man-
agement point of view, but from the intensely personal
perspective that asks the question Whom am I doing this
for, Sarason began to re-shape his thoughts and "make
sense out of his experiences." In doing so he rediscovered
a common household phrase— sense of community—and brought
its meaning to a higher plain of regard: the psychologi-
cal sense of community--the touchstone by which to judge
the efforts of any one who would create or lead a setting
in its mission of helping or teaching. It is the essence
of his community psychology. It says that in judging
our efforts we must not only examine the impact on the
clientele, but on the external community and the internal
community; i.e., the setting itself and the persons who
man the setting. It says that in this community we shall
take care of our own, be it a normal or handicapped person
or the teacher or therapist assigned to that person.
Being in Community: Love
or Responsible Concern ?
At this juncture it might be well to pause and
to consider an issue that inevitably arises when talking to
colleagues about the "quest for community," and one that
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may have arisen in the reader's mind, and that is the
challenge that such a quest is yet another veiled effort
at achieving universal love of the Judeo-Christian sort
or of the romantic or familial variety. We should like to
make it clear that this is not the case. A sense of
community implies neither that everybody loves each other
nor that everybody "must be friends"; to do so would be
straining the family analogy beyond its useful limits.
What then is the crucial "emotion" or attitude that
we should be looking for? The term that we would prefer
to use is responsible concern
,
a concept borrowed from a
group process technique known as Attitudinal Skills Train-
ing. (AST was an educational component of a drug treat-
ment program sponsored by the Addiction Services Agency in
New York City during the 1960s in which the writer parti-
cipated. It was used primarily in working with afflicted
families and community groups and in the training of
therapists.) In a true community what one would look for
are signs that most people would feel we are a member-
ship; we will not look away when a member is in need.
Responsible concern implies a known set of community val-
ues; it includes the obligation to confront a member when
he deviates from these values. Being in community implies
not that we like each other but that we are not alone and
are safe from attack or being ignored. As Wireman asserted
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when discussing the intimate secondary relationship, it
is more a matter of credibility than a matter of affection
(1979b, p. 15 ).
The relationship between being in community and
being in love that was suggested in our discussion of
Freud’s contribution to group psychology (Chapter III) is
not being refuted here. In that discussion love was
treated as an unconscious manifestation of a postulated
libidinal drive and was used to explain how group members
surrender self-interest in favor of the group ("limita-
tion of narcissism"). For us what is important is not so
much a concern with the validity of Freud's psychological
mechanics, but rather with the passionate and powerful
place that the group experience has in the human psyche.
Freud was introduced into our report in order to emphasize
the idea that the psychological sense of community— the
communal response— strikes some very primal chord deep
within our psychic core; that is, it is not simply a fad
or a luxury of civilization.
In the same vein did we introduce Tiger, McWil-
liams (Chapter III) and Ardrey (Chapter V) into the dis-
cussion. We became convinced that this was an innate force
that we were examining, a force which can be suddenly
released from its suppression in moments of hazard, enmity,
crisis, ritual or celebration to fill us with an inexplic-
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3-bls sense of oneness with our* fellows. Not 3. romantic
notion; a biologic notion.
The Problem of Individual Differences
Another issue that we wish to raise is the question
of individual differences
. It is easy to forget that
it is the individual who experiences the sense of commun-
ity, not the community; to speak of a group mentality is
only a convenience of speech. It may be asked, therefore,
whether or not some personalities are predisposed towards
the idea of a sense of community (the writer may be one
of these since he chose this as a topic of study!). Fur-
ther, may not a person's "need for community" vary from
time to time like other needs, depending on its momentary
place on his need hierarchy?
A recent incident at the writer's place of work is
a case in point. The Student Senate organized a "pick-
up" event to help resolve a problem of glass and other
litter strewn around the student parking lot. An invita-
tion was sent out to all the members of the college "com-
munity" to appear with brooms on a certain afternoon. A
pizza party was planned for the participants after the
event. Some students and one staff member appeared at
this "communal" event. Most did not. If we were to ex-
plain the degree of participation in this event on the basis
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of the degree of sense of community at the college, how
would we explain the different behaviors of the partici-
pators and non-participators, given that all are members
of the same environment? Some possible hypotheses are:
(1) Some of the people who did not participate
(a) were more attracted to a competing setting
(e.g., family, friends, other activities,
etc
.
)
.
(b) were not in the mood to associate with
people
.
(c) generally prefer to be alone or with a few
people
(d) dislike the particular activity (and/or
pizza parties )
.
(e) did not know about the activity.
(f) felt that the work should be left to paid
custodians
.
( g— s) etc., etc.
(2) Some of the people who did participate
(a) were attracted to the activity because they
were lonely and had no other social activity
to attend.
(b) liked the idea of beautifying the grounds.
(c) are predisposed to and have a need for a
sense of community.
(d) enjoy outdoor work (and/or pizza parties).
(e) felt an obligation to join the activity in
spite of competing settings.
(f) had the need to impress others with good
deeds
(g-z) etc., etc.
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Let us pose our question another way. Fromm ( 1956
, p.
32) writes that "Care, responsibility, respect and knowl-
edge are mutually interdependent. They are a syndrome of
attitudes which are to be found in the mature person."
How would one, then, promote a sense of community unless
that community were made up of "mature" people? On the
other hand, it is possible that the so called "self-
actualized" person, described by Maslow as
. . . belongingness-need satisfied (he does not feel
alienated, ostracized, orphaned, outside the group;
he fits into the family, the team, the society; he
is not an unwelcome intruder) (Maslow, 1965, p. 15),
would be less likely to be in quest of PSC or less likely
to experience that sudden sense of community that often
arises at communal occasions? We must be careful to
recognize that a community psychological perspective does
not assume the absence of individual predispositions any
more than a community health program assumes that all
people are equally prone to disease; treatment must always
proceed along the lines of a dual approach. In the same
way do we "treat" the lack of a sense of community; through
environmental interventions we strive to maximize communal
responses while at the same time we attempt to help indi-
viduals cope with loneliness, etc.
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Individual versus Society :
A Recurring Question
A related question, and one that must be faced in
any discussion stressing the importance of community, is
that of individuality
,
or to frame it in the present con-
text, the sense of self . The community-minded practitioner
must constantly take this into consideration. Almost
every author who dealt with the problem of community raised
this issue; one author, Bakan ( 1966 ) devoted an entire
book to it. The Duality of Human Existence . As in the
problem we discussed in our presentation of Tonnies’
concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaf
t
(Chapter III),
we see community/individuality as a dichotomy forever
seeking a synthesis. This is the "dialectic" to which
Sarason referred when he wrote that "The tension is in-
evitable and in itself should not be regarded as either
negative or positive" ( 197 ^, p. 273 )* Expressed in another
way, Bakan saw the problem as the integration of "agency
and communion" which is illustrated by a proverb (ascribed
to Hillel ) which he inserts in his argument:
If I am not for myself who will be for me?
But if I am only for myself, what am I?
Allport ( 1955 ) viewed the dilemma through its historical
origins, calling it "tribalism" versus "individualism."
Nisbet, from a medieval perspective, saw it as the
group
(family) versus the individual, explaining that "the
group
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was primary; it was the irreducible unit of the social
system at large." Today, observed Nisbet, "the individual
is primary" (1970, p. 82). Thus he described individual-
ism as the belief based on "the value of human personal-
ity and a conviction that the source of all progress lies
in the free exercise of individual energy" (1970, p. 224).
Most authors argued, however, that such "individual energy,"
or as Sarason put it "the creative potential of the indi-
vidual," gain's its strength from the community. This
brings up the question of freedom versus restraint, or as
Homans (1950) expressed it, "the problem of liberty."
Keyes treats the conflict in this manner:
There is an inescapable relationship between
brotherhood and oppression. Any group setting out
to build community must anticipate this relationship
and deal with it. Being in community doesn't make
you more free; it takes away some of your freedom in
exchange for the warmth of membership. Ignoring or
denying that trade-off just makes it harder to
confront
.
To deny the relationship between community and
conformity, to call them two different things, is to
make community that much more difficult to achieve.
To be in community requires the sacrifice of at least
part of your individuality (Keys, 1975, p. 17).
Morgan (1957) discussed the related conflict of
society versus solitude, and offered this quote from
another writer:
Man is both a gregarious and a solitary animal,
as much made for society as for solitude, and as
much for solitude as for society. His true life, in
a healthy state, is an alteration from one to the
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other in due proportion (W. R. Aleer
without citation in Morgan, 1957, p. 79)
And, indeed, Kanter in her analysis of the enduring 19 th
century commune found that "Some privacy in the midst of
strong group contact seems essential to success" (Kanter,
1972, p. 99).
All in all, our authors agreed that the question
of the individual versus society presents one of the nec-
essary antinomies of communal living. Recall that Sarason
told us that the goal of community psychology is "to
create the conditions in which people can experience a
sense of community that permits a productive compromise
between the needs of the individual and the achievement
of group goals" (
1
9
7
4
,
p. 155). We have already discussed
in Chapter V the dangers inherent in "too much community,"
or as Palmer called it, "false community." Communities
exist for individuals, and when the individual is endan-
gered the community fails its purpose. As some of the
presenters at the communitization conference pointed out,
in striving to create a community of the whole, let us say,
in a college setting, we must not endanger those smaller
associations, be they "cliques" or fraternities or other
informal or formal groups, which are so vital for indi-
vidual identifications. We see a parallel in Nisbet's
remarks about the political system with that of an insti-
tutional system—even a small college (we indicate the
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parallels in brackets)
:
The State [college] emerges as but one of the
associations of man’s [students' and staffs’] exist-
ence.
. . . The major objective of political democ-
racy becomes that of making harmonious and effective
the varied group allegiances which exist in society
[on campus], not sterilize them in the interest of
a monolithic political community [a college community
of the whole] (Nisbet, 1970, p. 250).
This raises yet one more dualistic conflict that is bound
to appear in the dialectic battle between the individual
and the society of the educational institution; in a sense
it was discussed when we reported on Nisbet 's concern with
’’the degradation of the academic dogma." It is the ques-
tion of an institution—its leadership—being the watch-
dog in terms of protecting its primary goals and mission
while at the same time facing the communal needs of its
members from which source, as Argyris pointed out, the
organization derives its energy. Mayer (1978), a commen-
tator on intentional communities, names this dualism the
conflict between the "psychological model of commitment"
and the "socio-cultural model of commitment"; the one
reflecting community and the other, institution:
The psychological model calls for commitment to
one another, and to the synergistic interactions
among the individuals.
The socio-cultural model calls for commitment to
ideas and carrying them out; emphasis. on results,
rather than processes, and on acting in a determina
framework rather than in an open, indeterminate one
(Mayer, 1978).
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Of course we recognize that both of these models are incor-
porated in the view of community that is spelled out in
this study (we argued in this vein when we discussed [Chap-
ter X] Nisbet’s complaint about the "degradation of aca-
demic dogma"). Mayer, himself, recognizes that his models
do not represent a true dichotomy; he introduces these
ideas by warning that they can be separated only concep-
tually and that in reality they are not separable.
Individual Psychology and Community :
The Adlerian View
Despite the potshots at theories of intrapsychic
supremacy that community psychologists are wont to take,
the community perspective does not imply that individual
psychology does not matter. Near the close of our report,
this looms large as another area requiring clarification.
In the end, it is the individual who is our client no
matter how we phrase it; it is that person whom we are
trying to reach, as Maslow put it, "via the community,
the
team or the organization." The most effective
community
psychologist may well be the well-trained clinician
imbued
with the community perspective. But beyond
that, there
is the more significant fact that, like
the dualism just
discussed, in reality , the distinctions between
an indi-
vidual psychology and any other psychology
are just con-
ceptual and invented for the convenience
of discussion and
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investigation. Many of the writers we have reviewed (for
example, Cooley, Tonnies, Ardrey, and Buber) have insisted
that the individual derives his psychology from his com-
munity. Alfred Adler ( 1927 ) comes to mind now because his
is the most prominent case of a theory of individual psy-
chology premised on the primacy of community (Harry Stack
Sullivan's theory of "interpersonal psychiatry," which
came after Adler's, is another case in point.)
It was Adler from whom we first learned that the
human is primarily a communal being. Unlike his teacher,
Sigmund Freud, Adler refused to characterize "social feel-
ing" as "a regression of the ego." The social feeling,
which in the German Gemeinschaftsgefuhl means "sense of
fellowship in the human community," is an essential aspect
of the healthy person; "it antedates the individual life
of man" ( 1927 , p. 28 ). Like Ardrey, Adler found in Dar-
win the proof that humans have a biological need for
community. For Adler, Gemeinschaftsgefuhl is second only
to the striving for power in regard to the development of
the human character ( 1927 , p. 166 ) . Both of these ele-
ments of human nature are seen as having their origin in
the state of weakness or "inferiority" that is the human
condition from birth through infancy; as long as a human
is alone he remains weak throughout all the stages of his
life and through old age. A standard of mental health,
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then, becomes how close or far one stands from community.
"We cannot judge a human being except by using the concept
of social feeling as a standard," wrote Adler. As we
noted In Chapter V, Bakan ( 1966 ) theorized that the "need
for communion" exists In a dormant, repressed state In the
modern human psyche, whereas In man's primal condition,
in which the need for community was a biological and ter-
ritorial imperative because of his weakness and dependency,
the human psyche wore communion "on its sleeve." We
speculated in that discussion that the repression mechan-
ism loses its force in times of crisis and momentarily we
experience, or, as we say in the counseling vernacular,
"get in touch with," our Gemeinschaftsgefuhl
. If Adler
is correct and Bakan is correct then such a universal
repression must be viewed as an existential malady. Only
through exposure to an individual psychology can a person
who would practice through a community perspective under-
stand that aspect of human nature which Adler calls the
"striving for recognition and superiority" (1927, p. 72).
If, after all, the psychological sense of community is a
goal or a value in the mind of a dean or a community psy-
chologist, then it must be recognized that individual
psychology is a staunch ally.
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Final Perspective: Leadership
.
The Community Index and ’
Growth-Enhancing Structures
We now have a body of knowledge relating to the
concept psychological sense of community. We now have a
person called a dean of students, infused with a commun-
ity psychological attitude incorporating the primacy of
the psychological sense of community and informed by the
knowledge that this and other sources have imparted. And
we have the setting: a small, residential liberal arts
college. With these as givens, a final perspective is
required, some guiding formulation. Although we prudently
announced in the Introduction to this report that we would
not be presenting a cookbook approach to community build-
ing, we nonetheless would offer some general direction in
the form of three basic principles (in terms of policy)
or steps (in terms of action):
Leadership
. The selection of the leader (Sara-
son, as we have learned, prefers to think in terms of the
"socialization of the leader," an idea discussed in depth
in his book on the "creation of settings," [1972, pp
.
181-215]) is our first principle or step that asks the
question "Is there a match between this community’s goals
and values and this person's leadership style, and does
this style incorporate the PSC value?" The issue of lead-
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ership as it relates to sense of community is a study unto
itself and not one on which we can elaborate here. To
make our point, however, we shall introduce Maslow' s notion
"on the relationship between psychological health and the
characteristics of superior managers" based in part on
Likert’s research (Maslow, 1965, pp . 74-81). Although
Maslow, himself, requires no introduction, let us first be
aware of his view of eupsychian management (remembering
that it was he who first coined the term "personal growth.")
. . . Psychotherapy tends to focus too exclusively
on the development of the individual, the self, the
identity, etc. I have thought of creative education
and now also of creative management as not only doing
for the individual but also developing him via the
community, the team, the group, the organization
—
which is just as legitimate a path of personal growth
as the autonomous paths. . . . The good community,
the good organization, the good team can help . . .
where the individual therapist is helpless (Maslow,
1965, p. 24).
Later he adds:
Beware of stressing the pleasures of autonomy,
of actualization of the individual self. Not enough
attention has been paid to the pleasures of being
in a love community with which one can identify, not
enough studies yet of esprit de corps (Maslow, 1965,
p. 24).
Returning to the question of leadership here is how Mas-
low would identify the "superior manager": (1) He is
"psychologically healthier"; (2) he has a desire to
"increase the health of the workers whom he manages";
(3) he would accomplish this "via the gratification of
basic needs for safety, belongingness, for affectionate
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relationships
.
. . etc." and "via the gratification of the
. . . metaneeds"; and (*J) he is, himself, "synergistic,"
and "will frame a synergistic situation for the people
[he manages]." The point we are making about leadership,
then, in our first principle, is that the leader must be
chosen with communal, or in Maslow's terms, "eupsychian"
values in mind. A corollary of this principle is that,
ideally, every worker in the organization is chosen in the
same manner, be he the superintendent of the physical
plant, the treasurer, the physics instructor, or of course
— the president!
The Community Index
. One of the writers we have
reviewed (Keyes, 1973, 1975) suggested that social and
political programs could be evaluated by a "community
index" which asks the question "Does the program bring
the people together or does it drive them apart?" We
suggest that the adoption of such an index is the simple
but crucial second step or principle. What would compose
a community index, in addition to the above general ques-
tion, would be up to the "leader" (the dean, etc.) who,
of course, would check with his or her community as to its
contents of community criteria. Depending on leadership
style, one might wish to go about this using a behavioral
approach such as the program which was suggested by one
of our "communitization" speakers (Smith, 1972, discussed
in Chapter X) or, one might wish to be less mechanistic
and proceed along the lines of the community intervention
369
model based on the conception of "community strain"
developed by Heller and Monahan (1977) and discussed in
Chapter IX, to take just two examples.
Growth-Enhancing Structures . In summarizing their
view on the role of the community psychologist on the
college Zax and Specter make this observation:
. . .
No doubt, the advantages offered by the college
campus as a community laboratory are too attractive
to lie fallow for the indefinite future. . . . The
most significant challenge for workers in the college
community will be the need to discover ways to make"
that setting a truly growth-enhancing environment
which, is altogether in keeping with the goals of
the educational enterprise (Zax and Specter, 197**,
p. 465).
In that same book, they entitle their chapter on communes
"The Creation of Growth-enhancing Settings." The reader
may recall that in presenting Heller’s and Monahan's in-
tervention model (Chapter IX) we quoted their summary of
their view of "optimal community life" which, in part,
read "We are not talking about a mystical or ethereal
quality but one that depends on the availability of_
growth-enhancing structures " (Heller and Monahan, 1977,
p. 395)- In that discussion we described
a growth-
enhancing structure as any systemized component of
a com-
munity or organization which serves to optimize
community
life and gave such examples as the use of
paraprofession-
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als, networks, resources, opportunities for direct action,
psychological success, feedback, general meetings, dis-
cussions, democratic procedures, and Barker’s concept of
the "optimal manning of behavior settings" (and let us now
add Wireman's conception of "intimate secondary relation-
ships"). Accordingly, our third and final principal is
the systematic supporting of existing and continual crea-
tion of new and needed, growth-enhancing structures which
anticipate human needs, minimize stress, encourage iden-
tifications, and in general promote contact and interde-
pendence throughout the total college system. To us it
does not matter what "delivery system" is employed; it
can be an "ecosystem" design, a "milieu management design,
a "community mental health" design, any model which, in
its broad outlines, incorporates the community perspective
with an emphasis on "prevention, competence and growth."
The point we wish to stress is that the system and inter-
vention techniques that are used are not at issue in this
formulation; it is rather the perspective , the attitude,
"what is in the head of the leader." In much of the
counseling psychology "outcome" research that was done in
the 1950s and 1960s, it was found that what distinguished
therapeutic outcomes was not so much the therapeutic
technique employed, but rather the presence of certain
variables in the "delivery system," i.e., the respect,
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empathic understanding, warmth, genuineness and authenti-
city of the therapist. Similarly, we are hypothesizing
that in a small college campus situation, in which a
dean of students must assume a more interventionist
role than such a position would demand, let us say, in
a large university, the student affairs model that
is adopted is less a factor than is a commitment by the
institution and its officers to promoting a sense
of community. And to repeat once more, that commit-
ment (or attitude) must be an informed one, and must be
painstakingly modeled by the leadership (or, in the
least, certainly by the dean).
Epilogue
Victorious celebrations, the VJ crowd scene at
Times Square, the U.S. Hockey Team victory over the Rus-
sians in the 1980 Olympic Games; crises and their after-
math, the Blizzard of '78, the death of a President, the
captivity and release of the hostages in Iran; national
pride; the boundaries of the self momentarily obliterated
and merged with other selves. What can we say about these
experiences? Yes, there is a communal response released
in these situations, a welling up from deep within our
psyches of the need for community. The excitement and
stimulation of the moment allows us to become "unglued,"
enough to "lose" ourselves in the joy of celebration, the
terror of hazard, the threat of enmity or the grief of
loss. It’s good to have our team or our country win, to
be on the winning side; or strangely, it's good to share
threat and grief. But like the ephemeral magic of a
"chemical communion" we inevitably "regain" our real
selves; and as in a post-holiday depression we find our-
selves "situationless" (as Martin Buber described it).
We neither achieved solidarity nor entered communion.
We cannot depend on a never-ending stream of sensational
events to maintain that communal feeling, that Gemein-
schaftsgefiihl .
In the day-to-day community life of the college
campus, although they do occur from time to time, we do
not deal with such dramatic and powerful events. We do,
on the other hand, have our small victories and our quiet
defeats. The custodian is told that the lounges never
looked better until he began working in this dorm; the
President greets a freshman walking across campus by name
students protest to the Trustees that a favorite instruc-
tor is being threatened by departmental budget cuts; only
a few spectators show up to see our play. These are the
quiet messages that tell us whether or not we are recog-
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nized, known, have impact, or belong. Can we depend on
a never-ending stream of these events which gives us
clues as to the qualities of our connections to others?
To continue the convenient metaphor of the stream, we may
say that once we know that there is a source, an enduring
source that we can tap into even when occasionally the
stream may go dry, we may achieve something like an
enduring sense that there is something here for me as it is
here for you, and a place that we can go to when we need
to or want to. We see the psychological sense of commun-
ity as being that kind of source.
We are teachers, counselors, psychologists, deans
—
people of good will— serving our students and clients and
each other. We are people of action, and practical, and
we want to build community or at least a sense of commun-
ity. We stand waiting to be told how to create or maintain
the "source." We are told:
But, in truth, community is another one of those
strange things . . . which eludes us if we aim
directly at it. Instead, community comes as a by -
product of commitment and struggle (Palmer, 1977
,
p~. 18
,
emphasis added).
We may fall into the trap of believing the myth that com-
munity equals utopia, that "in easy access to one another
we will find ourselves as brothers and sisters again."
But not so, cautions Palmer:
. . .
community always means the collision of egos.
It is less like a utopia than like a crucible or a
refiner's fire.
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. .
.
[There is] the destructive potential of being;
in love with one's" dream of community] ! 7 i (Palmer
,
1977
,
p. 19
,
emphasis added).
Hopefully, we have learned something in this study not so
much in terms of how to build a community in an institu-
tional setting but about the importance of becoming
engaged in that necessary "commitment and struggle" so
that we may go about our daily business in a way that is
protective of a sense of community in whatever form we
find it. The least we can do, to paraphrase McWilliams,
is to recognize community when it occurs; to broaden the
chance for others; and to feel compassion for those denied
the opportunity for community . And, perhaps the best
that we can do would be to
. . .
attempt to provide the greatest approximations
possible; [we] can make communities and fraternities
more possible, more likely rather than less (McWil-
liams, 1973, p. b22‘)T
We would like to think that in these pages a var-
iety of thinkers have been brought into a new dialogue
with one another. It is the writer's modest hope that the
reader will have joined us in this dialogue and that its
subject, the largely unattended to issue of the psycho-
logical sense of community, will increasingly be discussed
by college workers and others, not as some vaguely
cher-
ished and longed for condition, but as a crucial aspect
of institutional life.
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APPENDIX
Interview with Seymour Sarason, January 14, 1980
[The writer began the interview by telling Dr. Sarason
something of his background, leading up to the point of
how he came to be interested in the issue of the sense
of community, particularly on the campus of a small,
private, residential liberal arts college.]
Mandell: In the introduction to your book. The Psycho-
logical Sense of Community
,
you stated that there was a
"vast literature” dealing with this topic. But I soon
discovered that to find this material I couldn’t get any
results by looking for an indexed reference to "sense of
community .
"
Sarason: No, no—you get it in the utopian literature
like The Idea of Fraternity in America . You never get it
under that. It's like the "creation of settings"—you’ re
not going to find anything like that; you’ll go stark
raving mad.
M: Let me ask you. Have you read Glynn's dissertation?
It’s the only piece that I could find that deals
directly
with
—
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The leader is the model for what he wants other people
to do. OK? And if the sense of community is something
that he not only believes in but somehow in diverse ways
shows up in what you do and what you say, that becomes
influential
.
M: Well what happens if you're only the dean and not the
leader, so to speak? I guess then it’s your job to
influence the president. Although in Settings you were
describing the creation of new settings. I derived much
from the book because I was reading into it that the
same principles can apply to older institutions that bring
in new leaders. In a sense the trustees are hoping and
praying that a new setting, so to speak, will be created.
S: Oh, yes, I agree.
M: One example that comes to mind. There was no faculty
lounge. Again, not coming from a theory, but just coming
from where my gut was, I tried to influence the president
into creating a lounge out of one of the more central,
larger classrooms. There was some resistance, but
—
S: Look, the more you talk about the place the more I see
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S: The one from Catholic University? Yes, he sent me
a copy.
M: Well, he says very quickly in the beginning that you
added the word "psychological" to the expression "sense of
community" as a kind of "refinement" of the term.
Originally, when I thought about this, I thought it was
kind of a redundancy—or that maybe you had something
in mind that I was not grasping. I do use your term and
I assume the literature has adopted it.
S: Frankly, I think it is redundant, you see. And if
you were to ask me why— I added "psychological"— I couldn't
answer you—well—except that, well, for an audience of
psychologists if the word "psychology" isn’t in there—
I
mean they’re not likely to, you know, pay attention to it.
And I think I don’t have— I really think it’s redundant.
And I remember that, in fact, it bothered me a little bit.
M: Well, I think you’ve added a little rhythm; "psycho-
logical" adds a lot more flow. I think it will stick.
It’ll become a descriptor. Seriously, though, I wanted
to
ask you—what do you think of the idea of the c_ampus a_s__a
community?
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S: It’s a microcosm. You see, you can talk of a psycho-
logical sense of community on a continuum in terms of
geography, of an institution, or of an agency. You can
talk about the college, for example, as a community and
what are the ways in which the college works for or
against that sense of community so that people within it
have that sense of belonging, the sense of wanting to
belong, the sense of a kind of protection of a sort. In
the case of a setting like the college, however, I would
argue that that sense of community, in part, is a func-
tion of how that setting relates to the larger geographical
setting in which it is embedded. At some point that be-
comes a factor, a factor which can make for a better
sense of community. In other words, an adversarial—You
can have a sense of community at the college and not have
any sense of community with what surrounds the college.
So that if you have town-gown relationships—you know,
conflicts— in effect it can give you the feeling—But
in terms of the welfare of the system the viability of an
institution over time, that is always related to how it_
as an institution relates to the surrounding community.
[For the next several minutes the writer related to Dr.
Sarason some of the early problems that he, as a new dean,
encountered with the surrounding community, particularly
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about one example in which newcomers in the town organized
a protest in which one of the issues was the accusation
that the college had no sense of community, etc. The
writer then went on to explain some of the rifts and ten-
sions in the internal life of the college which were
splitting the community. For example, there was in evidence
a definite split within the institution regarding the
faculty’s and administration’s perceptions of what kind of
institution of learning should Windham College be, and what
kind of student should it be avoiding or attracting.
Finally, the writer came around to the question of the role
of a dean of students.]
M: I'll be attempting to develop in my dissertation the
model of the dean of students as a community psychologist.
Does that make any sense to you?
S: You know, that makes sense. You see, if you go back
to the Creating of Settings , one of the most important
chapters, from my standpoint, in the book is "The Sociali-
zation of the Leader." You know, the dean of students is
a leader, or at least is perceived as that by different
segments of the community. And so one has to ask how
does
the leader conceive of himself in relation to the
goals of
the institution? And does he see it as one in
which he or
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she, so to speak, acquires status, prestige, power or
what have you, or is it to help others do what they want
to do and is it one where you want to give a group of
individuals some sense of interdependence and interneed,
you see. And if it isn’t in your head then you don't do
these things.
[The interviewer responded to the last remark by describ-
ing an instance in which he, as the dean of students, came
into conflict with the campus psychologist who was direc-
tor of counseling at the college. The psychologist had
requested that the dean remove from the campus a coed who
had been diagnosed by the psychologist as a schizophrenic
who he believed would be a disturbance because of her
bizarre behavior and suicidal tendencies. The dean suc-
ceeded in convincing the president to support his refusal
to evict the student from the dormitory. The idea was to
attempt to see if some sort of support system would emerge
on her wing of the dormitory. It was related that a group
of residents who lived on her floor did succeed in develop-
ing a system of support that helped minimize the risks
and allowed her to complete her academic year without in-
terruption. Dr. Sarason then continued.]
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S: That’s a very, very good instance, you know, of sev-
eral things. One thing is that the student was embedded
in a network of relationships. And your job was to find
out whether it was working for her or against her. Was it
supportive? Was it isolating, or what-the-hell was it?
And the decision what to do with her was going to depend
upon that network of relationships and whether it had
aspects for her as well as for others of some sense of
community. And that’s a very good example of that.
That’s the difference in thinking in terms of an individual
psychology as against thinking in terms of a community psy-
chology. Let me give you an analogical example to that.
When Medicare was first established in '65 or ’66, every
financial incentive in Medicare was to place older people
in nursing homes. There wasn’t any financial incentive
to keep them home. OK? I mean it was disastrous! You
know, the idea of looking at what are the existing sup-
ports, what incentives are there in that context that are
helpful? It wasn't informed by any of this kind of think-
ing. I mean the prepotent tendency is to segregate. OK?
And, so that psychologist, no less than you, had some sense
of obligation. But, where the two of you departed was
that you didn’t see this as a decision that should be
made
about her without taking into account what was the
nature of
support; did she live in any kind of a community
that would
or could accept responsibility to be helpful.
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M. And, we also, I thought, owed that to the community
as well as to the student.
S: Well, that’s another way you can put it. Sure.
[The writer went on to describe how his continuing antago-
nism with the psychologist at Windham College around the
issue of individual treatment versus total community aware-
ness led him to first consider the significance of the
topic under consideration. Finally, he bluntly told Dr.
Sarason that one of the reasons he came to him was to
receive some reinforcement from him regarding pursuit of
this study
.
]
M: I think it’s going to work. The interesting thing
about it is how it all seems to be coming together as I
read the kind of material you are writing.
S: There are some other things that I've written. There’s
a book I wrote called Work, Aging and Social Change—which
is not about old people—it's about people like you or me
—with the subtitle Professionals and the One Life-One Car -
eer Imperative . In the one life-one career imperative so-
ciety says to us "Here is a smorgasbord of opportunities.
Choose the one dish that you are going to work at for the
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rest of your life." And that imperative is on a collision
course with the criterion of growth as a basis for, you
know—And so the book really is about professionals because
it isn’t the whole business of career change and the
dynamics of it. You know, it isn't only the factory worker
on the assembly line in Detroit who’s got the problem;
it's now right on through. You see, in one of the chap-
ters I discuss the relationship between one’s experience
of working one’s experience of a sense of community inward.
You cannot separate the two.
M: Dr. Sarason, it struck me when I went back and re-read
Settings that although you were really driving at the idea
of sense of community you didn’t actually use the words
and
—
S; No— I probably used them—but I know that’s what I was
describing—when I was describing the Yale Psycho-educa-
tional Clinic and the like. It’s very interesting. I
recently got a call from somebody who was at the clinic.
(This goes back to 1967 or ’ 68 . He's at another univer-
sity now.) He calls me up and says I'd like to come and
talk to you because I haven't been thinking since I left
the clinic. And that’s been the experience of people.
I
mean it was a kind of— And that was one reason why I
started it. I wanted my own family. You don’t have this
m a university. Let me explain something. if you want
to understand the university, especially places like Yale,
you’ve got to ask two questions. If you want to under-
stand why a sense of community is a very thin thing at a
university, you've got to ask two questions: Who tries
to make it at a university, and whom does the university
select? The answer to both questions is rugged individ -
ualism
. So you have a selection process whereby you bring
in ambitious, assertive prima donnas and then you wonder
why they can't work with each other! The university is
marvelous for individuals!
M: I think I also have to talk about the university; I
just don’t want to write about the small college. I'll
try to make some implications—because I believe there are
some. You’ve spoken a number of times about the smaller
community within the larger community. I remember visiting
one of those high-rise dormitories at U. Mass. And I
found—at least among the students on each floor—well of
course I suppose the whole thing was a kind of alienation
culture—but each floor seemed to have had a tremendous
sense of community; students would return the following
year to that same floor! And Windham sold itself as a
small private college where you would get to know every-
body, but there was a kind of coldness that its students
experienced there. So that the idea of size—uh . . .
S: You’re right
—
M: Small size does not guarantee—Two things being equal,
yes, the smaller the easier. Have you found the same
thing— that the size does not guarantee the sense of com-
munity at all?
S: Yeah. I think it’s oversimplifying
—
M: The faculty at the college, for example, were heavily
into their own private rural lives and—uh
—
S: Why did the college fail?
M: That’s a good question. But I’m not setting up any
hypothesis here to the effect that the lack of sense of
community—They will tell you that it was a financial
crisis, they they over-built and over-extended themselves
in the sixties, that they built a huge campus designed by
a prominent architect and the indebtedness could not con-
tinue to be supported after the era of the military drait
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had. passed, and so forth. You know, "mismanagement"
whatever that means. But basically, no endowment, no
alumni support, no
—
S: And that seems to confirm everything I said in the
chapter on "Buildings as Distractions." The sense of
community enters in the sense that it never really was
high on the priorities; I mean other things took prece-
dence over it. You know, they were after instant, you
know, legitimation; they were going to become another
Middlebury. They put themselves on the treadmill of
building and image. Their orientation was "How was the
outside going to look at us?" not "How do we want to
live?" I mean, for example, at the clinic we had a rule:
we would never have more people at the clinic than could
sit around that table—which meant around eighteen or
twenty people—or we could crowd a few more in—come what
may
.
M: You know, when the college started out it was located
throughout the village in the old buildings and
—
S: Look. Let me give you another— If you go back and
read over the cultural revolution in China and then what s
happening in Iran— . Maybe Iran is—
.
It is an anti-
western sentiment that says "We want to live the way
we're living. We want— You know, it's interesting.
A friend of mine who is Israeli and teaches at the Uni-
versity of Hartford, said to me years ago, he said "You
people just don't understand what is the most important
thing that really is in the world: it's religion." And,
you know to us who are no longer religious—we can't under-
stand the way in which religion organizes community and
the sense of community that it provides you. So, you know
the Iranians, and the Moslem world generally, says "We
don't want the Western World." And this is the problem
that Mao saw: that with the industrialization and the
like things were going to change. For example, he saw the
universities as an alien element so he shuts them down
for two years.
M: So you need the—So what happens? At your suggestion
I read Nisbet's The Quest for Community . And what happens
That is, what do you do consciously—and this is the ques-
tion I'm asking myself—what do you do if you're in a
leadership position to make up for some of this deficit?
There's no religion, as you say. What then is, as you
would call it, the "overarching value?" I don't mean
orientation exercises or large encounter groups.
that the sense of community simply wasn't in the heads
of the leaders of the joint.
M: You know where it was? It was in the Theatre Depart-
ment. That's where you found it. You could find beau-
tiful, intense pockets of it. Really beautiful. They
certainly had the value
,
the central theme that apparently
was a very powerful binding agent. You also found it among
the groups of kids that went on the college— sponsored
trips abroad in Paris or London or the like.
S: Well, yes. When you get in alien territory it has that
effect—but by its very nature a theatrical production,
unless there is some conscious agreement that, regardless
of what we feel about each other, we've got to act towards
each other in certain ways or you're in trouble. The
leadership thing is really in my opinion, you know, cru-
cial. If there's anything that the people who surround
you get very, very quickly is whether you are truly inter-
ested in helping them further their goals. Or do they
exist for you ? Are you approachable, you know, or are you
self-serving?
M: It would almost seem as if you would have to kind of
clone this kind of leader and distribute this around the
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APPENDIX
Interview with Seymour Sarason, January 14, 1980
[The writer began the interview by telling Dr. Sarason
something of his background, leading up to the point of
how he came to be interested in the issue of the sense
of community, particularly on the campus of a small,
private, residential liberal arts college.]
Mandell: In the introduction to your book. The Psycho-
logical Sense of Community
,
you stated that there was a
"vast literature" dealing with this topic. But I soon
discovered that to find this material I couldn’t get any
results by looking for an indexed reference to "sense of
community .
"
Sarason: No, no
—
you get it in the utopian literature
—
like The Idea of Fraternity in America . You never get it
under that. It's like the "creation of settings"—you’re
not going to find anything like that; you'll go stark
raving mad.
M: Let me ask you. Have you read Glynn's dissertation?
It's the only piece that I could find that deals directly
with
—
391
392
S: The one from Catholic University? Yes, he sent me
a copy.
M: Well, he says very quickly in the beginning that you
added the word "psychological" to the expression "sense of
community" as a kind of "refinement" of the term.
Originally, when I thought about this, I thought it was
kind of a redundancy—or that maybe you had something
in mind that I was not grasping. I do use your term and
I assume the literature has adopted it.
S: Frankly, I think it is_ redundant, you see. And if
you were to ask me why— I added "psychological"— I couldn’t
answer you—well—except that, well, for an audience of
psychologists if the word "psychology" isn’t in there—
I
mean they’re not likely to, you know, pay attention to it.
And I think I don't have— I really think it's redundant.
And I remember that, in fact, it bothered me a little bit.
M: Well, I think you’ve added a little rhythm; "psycho-
logical" adds a lot more flow. I think it will stick.
It'll become a descriptor. Seriously, though, I wanted to
ask you—what do you think of the idea of the campus as a
community ?
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S: It's a microcosm. You see, you can talk of a psycho-
logical sense of community on a continuum in terms of
geography, of an institution, or of an agency. You can
talk about the college, for example, as a community and
what are the ways in which the college works for or
against that sense of community so that people within it
have that sense of belonging, the sense of wanting to
belong, the sense of a kind of protection of a sort. In
the case of a setting like the college, however, I would
argue that that sense of community, in part, is a func-
tion of how that setting relates to the larger geographical
setting in which it is embedded. At some point that be-
comes a factor, a factor which can make for a better
sense of community. In other words, an adversarial—You
can have a sense of community at the college and not have
any sense of community with what surrounds the college.
So that if you have town-gown relationships—you know,
conflicts—in effect it can give you the feeling—But
in terms of the welfare of the system, the viability of an
institution over time, that is always related to how it
as an institution relates to the surrounding community.
[For the next several minutes the writer related to Dr.
Sarason some of the early problems that he, as a new dean,
encountered with the surrounding community, particularly
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about one example in which newcomers in the town organized
a protest in which one of the issues was the accusation
that the college had no sense of community, etc. The
writer then went on to explain some of the rifts and ten-
sions in the internal life of the college which were
splitting the community
. For example, there was in evidence
a definite split within the institution regarding the
faculty’s and administration’s perceptions of what kind of
institution of learning should Windham College be, and what
kind of student should it be avoiding or attracting.
Finally, the writer came around to the question of the role
of a dean of students.]
M: I’ll be attempting to develop in my dissertation the
model of the dean of students as a community psychologist.
Does that make any sense to you?
S: You know, that makes sense. You see, if you go back
to the Creating of Settings
,
one of the most important
chapters, from my standpoint, in the book is "The Sociali-
zation of the Leader." You know, the dean of students is
a leader, or at least is perceived as that by different
segments of the community. And so one has to ask how does
the leader conceive of himself in relation to the goals of
the institution? And does he see it as one in which he or
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she, so to speak, acquires status, prestige, power or
what have you, or is it to help others do what they want
to do and is it one where you want to give a group of
individuals some sense of interdependence and interneed,
you see. And if it isn’t in your head then you don’t do
these things.
[The interviewer responded to the last remark by describ-
ing an instance in which he, as the dean of students, came
into conflict with the campus psychologist who was direc-
tor of counseling at the college. The psychologist had
requested that the dean remove from the campus a coed who
had been diagnosed by the psychologist as a schizophrenic
who he believed would be a disturbance because of her
bizarre behavior and suicidal tendencies. The dean suc-
ceeded in convincing the president to support his refusal
to evict the student from the dormitory. The idea was to
attempt to see if some sort of support system would emerge
on her wing of the dormitory. It was related that a group
of residents who lived on her floor did succeed in develop-
ing a system of support that helped minimize the risks
and allowed her to complete her academic year without
interruption. Dr. Sarason then continued.]
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S: That's a very, very good instance, you know, of sev-
eral things. One thing is that the student was embedded
in a network of relationships. And your job was to find
out whether it was working for or against her. Was it
supportive? Was it isolating, or what-the-hell was it?
And the decision what to do with her was going to depend
upon that network of relationships and whether it had
aspects for her as well as for others of some sense of
community. And that's a very good example of that.
That's the difference in thinking in terms of an individual
psychology as against thinking in terms of a community psy-
chology. Let me give you an analogical example to that.
When Medicare was first established in '65 or ' 66
,
every
financial incentive in Medicare was to place older people
in nursing homes. There wasn't any financial incentive
to keep them home. OK? I mean it was disastrous! You
know, the idea of looking at what are the existing sup-
ports, what incentives are there in that context that are
helpful? It wasn't informed by any of this kind of think-
ing. I mean the prepotent tendency is to segregate. OK?
And, so that psychologist, no less than you, had some sense
of obligation. But, where the two of you departed was
that you didn't see this as a decision that should be made
about her without taking into account what was the nature of
support; did she live in any kind of a community that would
or could accept responsibility to be helpful.
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M: And, we also, I thought, owed that to the community
as well as to the student.
S: Well, that’s another way you can put it. Sure.
[The writer went on to describe how his continuing antago-
nism with the psychologist at Windham College around the
issue of individual treatment versus total community aware-
ness led him to first consider the significance of the
topic under consideration. Finally, he bluntly told Dr.
Sarason that one of the reasons he came to him was to
receive some reinforcement from him regarding pursuit of
this study
.
]
M: I think it's going to work. The interesting thing
about it is how it all seems to be coming together as I
read the kind of material you are writing.
S: There are some other things that I've written. There's
a book I wrote called Work, Aging and Social Change--which
is not about old people—it's about people like you or me
—with the subtitle Professionals and the One Life-One Car -
eer Imperative . In the one life-one career imperative so-
ciety says to us "Here is a smorgasbord of opportunities.
Choose the one dish that you are going to work at for the
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rest of your life." And that imperative is on a collision
course with the criterion of growth as a basis for, you
know—And so the book really is about professionals because
it isn’t the whole business of career change and the
dynamics of it. You know, it isn’t only the factory worker
on the assembly line in Detroit who’s got the problem;
it’s now right on through. You see, in one of the chap-
ters I discuss the relationship between one's experience
of working one's experience of a sense of community inward.
You cannot separate the two.
M: Dr. Sarason, it struck me when I went back and re-read
Settings that although you were really driving at the idea
of sense of community you didn't actually use the words
and
—
S: No— I probably used them—but I know that's what I was
describing—when I was describing the Yale Psycho-educa-
tional Clinic and the like. It’s very interesting. I
recently got a call from somebody who was at the clinic.
(This goes back to 1967 or '68. He's at another univer-
sity now.) He calls me up and says I'd like to come and
talk to you because I haven't been thinking since I left
the clinic. And that's been the experience of people. I
mean it was a kind of—And that was one reason why I
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started it. I wanted my own family. You don't have this
in a university. Let me explain something. If you want
to understand the university, especially places like Yale,
you've got to ask two questions. if you want to under-
stand why a sense of community is a very thin thing at a
university, you've got to ask two questions: Who tries
to make it at a university, and whom does the university
select? The answer to both questions is rugged individ-
ualism. So you have a selection process whereby you bring
in ambitious, assertive prima donnas and then you wonder
why they can't work with each other! The university is
marvelous for individuals!
M: I think I also have to talk about the university; I
just don't want to write about the small college. I'll
try to make some implications—because I believe there are
some. You've spoken a number of times about the smaller
community within the larger community. I remember visiting
one of those high-rise dormitories at U. Mass. And I
found—at least among the students on each floor—well of
course I suppose the whole thing was a kind of alienation
culture—but each floor seemed to have had a tremendous
sense of community; students would return the following
year to that same floor! And Windham sold itself as a
small private college where you would get to know every-
body, but there was a kind of coldness that its students
experienced there. So that the idea of size— uh
S: You're right
—
M: Small size does not guarantee—Two things being equal,
yes, the smaller the easier. Have you found the same
thing— that the size does not guarantee the sense of com-
munity at all?
S: Yeah. I think it's oversimplifying
—
M: The faculty at the college, for example, were heavily
into their own private rural lives and—uh
—
S: Why did the college fail?
M: That's a good question. But I'm not setting up any
hypothesis here to the effect that the lack of sense of
community— They will tell you that it was a financial
crisis, that they over-built and over-extended themselves
in the sixties, that they built a huge campus designed by
a prominent architect and the indebtedness could not con-
tinue to be supported after the era of the military draft
had passed, and so forth. You know, "mismanagement"
whatever that means. But basically, no endowment, no
alumni support, no
—
S: And that seems to confirm everything I said in the
chapter on "Buildings as Distractions." The sense of
community enters in the sense that it never really was
high on the priorities; I mean other things took prece-
dence over it. You know, they were after instant, you
know, legitimation; they were going to become another
Middlebury. They put themselves on the treadmill of
building and image. Their orientation was "How was the
outside going to look at us?" not "How do we want to
live?" I mean, for example, at the clinic we had a rule:
we would never have more people at the clinic than could
sit around that table--which meant around eighteen or
twenty people— or we could crowd a few more in— come what
may
.
M: You know, when the college started out it was located
throughout the village in the old buildings and
—
S: Look. Let me give you another— If you go back and
read over the cultural revolution in China and then what's
happening in Iran--. Maybe Iran is—
.
It is an anti-
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western sentiment that says "We want to live the way
we’re living. We want-.'- You know, it's interesting.
A friend of mine who is Israeli and teaches at the Uni-
versity of Hartford, said to me years ago, he said "You
people just don't understand what is the most important
thing that really is in the world: it's religion." And,
you know to us who are no longer religious—we can't under-
stand the way in which religion organizes community and
the sense of community that it provides you. So, you know
the Iranians, and the Moslem world generally, says "We
don't want the Western World." And this is the problem
that Mao saw: that with the industrialization and the
like things were going to change. For example, he saw the
universities as an alien element so he shuts them down
for two years
.
M: So you need the— So what happens? At your suggestion
I read Nisbet's The Quest for Community
. And what happens?
That is, what do you do consciously—and this is the ques-
tion I'm asking myself—what do you do if you're in a
leadership position to make up for some of this deficit?
There's no religion, as you say. What then is, as you
would call it, the "overarching value?" I don't mean
orientation exercises or large encounter groups.
S: The leader is the model for what he wants other people
to do. OK? And if the sense of community is something
that he not only believes in but somehow in diverse ways
shows up in what you do and what you say, that becomes
influential.
M: Well what happens if you're only the dean and not the
leader, so to speak? I guess then it’s your job to
influence the president. Although in Settings you were
describing the creation of new settings. I derived much
from the book because I was reading into it that the
same principles can apply to older institutions that bring
in new leaders. In a sense the trustees are hoping and
praying that a new setting, so to speak, will be created.
S: Oh, yes, I agree.
M. One example that comes to mind. There was no faculty
lounge. Again, not coming from a theory, but just coming
from where my gut was, I tried to influence the president
into creating a lounge out of one of the more central,
larger classrooms. There was some resistance, but
—
S: Look, the more you talk about the place the more I see
that the sense of community simply wasn't in the heads
Of the leaders of the joint.
M: You know where it was? It was in the Theatre Depart-
ment. That'S where you found it. You could find beau-
tiful, intense pockets of it. Really beautiful. They
certainly had the value
,
the central theme that apparently
was a very powerful binding agent. You also found it among
the groups of kids that went on the college-sponsored
trips abroad in Paris or London or the like.
S: Well, yes. When you get in alien territory it has that
effect but by its very nature a theatrical production,
unless there is some conscious agreement that, regardless
of what we feel about each other, we've got to act towards
each other in certain ways or you’re in trouble. The
leadership thing is really in my opinion, you know, cru-
cial. If there’s anything that the people who surround
you get very, very quickly is whether you are truly inter-
ested in helping them further their goals. Or do they
exist for you ? Are you approachable, you know, or are you
self-serving?
M: It would almost seem as if you would have to kind of
clone this kind of leader and distribute this around the
university. Like in the therapeutic milieu you have to
hire all personnel very carefully with this in mind.
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S: Yes. If the president, when he does his selections,
doesn’t look for this
—
M: It’s like you’ve got to select the janitor in the same
way that you would select the teacher or the counselor,
and so forth. And boy, the custodial staff can be the
source of a lot of problems of divisiveness.
S: You see, practically everything in our society works
against the development of a sense of community.
M: On the other hand, this sense of community seems to
crop up in a variety of crisis situations, such as a
blizzard or a—an accident that affects a group of stran-
gers. Where does this come from? I mean, do you have to
introduce tensions or states of crisis in an institution
in order to produce this spirit?
S: No, you see, what these kinds of stresses introduce is
that you need each other in a variety of ways. And that
means that other considerations are lower down on your
list of priorities.
H06
M: X believe you say in one of your books, that at best
this sense of community is a "transient experience."
S: In our society, yes. But not in the so-called primi-
tive societies.
M: But how about in the settings that you created.
*
Was it transient then?
S. X don't think that was transient. Though in some
ways things might have gotten more difficult. But we
look back at those times as the "golden age. " But you see
that was one reason I started these; to see if I could
develop this.
M: Had you conceived of it in this way at that time?
S: Yeah, well, it wasn't as clear then as it is now. I
was aware that--uh— You know, incidentally, a former
student of mine [S walks toward his desk, picks up a typed
paper and brings it back to his chair.] sent me this paper
to react to. Read the abstract. [It was about "teacher
burn-out" being a function of the lack of a sense of com-
munity in a particular school.] It's a paper he's going to
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give at some convention. He happened to teach for several
years at Harvard; he knows whereof he talks!
M: Hopefully, there’s a whole bunch of these people that
you sent out into the world.
S: Incidentally, my wife, sometimes I, likes to look at
the Waltons on TV. And of course a lot of people do. Now
what happens? Aside from the fairy tale happy endings
there 'is something more. There is almost an envy in the
sense of belongingness and obligation to each and every
member of that family.
M: My God! I just mentally made a catalog of all the
successful situation shows. My God, of course! They’re
all based on that formula!
S: I'm sure it's one of the elements that accounts for the
universal success of Thornton Wilder's Our Town .
M: How about too much community? Is there such a thing?
How about Guyana?
S: Well—well
—
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M: That's a terrible example of the extreme case of the
negation of the individual, of total selflessness—of
S: That's one though where it was manipulated—where the
leader arrogated to himself the privileges and might.
How ghastly!
Y
M: But, if I were to follow through on the definitions and
everything and look at the situation as a sociologist
might
—
S: Oh, they definitely had a sense of community
—
just
like the PLO does!
M: So that PSC in itself doesn't necessarily have a posi-
tive value. It depends upon its uses. When you talk about
"manipulation" if we consciously strive to accomplish our
goal and we say this or do that you can say that we are
manipulating.
S: Yup
.
M: Hopefully we don't get carried away with our own
—
S: --sense of
—
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M:
-importance or missionary zeal. And I think I have
to talk about this. The need for privacy and the protec-
tion of the individual.
Yeah and there is, when you say "too much," there is a
tension between the needs of the individual and the larger
community of which he is a part. That tension is not in
and of itself bad. It's the degree to which it gets
resolved [Tape ends.] [Continuing from an off-the-tape
discussion]
. . . and you should take a closer look at the
concept of resource exchange. This idea comes right out
of the sense of community. You read Human Services and
Resource Networks but look at my last book. The Challenges
of the Resource Exchange Networks
. And that gets to it in
a different way.
M: I’m intrigued with the idea that you would include a
dyad, that is a married couple within your basic defini-
tion of a setting, when you talk about—what is it—a—oh
yeah: at least two or more people who are in a sustained
relationship— for some— for a common objective or goal.
I'm intrigued because when I look at the concept of com-
munity I'd like to start with, you know, a look at mar-
riage, and—er— taking your definition of a sense of comm
—
And yet even with two people there’s no guarantee. That's
the incredible
— It’ s so easy to assume—We can say "There
are just too many people here—we Just can't have a sense
of community." And on the other end of that assumption
is that "just you and I—naturally we can easily be a
community"—but not so. Probably—
S: It’s the family, don't you see? That's why I brought
up the Waltons.
M. Yes, I can see that the family is the model for which
we're striving but even families don't work out. Oh, I
see that our hour is just about up. But I just want to
ask you about something you said: [Heading from page 255
(197^] "We have a plethora of anecdotes and case histo-
ries, but these invariably tell us more about the change
agent than about schools." What did you mean by that?
S: Yeah, when you read The Culture of the School you'll
see that what I mean is, that is, one of the points I
make there is that it is not surprising— remember, this
was in the context of all those efforts to change schools
in the sixties and early seventies— I said it is not sur-
prising if people who are outside of the schools and want
to change them turn out really not to understand the cul-
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ture of the school. Alright? However, it should be
understood that many of the people within schools who are
out to change schools
—
they don’t know their own culture
either! So what you get are many reports about efforts
for change which tell you much more about—uh— the "change
agent"—a term I hate—well, than it does about the cul-
ture of the school.
M: Well, how many of us actually think about the culture
of a school?
S: Right, we don’t. Now let me just— to—uh— . This
will tell you why I think schools will never be much dif-
ferent than they are; why they’ll never really move; why
they will never really move in the direction that people
say they want to go. If you were to ask university pro-
fessors how do you justify the university, the answer in
*
one way or another is that the university is a place where
the conditions are created whereby the faculty can learn,
change and grow. In fact, you can have a university with-
out students. And unless those conditions exist, it’s
going to be a lousy joint. Now if you were to ask teach-
ers— say elementary teachers— to justify the existence of
the elementary school, the answer is always going to be
"It's a place for kids." You cannot create the conditions
*U2
of learning and changing and growing unless you see that
identity^—that not everything is for the kids. But what
we’re bypassing is that we’re not making conditions that
can help the teachers grow and change.
M: The chairman of my dissertation committee, John Wide-
man, who took his doctorate from Harvard, invented a term,
"reflexive incoherence," to describe a learning situation
—in this case a counselor training program—in which the
culture of the school
,
itself, to borrow your term, did
not provide a good model of counseling. In other words
there was no internal coherence, even though they were
putting out counselors.
S: They had a product— they had a product.
[End of interview]
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